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ABSTRACT
The objectives of this study are first, to discover 
the factors influencing voting behavior in Louisiana during 
the period of 1812 to 1952 and in particular to analyse In­
fluences inherent of the processes of social differentiation 
and stratification; second, to inquire whether political ten­
dencies present in certain "crucial" elections represent 
deep-seated Interests and social cleavages; third, to charac­
terise persistent "climates1* of political opinion through 
demonstration of the relation between regional and class 
factors in voting behavior; fourth, to ascertain whether 
regularities in deviations from basic tendencies correlate 
with stability of geographic patterns of voting behavior; 
fifth, to search for continuity of basic political tendencies 
in situations of change*
The method used is the ecological analysis and com­
parison of election returns and sociological factors. A 
series of map diagrams are presented showing the geographical 
distribution of the vote in gubernatorial and presidential 
elections- In some cases findings were tested by correla­
tion methods.
The results show that analysis of Louisiana politics
x
through political ecology can be extremely useful. Whereas 
class factors were always important, basic cleavages appear 
more striking when social groupings are studied In geographi- 
cal distribution. Groups of influence —  sugar and cotton 
planters of south and north Louisiana, in alliance with com­
mercial interests —  were opposed by groups of number —  
farmers of hill parishes and bayou country and city laborers. 
Despite Whig or Democrat labels, Louisiana politics before 
the Civil War was dedicated to the furtherance of a planter 
aristocracy. In political struggles of Reconstruction this 
basic pattern of voting cleavage remained, only now former 
slaves voted in number. White farmer joined Bourbon planter 
and merchant in successful assertion of "White Supremacy" 
through the Democratic Party. Solidarity displayed in the 
vote of the hill farmers on this issue was carried over to 
more basic economic problems, but the Bourbon "climate" of 
opinion disallowed deviation. After the Populist movement 
was frustrated, Negro and poor white alike were disenfran­
chised in 1898 and Louisiana commenced the Twentieth Century 
with minority representation and with an economically deprived 
lower class. Gne-party politics was in reality a dominating 
"group" politics, upset only by the advent of Longism which 
brought a balance to political forces. Leading tendencies 
and persistent opinion were found in the distribution of vot­
ing support of pro and apt! Long factions, which in recent
xi
years have paralleled Democratic and Bepubltcan party expres­
sions. %  1952 Influences of industrialization and urbaniza­
tion had created a new base for social stratification, and 
with Negroes voting again, Louisiana politics was more 
representative of all elements of society# Two-party politics 
existed in fact if not in name#
The significance of this study lies in systematic 
analysis of election returns for over one hundred years# It 
has discovered political tendencies of long duration and has 
presented an evaluation of factors motivating Louisiana 
political behavior# Such a study contributes to the empirical 
foundations from which generalisations may be drawn in the 
field of political sociology#
xll
CHAPTER I
POLITICAL ECOLOGY; METHODOLOGY AND CERTAIN PROBLEMS
If sociology be regarded as the study of social action, 
then most certainly political action Is an Important field of 
investigation for the sociologist. And as in the general 
field, it is essential that a methodology be developed, that 
the scholar wed conceptual schemes with research tools. For 
political sociology, the techniques of political ecology have 
been devised.
^One of the main concerns of political sociology Is 
the study of the interrelationships between political tendon*
tlon of political attitudes affords the opportunity for 
answering the question of who votes for what and why. Since 
the utilization of quantitative methods is desirable, it has 
been found fruitful to focus attention upon analysis of elec­
tion returns. We proceed on the assumption that in our 
political system an analysis of the geographical distribution 
of support for a party or candidate enables us to find out 
what classes and categories of voters make up that support,
1B. Beberle, Social Movementst £n Introduction to 
Political Sociology (New Yorks Appleton-Century-Crorts, Inc. 
1951)7
1
cles, movements, and parties, and social
2It has also been suggested that such analysis leads to a more 
complete understanding of the fundamental processes of social 
integration or disintegration*2
She political ecologist attempts to explain the politic 
cal behavior of the people in a given area through inquiry 
into the factors which may Influence voting* By correlating 
significant indices of social characteristics with election 
returns, we can ascertain the actual interests and predispo- 
sitlons which are present in an area as well as the cleavages 
which are reflected in the voting*
The method of political ecology consists primarily in 
the comparison of election returns in small areas and in cor­
relating the differences between voting behavior in these 
areas to differences in the social stratification* The geo­
graphic characteristics of an area are influential in the 
development of a particular economy which In turn determines 
the objective class structure, and ultimately, political ten-
their political attitudes by their "life chances” in Max 
Weber*s sense, or more precisely* by their interpretation of 
the conditions and Interests of their own social class*)
The continental scholar most influential in the devel­
opment of the theory and techniques of political ecology, or
2r . Heberle, ”0n Political Ecology,” Social Forces* 
Vol. 31t No. 1 (1952).
^Heberle, Social Movements, pp. 312-211*.
assumption is that people are influenced in
*i»t he calls the saMXmMlB d£ 1» opinion polltlane. Is Andre 
Siegfried. His interest In the subject came from his obser- 
rations of the astounding consistencies in political opinion 
In areas of France, despite the well-known instability of 
political parties* He was moved to seek the geographic and 
social factors which contribute to this apparently underlying 
stability* More recently, Kudolf Heberle has made a compre- 
hensive study of a region in Germany applying the techniques 
developed by Siegfried with the addition of more refined 
statistical methods*^
In this country, the foremost exponents of quantita­
tive and regional studies of a more or less ecological nature
have been: A* N. Holcombe, Stuart Bice, George Lundberg,
£
Harold Gosnell, V* 0. Key, Jr., and Samuel Lubell* In gen­
eral the work of these men has emphasised the regional (geo­
graphic), or the statistical approach, or a combination of
^Andre Siegfried,
11 cue (Parist Ansand Colin, 19^ *7).
5r . Heberle, From Deaoeraoy Jjo Jfaaism (Baton Rouges 
Louisiana State University Press, I9**5) •
^Arthur N. Holcombe, 2he Political EaJfttSE jof 2
(New forki Harper and Bros., 192^): Stuart Bice. Qmntltative 
Methods in Politics (New York! A. A. Knopf. 1928)5 George 
Lundberg, "The Geographic and Economic Basis of Political 
Radicalism and Conservatism,'1 American &L l&gisl&gY,
Vol. XXXII (1927)5 Harold F. Gosnell, Grass Boots Politics 
(Washington, D.C*, American 19*2)$
radT. 0.K e y , Knopf; 
19^9); S. Lubell. The Future of American Politics (New York* 
Harper & Bros*, 1951)*
kboth* The work of Lubell suggests what may be accomplished 
from a skillful interpretation of voting statistics coupled 
with a general knowledge of the characteristics of various 
areas and groupings.
A veritable "school" of political ecology has been 
developed in France since the end of the last World War? 
most of these have been the students of, or have been influ­
enced by, Siegfried* A series of studies have been published 
by the national Foundation of Political Sciences Which are 
ecological in nature and are described by the term sociologie 
electorale.? These scholars do not pretend that the increase 
ing number of monographs on the electoral sociology of dif­
ferent regions of France makes possible at this time the 
statement of general laws concerning the determination of 
political opinions by specific factors; their knowledge is as 
yet too fragmentary* It Is possible, however, to engage in 
certain comparisons, surely the way to generalisations, and 
to make some reflections on the nature of the existence be­
tween given social and political phenomena.
The term soclologle electorale has likewise been 
adopted by the Norwegian political scientist, Sten S, Nilson, 
who has published the first comprehensive treatise on the
7P. Ooguel and 3. Dupeux, Soololpgie Electorale:
Sfi.aalgae IV.Sn S U M , S a U A  Mjtefitoa (Cabiers de la Fonda 
tion Nationals des Sciences Polltiques, No. 26. Paris, 
Araand Colin, 1951).
9subject#® the value of this work lies in bringing together 
both European and American findings and the drawing of com­
parisons between the various studies# M l  son provides a 
thorough review of the literature concerned with application 
of quantitative methods to political behavior# He suggests 
that a comparative political ecology may be developed#
In the attempt to abstract general "principles'1 of 
political ecology, some amount of discussion has centered 
about the charge that the "ecologist** may be guilty of being 
a geographic determinlst# Such is not the ease, for as 
Heberle has pointed out,^ the implications of a schema such 
as found in Siegfried's Ardeche study are not that geographic 
(or even geological) conditions determine the political be­
havior of the people of an area, but that geographic or geo­
logic zones tend to correspond to politically relevant zones• 
Heberle goes on to say that f(«..ln this h© is quit® justified, 
because it is perfectly amazing to see these correspondences
even in regions where the geological structure is as incon-
10splcuous —  for the layman, at least —  as in Louisiana."
The point is that the physical landscape Is there to be used, 
and that the way in which men utilize a particular natural
8S. Nilson, Hlatolra &  ficjfiMfla £flUA&flaga (Bergen,
1950).
Heberle, "Principles of Political Ecology," 
Sozlalf^r^ung in m&BZSZ l M £  1l< m i
*°Heberle, Principles, pp, 192-193.
6environment depends in large measure on their system of 
values
{Louisiana appears particularly amenable to an appli­
cation of the techniques of political ecology for two reasons. 
In the first place, although Louisiana has been a "one-party 
state," at least since 1900, the Democratic party contains 
quite well-defined factions representing the Interests of 
various elements of the population* Secondly, the state may 
be divided into definable sub-regions on the basis of socio­
economic , cultural, geographic, and even geologic indices*) 
Much has been written concerning Louisiana politics, but we 
gain from this literature little understanding of the ecologi­
cal conditions of political life* Louisiana politics become 
intelligible by analysis of the social forces behind the fac­
tions and by the demonstration of the tendencies which the 
factions represent*
The present study has been undertaken to meet certain 
problems encountered in an earlier attempt at determining the 
political ecology of Louisiana[The examination of voting 
behavior in "crucial" elections in Louisiana (Secession in 
l86lf Populism in 1896, Socialism in 1912, and the vote for 
Huey Long in 1928) suggested that the events of the past most
11 w. Flrey, Land fias. tofiantei SmSUB (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1947)«
12P. Howard, toft foltotofll ESS&m. St LffiltoMM («£> 
published Hester’s thesis, Louisiana State university, 1951)*
7certainly influenced the present, let, the need had been 
felt to check generalisations made for different periods in 
regard to the possible continuity of basic behavioral tenden­
cies and the Influence of cumulative experiences.
A growing body of empirically derived data established 
through ecological analysis of political behavior has made it 
practical, if not necessary, to re-examine the generalisa­
tions being made concerning Louisiana p o l i t i e s , ^  (investi­
gations, quite legitimately, focused upon certain problems 
(such as support of the Long faction) and specific periods 
(such as the 1890fs when Populism appeared in Louisiana) 
with the intention of bringing understanding to political 
processes, the careers of politicians, and the voting behavior
of classes within the electorate#)
Analysis utilizing the methodology of political 
ecology has shown that a "one-party1* state is amenable to 
quantitative study. Factions within, as well as deviations 
from, the Democratic Party stemmed from definite elements 
within the social structure of Louisiana society# [ Evidence 
suggested that within the rural population two divergent
Heberle and A, Bertrand, "Factors Motivating Vot­
ing Behavior in a One-Party State," Social Forces, Vol, 27,
Quarterly, vol, ajuuii My?!)} r. nowara, "voting oenavn 
in Baton R o u g e Proceedings of the Louisiana Academy of 
Sciences (1952),
3groups, planters and farmers, displayed a long-time continuity 
©f social and political antagonism* The phenomenon of Loagism 
was believed to have emerged from this traditional cleavage# 
Within the urban areas of the state there appeared to be the 
beginnings of another political cleavage, ^The older commer­
cial layer of the city populations allied themselves with the 
planter class, i How, an increasing urban-industriallzation 
was producing a growing differential between middle and work­
ing classes. Evidence was found of a correspondence of fac­
tional cleavages to nationwide (party) cleavages. The apparent 
consistency in the continuity of geographic distribution of 
the support of various parties and factions indicated that 
the voting behavior of sub-regions of the state manifested 
the crystallization of antagonistic tendencies in the social 
relationships of divergent groups.
The contention that similarities in voting tendencies, 
found for specific "crucial” elections, of necessity demon­
strated the existence of a continuity of basic influences 
might be seriously challenged. The investigator did not show 
what voting behavior may have been manifested In the periods 
between the key elections* Furthermore, the very choice of 
"crucial” elections might be biased by value judgment or a 
superficial interpretation of historical events* The present 
study therefore proposes to examine Louisiana politics in his­
torical depth. The theme may be stated thus! the search for 
basic political tendencies in situations of change#
9This study will begin with an investigation of the 
interrelationships of ecological factors and social values 
of the people of Louisiana before the Civil War* ^The attempt 
will be made to demonstrate how Louisiana colonial experience 
Influenced the early days of statehood and the development 
of Louisiana political parties*) After showing how the in­
strument of government was established in 1812 and manned 
through electoral choice, |th® success or failure of Whig and 
Democratic party will be traced* Finally, with the discov­
ery of the leading political tendencies of the period, an 
evaluation will be made concerning the influences 'which led 
to the tragedy of Secession.
Chapter III will provide a fresh view of the period 
of Reconstruction, tracing political developments from l86*f 
through 1900# The focus of attention will be placed upon the 
voter support of the various factions and parties which en­
gaged in the political struggle for power during these decades. 
Of special concern will be the attempt to discover the pres­
ence of social cleavages and experiences which may provide
\
evidence of continuity In basic political tendencies*)
(in the fourth chapter, the problem is one of putting 
the phenomenon of Longism In proper perspective, to ascer­
tain whether the political maneuvering in the years before 
1900 which gave rise to ”one~party politics’* guaranteed the 
potential rise of a leader such as Kuey Long* SSmphasia will 
highlight social conditions rather than the influence of
10
personality and individual activities.
Chapter V provides an analysis of the most recent elec­
tions in Louisiana, Here the purpose is to discover how much 
of the experiences and tendencies of th© past are still in­
fluent ial in Louisiana political life and will channel the 
voting behavior of the future. At the same time changes and 
the appearance of new factors will be noted.
Finally, Chapter VI will present a brief evaluation 
of the entire study, citing what generalizations appear 
feasible concerning Louisiana politics.
CHAPTER II
LOUISIANA EXPERIENCES REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
•Of forms of government in which one rules, 
we eall that which regards the common interests, 
kingship or royalty; that in which more than 
one, hut not many, rule, aristocracy; and it is 
so called either because the rulers are the best 
men, or because they have at heart the best in­
terests of the state and of the citizens. But 
when the citizens at large administer the state 
for the common interest, the government is 
called •••a constitution.**
Aristotle
a. coioaiai J&& Baatag ol j&a fimaddr
tutlon of 1812. (in the only early ‘•ecological11 study of 
Louisiana politics,* Greer asserted that the social and In­
dustrial activities of Louisiana were influenced by two fac­
tors, topographical and geographical conditions, and the 
nature and diversity of the population. \ If one can find In­
terests requiring different policies, then he has found potent 
elements in the determination of political choices.
Louisiana was obviously a land of economic and, hence, 
political differences. In simple terras of agricultural pro­
duction —  which became Louisiana*s economic lifeblood --
*J. K. Greer. "Louisiana Politics, 1830-1861," Louial
a m  Historical Quarterly. Vol. XII, XIII, MMfcn.
12
there was cotton, a natural staple, and sugar, an artificial 
one. Here was an assertion of simple economic necessity 
leading to political organisation* ( Norton has written that 
"sugar could not be produced in Louisiana without the active 
protection ©f the central government, and the realisation 
that this m s  an Inexorable fact made the sugar growers al­
most without exception National Republicans, and later Whigs.”2
That, up until 182^, no political party per se was or­
ganised does not invalidate the thesis. It must always be 
remembered that Louisiana emerged a United State In one day. 
Her citizens had had no past experience with political repre­
sentation, and the subsequent development of political parties 
and factions within the state speaks well of her successful 
adaptation to republican government. When it became neces­
sary to organize politically In order to seek and gain the 
support and well being of her interests, developed in colonial 
status under French and Spanish dominion, Louisiana emerged 
as a copy in miniature of national political processes.
It is against a background of colonial experience that 
the subsequent political processes of Louisiana, the state, 
must be viewed. When Louisiana entered the Union, her con­
stitutional framers met peculiar difficulties in establishing 
the instrument of a democratic form of government among a
2L. M. Norton. A History s£ MLg £S£iZ In fefflAffitoa 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 
19M)).
13
people devoid of past polities! experience of such a nature* 
(Louisiana's early political development differed from 
that of other American states. Her colonial experience was 
gained under French, rather than English, influences*^ For 
a short period France had ceded Louisiana to Spain* The 
colonists had resented the Spanish transfer, and Spain’s rule 
left little Influence. As a Boyal Colony, the laws govern­
ing Louisiana emanated directly from France* Her laws were 
Louisiana law; particularly, the Custom of Paris became the 
local law of the colony* (Present day civil law doctrine of 
the state, in large part, stems from the experiences under 
this arrangement. Under France and Spain, then, the Louisi­
ana colonists were politically passive* They did not partici­
pate in civil administration to any extent, and apparently 
they were satisfied with the generally kind paternalism of 
their rulers*
Although extending for only sixty-seven years, French 
rule left the lasting mark, influencing the institutions and 
the attitudes of the people.) Later Anglo-Saxon infusion ’’has
3m . Evans, a Stndy la £tgj& tfapxmgfl.lt 4fl IfiflM- 
ana (Baton Rouges Louisiana State University Press, 1931)•
Mr. Evans divided Louisiana political history before 1812 into 
three main periods with the following divisionss
Under France
1699-1712 Royal Colony 
1712-1731 Charter Colony 
1731-1769 Royal Colony 
Under Spain 
1769-1803 
Territory of U* S*
1803-1812
Ik
never been powerful enough to displace, but only to modify, 
the basic Latin institutions*1 ** (under the Enabling Act of 
18U, the United States Congress allowed the Territory of 
Louisiana to call a convention and frame a constitution, that 
she might become one of the United States* How different an
occasion than the convention which had met on an earlier date
\
at Philadelphia! i
Usually, a constitution has a gradual development, 
the product of the progression or retrogression of the com­
munity.^ The majority of the original thirteen American 
colonies had experienced Anglo-Saxon Influences* The colon­
ists revolted against oppression tinder the prevalent political 
system, not against its common law traditions. In the fram­
ing of the American Constitution there was little which was
z
new in it, if there was much which was debatable. In Louisi­
ana the people had no such continuity of experience which 
might be articulated In an instrument of government. The dif­
ferences in the social structure and in the cumulative experi­
ence between Louisiana and the thirteen original states are 
apparent when their constitutions are compared. Hot only was 
the political experience vastly different, there was also a
4bld.. p. 12.
5W. Dart, ed., Constitutions of £h£ State s i Louisiana 
(Indianapolis * i&b'bs*4ft@rril! Co . , 19327 •
67. L. Parrington, Main Streams in American Thought 
(Hew fork* Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1930/ Vol. X, p. 279•
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unity of interests among the politically active which had 
h e m  lacking in the other colonies*
[The royal French colonists had dreams of aristocracy* 
The major problem of Louisiana was to frame a constitution ac­
ceptable to the American Congress, being republican enough to 
satisfy the temper of the time* This becomes clear when the 
office of the governor in the new state of Louisiana is exam­
ined below. (hie student of Louisiana government has aptly 
summarised the differences alluded to above in these wordsi
Louisiana, too, had her symbol of external control, 
but in comparing the formation of her first Constitution 
to that of the revolutionary state constitutions, the 
differences remain more significant than the similarities. 
Of fundamental importance was the lack of a revolutionary 
struggle; no Loulsiananfs blood had been shed in their 
effort to rid themselves of external control# In addi­
tion, there was not the same Internal conflict that had 
expressed Itself in the lively struggle between the 
yeoman class of farmers and the large planters and 
financial interests in the older states*'
Louisiana was an aristocratic society with strong French 
sympathies and, hence, the constitution which was framed ex­
pressed the will of this dominant element of the soolety 
Just as all ensuing constitutions were to express the influ­
ence of some other dominant portion of the citizenry* \
r
The prevailing attitude of this early elite was re­
flected in the pages of the Louisiana fi&gsMa when it .urged 
the convention to adopt a short aristocratic constitution based
7j. v. prothro, a study af S.aaa$i&&la3al fiavatomaa&a 
ifl Ste Office at I&8 M ssaaE 1& toaMaB| (unpublished 
master's theeis, Louisiana State thiiverslty, 1938), p. 30.
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upon a propertied electorate, and which provided for a gov­
ernor not elected by s u f f r a g e (The membership of the con* 
vention was composed of seventeen men of American descent 
and twenty-six of Creole ancestry* Among this elite group 
were three future governors, five future United States 
Senators, one future Congressman, and a future minister to
Q
France* This was to be a convention which would take care 
of its own.
Casting about for models of a constitution suitable
i
to their needs, ^vthe framers decided upon the Kentucky Con­
stitution of 1797* ; It had been written by a similarly con-
/
servative convention with anti-democratic leanings. In most 
cases the Louisiana convention used the exact language of 
this Instrument. The Kentucky Constitution, in turn, had been 
patterned after the Federal document. (But the Louisiana Con­
stitution emerged ultra-conservative and ultra-aristocratic.) 
In studying the origins of this first of Louisiana #s consti­
tutions, Usee concluded that the explanation most warrant­
able "...was that the members of the convention chose the 
Kentucky Constitution as a model because it was the last 
southern constitution to be adopted before 1812, and that they 
believed it contained the provisions which most nearly
S M  Zijesi J m W m m  S M &
£  (unpublished master1® thesis, Louisl-
P* D« Uzee,    _
A m ax alj& a. SiiaAaTunp
ana State University, 193°) P* 30
9Ibld.. p. 15-
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coincided with their needs
f
^The Constitution of 1812 was far from being in aeeord
with the spirit of the American Union. ,M...It had been so
formulated as to satisfy the alien prejudices in favor of
hereditary government existing in the State during its early 
11years.w"  The preamble heralds the aristocratic attitude of 
the convention. It began, MWe the renresentatives of the 
people* and ended with, "do mutually agree with each other 
to form ourselves into a free and independent State.*1* 2
[ Finally, emphasis must be placed upon the provisions 
made concerning the powers of the executive in the first 
Louisiana Constitution, since the present study shall focus 
upon analysis of the electoral support of Louisiana gover­
nors. The framers of the Constitution of 1312 adopted a 
strong executive, an action at variance with the practice of 
the earlier states, who had reason to reject a strong govern­
mental head, /in Louisiana the power of the executive began 
with strength, reflecting the experiences of the past and 
the pervasive unity of the early plantation aristocracy. 
Moreover, a record of the appointive power of the governor 
likewise points up the extent to which the people wished to
10Ibld.. p. 31.
**Evans, op. clt.. p. 33*
^Evans, clt.y p. 283 italicised by Evans.
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delegate authority to the executive#^ (^ Th© document dimin­
ished the absolute appointive power of the governor only to 
senatorial approval, and the elite would provide the member­
ship of the General Assembly, The governor was to be elected 
by the Assembly from the two highest on the list of candi­
dates voted upon lay the people. The voter only indicated 
his preference. The executive was required to be a citlsen 
of the United States, a resident of Louisiana six years, and 
to own taxable property valued at $5,000, Aristocratic, 
indeed i)
b. ufi.li.ste t e  %pMh.ery 2? S m  M & -
aIggy si hmdstem W W m X Easfete* few guber­
natorial elections were in the nature of skirmishes between 
local factions, although cutting across this was the struggle 
for power between French and American# The Florida parishes, 
then four in number, were Joined to Louisiana in the Act of 
Statehood in April, 1812, although these parishes, settled 
by American stock of American experience and Uemocratie in 
politics, had not been represented at the Constitutional con­
vention, The native Louisianan outlook was strange to the 
Americans who migrated in ever increasing number to New 
Orleans, the Florida parishes, and to north Louisiana, It 
is perhaps understandable, in terms of ethnocentrlsm, why the
13B. J. Taylor, Jr., T M  Appointive a M  Bamoval Z2ESZS 
fi£ jjjia Governor fi£ Loulslara (unpublished master»s thesis, 
Louisiana State University, 1935) P- 151-
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issue in these early elections was carried by old Creole 
settlers against American newcomers* "The Frenchman," in 
turn, * .**was looked upon as a Frenchman by the English 
citizen or settler) though he might have been of the same 
political part
The cleavage was not apparent, perhaps, In the first 
gubernatorial election, when the old Territorial Cfovernor, 
Claiborne, was chosen by the assembly over Jacques Villere# 
Probably there was more unity of opinion concerning the per­
formance of this man whom everybody knew, even if there might 
have been some honest differences of opinion regarding cer­
tain of his actions while working for the national govern­
ment* As his term of office drew to a dose, • .it was 
evident he had done a difficult job amazingly well**** He 
had succeeded in winning the admiration of the people and 
had headed them in the direction of successful representative 
government*"*^
In 1816) despite the attempts at keeping nativity out 
of politics, the French-speaking elite had nominated an il­
lustrious son, Villere, while the Americans had backed 
Joshua Lewis. Villere received 2,31*+ votes to 2,1^5 for 
Lewis$ the Florida parishes, predominantly American, gave
*\lreerf &£• clt*, p* 330*
1?0. McGinty, A History of (New Iork»
Exposition Press, 19bDf p. 126*
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Lewis 7**0 votes and Villere 18 votes.^ It had been feared 
that Villere would show partisanship in his appointments, 
hut such was not the case* The Frenchman demonstrated his 
capacity to rule and his aristocratic sense of responsi­
bility in making a sincere effort to heal the breach be­
tween Creole and American*
Thomas Robertson, candidate of the American faction, 
polled the highest vote in a field of four in 1820. The next 
highest vote was cast for the Creole, Peter DerMgny* Louisi­
ana had had her first taste of representative government and 
had found able candidates were not wanting* By 182** the 
people were becoming more vitally interested with national 
issues, finding that there could be a rewarding relationship 
of local with national concerns* Continuance of the Creole- 
American split would remain an influence on Louisiana poli­
ties, but there were other Interests about which to focus 
the political struggle*
Louisiana became a meeting ground of national tenden­
cies in the lSaO’s* A clarity of interests and party sup­
port might be observed resulting from that emerging structure, 
the plantation economy* Ultimately, the Interests of sugar 
and cotton country might be the same; but since the cotton 
planter was a more recent arrival on the Louisiana scene, he 
had brought with him a political preference for the
l6Ibid„. p. 127.
£1
Democratic party. Up until the early thirties the great 
national parties were the National Federalists and the Jef­
fersonian Democrats, ihe program of the former found sym­
pathetic support from "native" Louisianans, the sugar planters 
and the attendant commercial Interests of the city. The 
simple process of migration was bringing to Louisiana ever 
increasing numbers of backwoods Democrats, from the same 
stream as the cotton planters, but arrived too late and not 
so fortunate.
Though in the following decade the party labels changed, 
the two basically different views of the ends of government 
remained. The Whigs of Adams and Clay lined up against the 
Jacksonian Democrats. The Whig program envisaged the state 
as the originator of ambitious programs of internal improve­
ments whereas the Jacksonians wanted the state kept simple 
and frugal. The middle class Whiggery of Clay represented 
the Influence of the maturing settlement, while Jaeksonianism 
was of the frontier —  coonskin Individualism with its simple 
agrarian lalssea fair..17
The South was the heir to the Democratic Party. But 
behind the label it was a party divided against itselfj un­
fortunately, in retrospect, the Democrats became split on 
principle. Failure to look behind the label of the party of
^Parrington, on. clt.. Vol. II, pp. 13Q-139•
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traditional choice was costly* Since the Democrats of the 
South also were the party of numbers, when the time came to 
stand up and be counted, Secession was inevitable* the in* 
telleetu&l leaders of the two streams of thought were Jeffer­
son and Calhoun* "The contrast In their philosophies — * the 
rejection by the latter of equalitarlan idealism, and the 
substitution of economic realism —  mark the diverse tendon- 
cies which in the end disrupted the South*"
Jackson was of Jeffersonian bent, whereas Jefferson 
Davis was of the Calhounian school of thought? Henry Clay may 
be depleted as having wavered in between* Louisiana, in the 
three decades from 1830 to the Secession, embraced the two 
great parties, Whig and Democratic* Possibly in the good of 
both, or at least the portions which were not ideologically 
in contradiction, the local interests and demands of the 
politically articulate people of the state found satisfaction* 
When crisis came, however, it would be necessary to look be­
hind party labels and determine what ends were being furthered* 
The immediate Impression was that the Democrats were 
the party of poverty and numbers* On the other hand, the 
Whigs appeared to represent property and talents* Emerson 
was supposed to have remarked that the Democrats had the best 
principles and the Whigs the best men. In Louisiana, as the
*®Parrington, op. clt *? II, k.
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cotton planter found prosperity, he might drop his previous 
Democratic affiliation. The Whigs had good men and they also 
attracted propertied reinforcements. They found strong sup- 
port in the South,
In the South, the Whigs were the party of gentility 
and property, owning over two-thirds of all the slaves. 
Sugar planters in Louisiana, who wanted protection 
against Cuba; big cotton planters, who regretted the 
U,S, Bank, and who, in state politics resisted the re­
pudiating tendencies of their poorer fellows 
all went Whig. *
* * • •
It would not be difficult to imagine, then, how the alignment 
of support for the principles and parties worked out In 
Louisiana. All the diverse elements working to produce the 
national situation appeared to have been present*
In the early days of statehood the political struggle 
had been between the old Creole elite and the American new­
comers. The gubernatorial election of 182 ,^ however, brought 
a broader cleavage, support for Republican or Democratic 
party. To be sure, there was superficial similarity between 
the old and new alignments. The sugar planters, mostly of 
French lineage, tended to become Whigs, finding agreement be­
tween their Interests and the Adams-Clay political philosophy 
of the "American System." And the newcomer Americans, bring­
ing their Democratic heritage with them, supported the 
Democratic party of Louisiana, There was room enough within 
these two parties for the Intrusion of Interests other than
«S. E. Morlson and H. S, Cowaager.
American Re^bllc (New Yorki Oxford UniversTEy Press,
Anativity* These alignments initiated the political experi­
ences which were to mold traditional support and climates 
of opinion in the history of Louisiana politics.
c . £h£ garaUaJ, a£ k a k t e i  §M UsAismir Zsll$lss»
and Triumphant . In the election year of iBzk
the people of Louisiana embraced the two great national par­
ties. At least, the representatives of the "peoplew in the 
General Assembly manifested a tendency toward party politics 
as they cast the five electoral votes allotted to Louisiana. 
The Congressional delegation had had opportunity to report 
favorably to their constituents concerning the advantages of 
supporting one national party or the other. The Assembly was 
split with three electoral votes going to Jackson and two 
for Adams. Democrat and Whig emerged in Louisiana politics.
The results of the gubernatorial election, however, 
showed that despite this tendency to adopt labels or support 
a party interest, the old vestiges of the French-Araerican 
cleavage remained. Once again the campaign was a struggle 
of personalities, where provincial prejudices served as 
issues. Of the five competing candidates, Henry Johnson 
was the strongest, as he had succeeded W. €• C. Claiborne in 
the Senate in 1818. With Washington experience, Johnson was 
more likely to spell out the Issues behind the emerging party
*°£ton» BgMUMf Aa SaaMJalsflsat t o U t o
1699-1876 (Baton Bouge: Franklin Press, 1935) p. 102.
25
labels* The two other candidates with any considerable chance 
to succeed were of Oreol© lineage. Bernard larigny cam© from 
the illustrious family of the Be Mandevllle. It was claimed 
that he had played politics and ran to split the Creole vote. 
Jacques Villere had served with distinction, previously, as 
Governor.
For the first time, in 182*4-, the Journal of the Louisi­
ana Senate published parish returns In the vote for governor. 
Henry Johnson had received 2,8*+7, Or H&A per cent of the 
popular vote. He gained pluralities in fourteen of the twenty- 
five parishes which published returns* In fact, however, the 
combined vote for the two Creole candidates would have pro­
duced 52 per cent of the total votes H&rlgny gained plurali­
ties in four French parishes and Villere In eight of them.
The support of the latter was more general, as his strength 
ranged from Plaquemines to the southeast, on up the Mississippi 
to Point© Coupee and Avoyelles, and up the Bed Hiver in 
Hatchit©(dies* Pockets of French sentiment were spread through­
out Louisiana*
Quartlie distribution of the Johnson vote indicated 
that his strongest support came from the Florida parishes 
where American sentiment was firmly established. (See Fig­
ure 1.) It would take further elections before the French- 
American cleavage would cease to dominate gubernatorial 
campaigns. Vet even so, In several parishes where settlers 
were of predominant American stock, there was indication
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1324 
VOTE FOR HENRY JOHNSON 
BY PARISHES
E33 1st quarter: 00,0$ - 24*6$
2nd quarter: 23,0$ - 41.5$
3rd quarter: 43*4$ - 71.9$
4th quarter: 30.3$ - 92.4$
Source: Journal of Senate. State of Louisiana. 132
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that the vote in lB2b revealed more than native prejudices* 
Concordia and Ouachita, for example, although on the list of 
majority Johnson parishes, registered a sizable opposition 
to his candidacy. The lack of relatively complete solidarity 
here might bespeak divergent economic and social Interests*
Preparations for the 1828 campaigns commenced ar *arly 
as two years ahead of time. Louisiana politicians were 
learning the value of uniting national and local control of 
the offices of government. Both National Republicans and 
Democrats sought to gain all the state offices, the national 
congressional and senatorial seats, as well as the support 
of the presidential electors. The Republicans supported 
Pierre Derblgny and Philemon Thomas, and the Democrats 
Bernard Marigny and Thomas Butler. Derblgny won with M+.l 
per cent of the vote cast in his favor* The combined Demo­
cratic vote was only 39*6 per cent. In this election Derblgny 
gained pluralities in fourteen parishes, including most of 
south Louisiana as well as the parishes of Natchitoches, 
Concordia, and Rapides.
The quartlie distribution of Derblgny support, in Fig­
ure 2, however, indicated his greatest backing came from the 
French sugar country. The support for Derblgny in Concordia 
Parish, which was also plantation (cotton) country, although 
not sufficient to place it in the top Republican quartile, 
was nevertheless relatively strong, again. The same may be 
said of Rapides. In other words, the intrusion of economic
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1626 
PIERRE DERBIGNY 
BY PARISHES
1st quarter: 00.3# - IS*8%
2nd quarter: 23.7# - 43.0#
3rd quarter: 44.6# - 65.4#
4th quarter: 71.3# - 69.0#m
m
Source: Journal of 3enatet State of Louisiana. 1626
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interests, rather than nativity, was seenj the predominant 
plantation parishes of cotton country were comprised of popu­
lations with no general consensus of opinion* The weakest 
Republican support was found in the Florida parishes, where 
the planter opinion was more entrenched and where it had been 
traditionally Democratic*
The results of the 1828 presidential vote in Louisiana 
may be considered a forecast of things to come* An element 
of demographic processes worked to the detriment of the con­
servative groups of the state who were championing the 
Republican cause* It was not the sheer addition of numbers 
to the electorate which gave a hint of inevitability, for 
with a property provision in granting the suffrage, the proc­
ess of economic selection would do its work* The vast ma­
jority of migrants to Louisiana came from areas where the 
climate of political opinion had produced a traditional 
Democratic leaning* North Louisiana was the predominant seat 
of Democratic support, for it was here, and in southwest Louisi­
ana, that the migrants settled* The politically articulate 
were predominantly Democratic, but evidence has already been 
given showing that as an area became less "frontier," elements 
of economic self-interest might blunt the traditional Demo­
cratic sentiment* This is seen when new parishes were estab­
lished, which would register a high Democratic vote while the 
vote of the older "core" area remained more conservative in 
tendency*
30
It was not as if the Republicans were unaware of th© 
great popularity of the "Hero of New Orleans. 11 Experience 
with the ever more popular ^democratic” form of government 
Indicated the importance of mass appeal. Louisiana Republi- 
cans put up a vigorous opposition, but Jackson gained the 
vote of the electorate, though his margin was not as high as 
might be expected5 he was given 53*0 per cent of th© popular 
vote. A student of the period explained Jackson*® support*
Jackson’s endorsement cam© from the City of New 
Orleans, and from the ’interior.’ His personal popu­
larity will largely explain his victory in the city.
The ’interior1 cotton farmer had no need or desire for 
the application of the protective principle,. No West 
Indian latifundia challenged their staple.**
Quartlie distribution of the Jackson vote clearly dem­
onstrated his ttinterlorM popularity. (See Figure 3*) The 
FI or Idas and north Louisiana emerge as the seat of Democratic 
support. The National Republicans carried only twelve par­
ishes, mostly the predominant sugar producers. Southwest 
Louisiana, at that time all St. Landry parish, appeared to be 
Republican country, and yet this was an area, recipient of a 
steady migration of farmers. The answer to the seeming para­
dox must lie in the fact that the "core” of the parish, can** 
tered about Opelousas, had an electorate which outnumbered that 
of the hinterland. And there was a sizable conservative ele­
ment centered in the more settled portions of St. Landry.
21Rorton, £ History 1M &  £aiSZ, p. 63.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1323 
VOTE FOR ANDREW JACKSON 
BY PARISHES
1st quarter: 10,3# - 29. 
2nd quarter: 39.5# - 52. 
3rd quarter:
4th quarter: 69.6# - 34.7#
Source: L. Norton, A History of the Whig Part
In Louisiana
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The fact that New Orleans voted Jackson by only 52*9 per cent 
demonstrates the split of the electorate there between Ameri­
can and European migrant labor and the great commercial 
interests and old French*
Although the Louisiana Jacksonians triumphed in the 
presidential campaign, they were not yet strong enough to 
challenge in state politics. For in 1831 the Republicans 
again captured the governorship, this time with Andre Homan, 
who represented the elite of the Creole element* Again each 
party entered two candidates, the Republicans Roman and Arnaud 
Beauvais, the Democrats entering W. s. Hamilton and David 
Randall* As was the case in the previous gubernatorial elec­
tion, the combined Democratic vote would not have been enough 
to ensure victory. Roman received ^3*6 per cent of the vote, 
whereas the combined Democratic vote would have amounted to 
but 3 6 per cent.
The highest Republican support came from the sugar 
country, as Figure b Indicates* The Floridas and northeast 
Louisiana were strongly Democratic* Even so, there was enough 
Republican sentiment in West Feliciana and Concordia, for 
example, to register close to a quarter of the vote for Roman. 
Of special note is the behavior of Assumption Parish. Th© 
voters were evenly divided in their presidential choices in 
1828, as was the Ascension electorate* In subsequent elec­
tions, the support for one party or the other took ups and 
downs. Assumption was in th© heart of th© French country, of
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1331 
VOTE FOR ANDRE ROMAN 
BY PARISHES
l3t quarter: 5.2% - 27.
2nd quarter: 28.5/5 - 42.4%
3rd quarter: 41.6% - 52.1%
BUS 4th quarter: 62.4% - 90.4%
W j
source: Journal of Senate. State of Louisiana. 1631
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course, but the politically articulate population had been 
influenced by several waves of Anglo-Saxon settlement and the 
establishment of the plantation e c o n o m y T h e r e  was the ob­
jective foundation, at least, for differences of opinion 
which might show up in the voting statistics*
The victory of the Republicans in the gubernatorial 
election of the preceding year was no indication of victory 
in 1832. Nationally, Jackson was in the political saddle, 
and Louisianans flocked to his support in even greater numbers 
than in the previous election* (See Figure ?*) Th© pattern 
of distribution of th® Jackson vote was quit© similar to 
that of his first success; the striking difference was in the 
proportion favoring him* New Orleans gave six per cent more 
of its vote to the Democrat than in 1828. Whereas both 
Ascension and Assumption parishes had compiled tie votes in 
1828, in this election the former gave 87*3 par cent, while 
the latter gave him only 15*^ per cent ot Its vote* Ascen­
sion had company, though, for neighboring Iberville, St*
James and St. Charles along the river, also registered ma­
jorities for Jackson* This was in contrast to the heavy Re­
publican support deeper in the sugar country*
While the great popular hero won elections with ease 
in Louisiana, his party had not yet been able to translate
22 V. J. Parent on, £ Sociological gJmdjr 3.t & MSZXS. 
Village is th£ French Section of Louisiana (unpublished 
master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 193°), pp.
30-33.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1832 
VOTE FOR ANDREW JACKSON 
BY PARISHES
1st quarter:
2nd quarter:
3rd quarter:
4th quarter:
56.9% - 65.9% 
67.1% - 79. 
83.2% - 100%m
a
rH1
Source: L. Norton, ^ History of the Whig Party
in Louisiana
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this national success to the state scene* For the Democrats 
did not succeed in winning the governorship until 18^25 
after this election they won each contest up to Secession*
No doubt, the pattern of Jacksonian victory m s  a forecast 
of coming events*
Meanwhile, in 183*+, another of Louisiana's most noted 
sons was nominated as candidate of the newly formed Whig 
party of Henry Clay, She Whigs had retained the nationalistic 
program of the old Republican party and were organised to give 
opposition to the leveling tendencies of the Jacksonians*
Quite naturally many Louisiana people joined forces* the 
Whigs were to elect Edward Douglas White in 1831*- and Andre
Homan for his second term of office in 1838.
White's victory over the Democratic candidate, John 
B* Dawson, was complete* Ee received nearly 60 per cent of 
the vote cast* The election was conducted so as to arouse 
class consciousness, and both parties used demagogy to wln.2  ^
Bach sought the French vote and the New Orleans Irish vote* 
Since such was the case, it might be useful to present a sum­
mary of the qualifications of the two candidates *
Edward D. White was proclaimed as an uncompromising 
Whig, a fast friend of protective tariff, a jealous ad­
vocate of internal improvements, a warm and substantial
friend of the United States Bank, and a firm and con­
sistent exponent of the American system.
John B. Dawson was zealously supported by the Demo­
crats, who represented him as a firra and pure public
2%orton, Headings, p. 1095 McGinfcy, a&. p. 137.
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man, a friend of the people, a supporter of the Union 
of the states, and an advocate of low tariff*kand an 
unflinching enemy of the United States Bank*
The Whigs were more successful in their campaign ef­
forts. Even the "Hero of New Orleans" had not been able to 
command the support given to White in that city. And it was 
obvious that Dawson could pose as no Jackson. Within the par­
ishes, there was some indication of the old pattern of split 
between French-American. (See Figure 6.) Dawson took plu­
ralities in the Floridas and in north Louisiana. Heturns of 
more than 80 per cent were registered in White#s favor in 
seven of the sugar parishes. All of the sugar country gave 
majorities for White, who, after all, was the Whig represen­
tative of the south Louisiana aristocracy. The contrast in 
support given the Whig in Catahoula and Concordia is striking, 
with the latter once again listed in the ranks of the conserva­
tives. Catahoula, bordering the hills, had more of the farmer 
class whose subsistence agriculture need not bring a shift in 
sentiment away from the traditions of the Democracy.
Political reversals on the national scene apparently 
have always brought repercussions back home. The panic of 
1837 and ensuing depression placed a stigma on the Democratic 
administration. The local effect was immediate. The panic 
had caused fifteen Hew Orleans banks to suspend specie pay­
ment, paralyzing business and spreading consternation among 
planters and commercial people alike. Such a consequence
Norton, Readings, p. 109*
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1834 
VOTE FOR EDWARD WHITE 
BY PARISHES
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2nd quarter: 38.6$ - 61.6$
3rd quarter: 56.2$ - 74.8$
4th quarter: 82.4$ - 96.8$
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might not have guaranteed a Whig victory, hut coupled with 
the reputation of the Whig candidate, ex-Governor Homan, this 
circumstance brought success *
Even so, Roman won with only ?2,8 per cent of the vote 
in his favor. The support of the candidates in this election, 
as seen in Figure 7, demonstrated that in a crisis situation 
the voter might leave his traditional tendencies and give 
support where it might do him the most good. Both Roman and 
Prieur cut into sugar and cotton country. The Floridas were 
split in their support of Roman, and his strongest support 
was seated outside the sugar country. Both Catahoula and 
Concordia supported the Whig. Hewly established Caldwell 
showed no such predisposition. On the other hand, Caddo Par­
ish reported its first returns in this election, also, and 
was listed in the Whig ranks* Caddo was Red River plantation 
country, while the farmer might be found in greater number in 
Caldwell. This was to be the high water mark of Whiggery in 
Louisiana. In this election, the margin of victory was nar­
row, and with population steadily Increasing every year, the 
success of the Whig party was doubtful. In 18**2 the Demo­
cratic party captured the governorship with Alexandre Mouton, 
state legislator from Lafayette Parish, who received 60 per 
cent of the popular vote and became Louisiana*s first Demo­
cratic governor. The HSfhigs had suffered from the same malady 
which had given victory in 1838. Unsound banking policies, 
enacted over Homan's protests, had sunk the Whig party.
m
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1838 
VOTE FOR ANDRE' ROMAN 
BY PARISHES
1st quarter: 21.0$ - 35.6#
2nd quarter: 41 *9^ - 49.9$
3rd quarter: 51.0$ - 64.4$
4th quarter: 65.6$ - 96.5$
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In the long run, population growth would work against 
the Whigs, the strongest support for that party came from 
the sugar country, which in the two decades from 1820 to 18^0 
counted a white population increase of between ^0 and 50 per 
cent. At the same time, predominantly Democratic north 
Louisiana marked a population increase which was more than 
double. The number of slaves in south Louisiana increased by 
over IkO per cent. The percentage increase in north Louisiana 
was much greater5 cotton country was more recently developed, 
and the number of slaves Increased from a base of practically 
none. Hot all of north Louisiana was devoted to the planta­
tion economy, by any means.
There were relatively few slaves but many farmers in 
the hill parishes. The differential between white farmer and 
planter may be viewed in comparing Concordia, which had a 
sizable voting element partial to Whiggery, with Catahoula 
Parish, strong in support of the Democratic Party. With more 
than twice as many white people, Catahoula counted nearly 
five times fewer slaves, Concordia recorded an Increase in 
slaves of over 300 per cent from 1820 to I8*f0. The incidence 
of slavery marked the plantation economy, which In turn 
tended to be an index of conservative political tendencies. 
There were more farmers than planters in north Louisiana as 
a whole, though,
Ize4
the success and aehievemmt^^f ^the Republican-Whigs, In
k2
view of the general excellence of the qualification of Louisi­
ana *s early governors, it might be regretful that the Whigs 
could win no more* Of course they were not voiceless, for 
Whigs were in strong representation in the Louisiana Assembly 
throughout the forties and most of the fifties. Th© two 
strongest economic elements of the state followed Whig ten­
dencies* these, '‘the merchants and the sugar planters, were 
the aristocrats of Louisiana* They had a community of inter­
est which was satisfied by the Whig platform$ and as elec­
tions approached, they expressed themselves as preferring a 
party nominee who was a ’gentleman- * This usually meant that 
they preferred the nomination of a wealthy sugar planter."2'* 
Little wonder the Whigs could get nowhere with the rural 
Democrats, the raw frontiersmen with their strong sense of 
individualism*
Governor Roman had represented this elite community*
He was a sugar planter from St. James, on the west side. Of 
his qualifications there is no argument. He was a wise and 
progressive leader. He worked for the Improvement of public 
education; Roman established a model penal system, a well 
organised militia; he worked for the multiplication of com­
munications and the encouragement of science and agriculture* 
Crossing party lines where principle mattered, Homan had en­
dorsed Jackson’s stand against the Nullification Ordinance
2-’Norton, Readings, p. 113.
>♦3
of South Carolina, The Whig tempered conservatism with 
political responsibility.
Quotations from Homan’s inaugural address in 1831 and 
his farewell address of I8b3 will catch a bit of the Whig 
flavor:
The gratitude which I feel for the extreme kindness 
conferred on me by a majority of the votes of my fellow 
citizens, is increased still more from the idea that it 
is not due to party spirit that 1 am Indebted for my 
election. That illiberality which some would wish to 
substitute for patriotism and which consists In inquir­
ing not whether a candidate is capable and honest, but 
whether he belongs to such a party, such a section of the 
state, or to such a population has not generally exerted 
against me.
The country has changed; the wide career offered to 
our agriculture and commercial industry is not closed; 
no convulsions of nature have destroyed the fertility 
of our soil, or turned away from our capital th© stream 
of the Mississippi, We are now aware of our real sltua- 
tion; we enjoy the advantages of solf“government, and 
our destinies are in our own hands, Louisiana must yet 
be prosperous and happy if the means which we still re­
tain, are administered with that prudence and economy 
which should have been always observed*2'
The Whigs were gone from the seat of government, but not for­
gotten, Many of their numbers were yet to make contributions 
to the well-being of the state,
Louisiana had been a Whig state, but in the iS^O’s the 
winds of Jacksonian doctrine became strong. It was as if the 
democratic sentiments of the ever increasing migrant groups 
incubated until Democratic number could make them felt. But
2^McGinty, cit** p* 135*
27D. F. Barge, Louisiana IMSI S a m i  iMZfi 
Roman 18^1-1835. l839-18j»3 (mpqLllahed master’s thenls. 
Louisiana State University, 1937)» P* 150,
Mf
before rooking an analysis of the political fortunes of Louisi­
ana in the period from 18**6 to Secession, it is necessary to 
investigate the move for, and the outcome of, the Constitu­
tional Convention of 18V5# The desire to drive aristocracy 
and privilege from government was said to have served as the 
animus of the entire Jacksonian movement. By l8**5 the Demo­
crats were numerous enough in Louisiana to make their desires 
felt* As early as I8*f2, and again in 18^3, the people of 
Louisiana evinced strong approval to hold a constitutional 
convention* In the former year the electorate voted nearly 
three to one "for." Eight parishes voted against th© proposal5 
these were sugar parishes clustered near Orleans, which was 
also "against.*1 Nearly every parish of north Louisiana had 
registered approval by over 90 per cent, The actual enabling 
act passed the legislature March 18, l8Mt, and the convention
y
was held the following year.
It may seem strange In retrospect from the present, 
after Louisianans almost doubled the mortality rate which 
Jefferson had prescribed for constitutions —  ten in 110 
years —  that the first constitution was to last for over 
thirty years. However, the social grouping which had written 
Louisiana’s first organic law was satisfied with the results; 
for them there was no real need to make a change. The multi­
plication of Louisiana’s electorate through migration from 
the southeastern states and the growing success of the Demo­
crats at th© polls upset the old order. "The populace.... 
felt that they were living in the nineteenth century under a
*♦5
seventeenth century government .,|2® The main "aristocratic** 
provisions which were objectionable were the property and re­
ligious qualifications for holding office, the limitation on 
suffrage, the great appointive power of the governor, and 
the Inequality of senatorial representation.
The great significance of the convention was the fact 
that the membership brought two distinct philosophies of 
government. The existence of a two-party system in the state, 
and the fact that one of these, the Democratic party, was a 
rising party with leveling tendencies established clear issues 
leading to meaningful argument. The great Issues were con­
cerned with the proper function of government and the position 
of the governor. “Should the government represent the simple 
public needs and desires of the entire population, or should 
it establish a restrictive order under the auspices of those 
gentlemen of principle and property who best know the needs 
of the unthinking masses?*'2^ Obviously the Constitution of 
1812 had given answer in far different terms than was desired
at this time.
That both sides would be represented was guaranteed 
when the results of the election of delegates were made known. 
The convention was composed of thirty-nine Whigs and thirty- 
eight Democrats. One Whig editor exulted*
2®Prothro, on. elt.. p. 9*
2^Prothro, ££« clt.t p. 153.
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thank providence our Constitution will be safe from 
the agrarian and leveling view of the radicals? of th® 
numbers elected to the Convention M5 are conservatives * 
enough to satisfy us that none but changes absolutely 
necessary will be made in the Constitution —  that the 
Judiciary will not be elective by the people —  thus 
securing toAus one of the greatest boons we were strug­
gling for.3°
Yet, the constitution written in 18*»5 was a liberal doctrine 
compared with that of 1812• And it was prefaced by words 
far different than those embodied In the Preamble of 1812* 
Gentleman rule was still maintained) but a concession had 
been made by the aristocrats* How the people were doing 
things for themselves* The Constitution of 18**5 began* **We 
the people of Louisiana* do ordain and establish**1
Of course* none went away from the convention com­
pletely satisfied. There had been opposing views and com­
promise had been achieved? for such a social process to work* 
every one must give up some point or interest* Borne Whigs 
were dissatisfied because the new instrument was too Demo­
cratic* The convention president* Joseph Walker* and the 
Democratic "radicals" signed* but purely as compromise? the 
instrument was not democratic enough for them*
One of the controversial Issues had centered about the 
suffrage* The Whigs feared to let the bars down completely* 
As finally written* suffrage was granted to all white males 
twenty-one years of age or over and who had been citizens of
3°Horton, Readings, p. 122.
the United States for two years and of the state two years 
preceding an election. The governor was no longer required 
to have a property qualification, but he must be thirty-five 
years of age and a resident of Louisiana for at least fifteen 
years* The office of Lt,-Qovernor was established* The 
legislators were no longer restricted to property qualifica­
tions, and some offices formerly appointive were made elective 
The conservatives successfully maintained the Judicial bulwark 
for judges were still to be appointed by the governor, with 
the consent of the Senate, A lasting accomplishment of the 
convention was the creation of the Office of State Superin­
tendent of Public Education. In fine the influence of Jack­
sonian Democracy had been felt\ Anglo-Saxon traditions, 
reworked through American experience, became a part of the 
political heritage of Louisiana,
o* 1 M  Poimfall at libs MfrAsa S M  Impending Secession. 
The downfall of the Whigs, in the elections which were to 
follow, may be explained by the simple phrase t too many 
Jaeksonians* "Whig power In Louisiana was enervated by the 
liberalisation of the state’s constitution,11^  the Whigs 
never succeeded in electing a governor again. Election 
analysis then must focus upon the successes of the Democratic 
tickets and the various elements which made up the voting
^Norton, A History at A M  I M S  £S£$X! dee also, S. 
Asseff, Legislative Apportionment ifl Aawiglflp (Baton Rougei 
Bureau of Government Research, Louisiana State University, 
1950).
support. Until i860, the gubernatorial elections were close; 
the Democratic support ranged from only 51 to 5**- per cent of 
the total rote. A close election might indicate a clear 
cleavage within the electorate and an intense interest in 
the resolution of pressing issues* It would be important to 
know how many of Louisiana's people had the suffrage, also*
TABLE I
POPULATION AND THE VOTE 
1830*1860
J & Q . j m L JLfiSL
White Males, 20 
Years Old and 
Above 25,886 50,110 80,^50 98,1*6
Total Vote Cast 
Nearest Election 
Year 8,318 20,000 36,119 VI, O M
Vote Per Cent 
of Population 
Group 32.1J8 39.958 M 4-.85S Vl.758
♦Sourcet U, S* Census, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eighth; Lmig.iana g M U m  feSUSMlfl*
The table printed above presents only an approximation 
of the relation between population of voting age and the 
number of people actually voting, but it does allow several 
Important generalizations* In the first place, it belies the 
assumption that if Louisiana had government by gentlemen, 
then the "people” were politically voiceless* It has been
shown that Louisiana aid enjoy gentleman rule? this fact re- 
enforces the classic proposition that political power follows 
fro® economic domination* Louisiana ’a wealth came from the 
plantation economy and for this reason, perhaps, it was the 
planter and merchant, the articulate upper classes, which 
dominated the government.
Less than half the population of voting age practiced 
suffrage in the four decades prior to the Civil War* Un­
doubtedly the majority of votes cast were upper class ballots. 
Yet, how many people bother to vote even If they have the 
privilege? In the presidential election of 1952, certainly 
an intensely heated election in Louisiana, only kO per cent 
of the people of voting age voted, this percentage Is little 
different than those in the decades under discussion. The 
backwoods farmers of north Louisiana and the "interior11 popu­
lation of south Louisiana, 1&& pe.tJAS M
probably outnumbered the planter-merchant groups. But it Is 
an open question whether the problem of suffrage was major. 
These groups migrated to Louisiana, established homes and 
farms and self-sufficiency. Would they not seek economic se­
curity first? It might take time to develop the level of 
articulation enjoyed by the elite, and to participate in po­
litical affairs. Politics would become important when the 
farmer found he might have to fight someone else's warl
The figures do show the Increase of able bodied voters, 
though, and indicate that a good many of the migrants must
have utilised the suffrage» Between 1830 and 18^0 the popu­
lation of voting age almost doubled, while th® number of 
votes cast had increased by 150 per cent. It Is significant 
that this increase came before the liberalisation of the suf­
frage requirements, too. In the next decade voting popula­
tion increased 60 per cent, and the number of votes cast had 
increased by 80 per cent. Obviously the number of voters 
had increased steadily In Louisiana,
Whether planters or farmers, the majority of the in­
creased voter population must have been Democrats. But with 
the support in elections breaking even, there must have been 
a subtle change in the combinations of groups supporting the 
Whigs and Democrats, A new alignment of interests was in the 
process of developing, through emulation of the Whig aristo­
crats, or through identity of interests, portions of the 
cotton planter class had left the Democratic party.
In the first election after the adoption of the new 
constitution, the Democratic party, in l8*f6, successfully 
supported the candidacy of Isaac Johnson, who received 
per cent of the total vote of 23,35^, The Democrats gained 
a majority of two In th© senate, whereas th© Whigs, behind 
De Boys, held a majority of three in the house, Johnson was 
a member of the West Feliciana aristocracyj his leadership 
of th© state administration left little to choose from, so 
far as accomplishments were concerned, between th© new Demo­
crats and the old Whigs. However, the issue of slavery was
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in emergence, an issue which the Democrats would face in a 
different manner than the Whigs.
The Wilmot Proviso was advanced nationally, in meeting 
the problem of the annexation of Texas. The storm of protest 
raised by southern politicians was indicative of the determine* 
tion of a dominant element of the Democratic party to struggle 
for their views on slavery. This was sectionalism, and it 
remained to be seen whether the traditional parallel of Louisi­
ana with national Interests would be spread. As a spokesman 
of Louisiana Democrats, Governor Johnson answered in these 
wordss
Noninterference of congress with the slavery question 
is the surest means of preserving the Union, and that 
doctrine should be insisted on with an unflinching resolu­
tion never to surrender it. To any proposition, there­
fore, to compromise that doctrine, the South, with the 
bitter and humiliating experience before her. will turn 
a deaf ear. Submission to Incipient oppression prepares 
men for the yoke, and compromises on this question are 
nothing else than anti-slavery victories. The repeated, 
galling, and unprovoked aggressions of anti-slavery 
leave no room to anticipate a cessation of hostilities, 
and the South had been sufficiently warned that, if it 
is wise to hope for the best, it is equally prudent to 
prepare for th© worst. It is far^better to be lawless 
than to live under lawless rule.*^
Despite these words, which suggest that then as now the use 
of the social process of compromise was little less than ap­
peasement and almost treason, Johnson was not a strict party 
man; he appointed some Whigs to office, and tried to steer a 
middle course on the slavery question.
32m . L. McLure, Louisiana Leaders t 183Q-186.Q (Shreve­
port* Journal Printing 3 o ™ & ) ,  p.72.
What areas of the state had given voting support to a 
Democrat of such ideas and actions? Although gaining but a 
slim majority of about 2,000 votes, yet Johnson had plurali­
ties in thirty of the forty-three parishes which voted, in­
dicative of the wide spread of his appeal, Th© highest 
Democratic vote was seated in th© "interior* parishes of 
north and southwest Louisiana. (See Figure 8,) Likewise, 
the Floridas were strong in support of Johnson, th© native 
son. The formerly named areas, where th© Democratic farmer 
resided, show the effects of the lowered suffrage qualiflea- 
tions* This was the first election in which nearly all the 
parishes of the hills and the prairies registered support in 
the highest quartlie of the Democratic percentages#
The sugar parishes remained the seat of the Whig sup­
port# However, parishes from cotton country likewise emerged 
with Whig leanings# Wherever there was a sizable layer of 
planter classes within th© northern parishes, a rather even 
split of the vote occurred* In this ©lection, in fact, both 
Union and Morehouse were on th© list of parishes lowest in 
support of the Democratic candidate, and Madison and Concordia 
had given majorities to th© Whigs, also# A very definite ten­
dency toward fhiggery had emerged In th© four "front" parishes 
of the Mississippi delta. Here the large seal© planters pre­
empted the levee lands and In back, along the secondary 
levees, more small planters were found* Th© election returns 
Indicate that a difference In political opinion likewise
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1846 
VOTE FOR ISAAC JOHNSON 
BY PARISHES
1st quarter: 21,4# - 47.
2nd quarter: 47.436 - 52.5/6
3rd quarter: 54.236 - 61.736
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occurred# Th© significance in th© distribution of th© Demo­
cratic vote in this election, then, was twofold 5 it marked 
the cluster of strong Democratic tendency in th© hills and 
the emergence of a Whig leaning among portions of the planter 
groups of eotton country.
Two years later, in l8*+8, the Whigs became enthusias­
tic concerning their chances In the gubernatorial campaign 
of 18?0. The Whig candidate for president, Louisianafs 
General Taylor, was successful, and had carried Louisiana. 
Whigs should have known from past experience, however, that 
Louisianans were strong in their support of military heroes 
at the polls — > "old soldiers never die. 11 Just as the Whigs 
remained in office despite the election of Jackson, so th© 
Democrats in 1850 won despite the Taylor popularity.
The Democrats eked out victory in the race for governor 
in 1850# Joseph Walker, native of New Orleans, and president 
of the Constitutional Convention of 18V5, had won with 51A  
per cent of the vote, a slim majority of just over a thousand 
votes over the Whig, Plauche. The campaign had followed 
national Issues, among which was the problem of the Wilmot 
Proviso\ the Democrats had opposed, and th© Whigs had favored 
it. In his inaugural address Governor Walker gave much at­
tention to the problem of slavery# These are his words*
Situated as we are, I think we owe it to ourselves, 
to our sister States of the South, and to our northern 
brethren, to declare that if, unhappily, the anti­
slavery agitation, which has so long been allowed to 
insult our feeling should be carried to the point of 
aggression upon our rights\ if the equality between all
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the members of the Confederacy, established and guaran­
teed by the constitutlon, should be destroyed or trenched 
upon by the action of the general government, then we 
are prepared to make common cause with our neighbors of 
the slave-holding States, and pronounce the Union at an 
end* I shall look upon the dissolution of the Union as 
the greatest calamity that could befall us5 but that, 
great as this calamity would be, I am certain there is 
no one of our citisens who would be willing for a moment, 
to weigh it in the balance against the dishonor of sub­
mission*^
Walker had been among the group of "radical” Democrats 
at the constitutional convention who had felt that the instru­
ment had not gone far enough toward democracy* It could be 
assumed that the people, newly tasting of more democracy, 
would have given Walker great support at the polls* That 
such was not the case was the resultant of the continuation 
of a tendency noted in analysis of the preceding election*
The geographical distribution of the highest quarter of sup­
port for Walker indicates that the supposed backing of the 
"people” was indeed apparent* (See Figure 9») There was a 
cluster of Walker strength in the newer parishes created in 
northwest Louisiana* Indeed, the bulk of Democratic support 
came from the same "interior” parishes which had voted Demo­
cratic in 1(M* However, the increased solidarity of the 
cotton and sugar plantation parishes In support of Whiggery 
was such that the total Democratic vote was evened.
The people had tasted of the joys of democracy, and 
it became apparent that they wanted an instrument that was 
absolutely democratic; the appointing power of the governor
33Ibld.. p. 73
//,
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1850 
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was still too groat* Governor Walker now opposed the sailing 
of another convention; but th© people demanded it, and a 
peculiar document resulted; It was both more radical and more 
conservative than the instrument of seven years previous.
The Whigs were quick to perceive their opportunity in this 
movement and campaigned vigorously in the ©lection for dele­
gates » Their strategy showed they could not afford to be as 
openly anti-democracy ..with th© same honest vindictiveness 
that had been used earlier# Jacksonianism had so popularised 
the word fdemocracy1 that those later Whig® shifted their 
strategy,#3^ Vernon Farrington observed concerning th® 
national scene that .instead of proclaiming democracy the 
mother of all mischiefs, they/the later Whlgs^ welcomed it 
as an effective aid in vote g e t t i n g , T h a t  such an approach 
was successful is borne out by the fact that of the membership 
of the convention the Whigs outnumbered th® Democrats by 35 
to W5. The Baton Koug® Gazette hid Its enthusiasm when the 
Whigs filled two-thirds of the seats in saying*
The Whigs have an awful responsibility resting upon 
them, and it behooves every Whig to work with diligence 
and to present to the people a constitution wise in its 
construction, liberal in its provisions and worthy of 
the great state of Louisiana and of the Whig party. We 
now have it in our power to place Louisiana beyond the 
reach of Locofocoism and..to retain its government in our 
hands for years to come.™
3**Prothro, op. olt#. p. 6 2 ,
35parrlngton, op. eft,f II, 152..
3^Prothro, OP. jslfc., p* 62*
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Diverse elements pushed through the 1852 convention, 
and its work reflects the demands of different groups• It 
met the demands of the people for a more democratic struc­
ture; ©very office became elective, Including the judiciary, 
and terms of office were shortened. The Whigs did work with 
diligence, however, and in the changes made concerning re­
presentation saw to the perpetuation of their control of 
government. Representation was to be based upon total popu­
lation rather than upon qualified voters. This meant that 
the planter interest would control the legislature, as their 
slaves would count in their favor. The Democrats had argued 
with some justification that H«• .one Whig master and his 
1,000 slaves possessed representation in the Oeneral Assembly 
equal to 1,001 free, white Democrats Th© Democrats were 
also in objection to the more liberal provision granted cor­
porations and commercial interests generally, let, the Con­
stitution was endorsed by the voters of the state, the feeling 
being that despite some objections this new Instrument was 
more satisfactory than the one it superceded.
Under stipulations of th® new Constitution, the citi­
zens of Louisiana ^hould vote for governor in 1852. Th© 
Democrats chose as their candidate Paul 0. Hebert, resident 
of Iberville Parish and of Acadian lineage. Again as in th© 
last election, the Democratic margin was very slim, this 
time a majority of less than 2,000 votes. His main support
^Norton, Headings, p. 161.
59
came from the hill farmers of the interior parishes, and from 
the Floridas* (See Figure 10*) Once more the cotton and 
sugar planters showed their like-mindedness in joint support 
of the Whig candidate, Bourdelon* Over half of Hebert9s 
slight lead might have been secured in Hew Orleans, where he 
obtained per cent, representing a majority of some 1,200 
votes. Elements of city and country were lined up behind th© 
Democratic party; of course the same could be said for th© 
Whigs, save that the elements were of far different composi­
tion*
Louisiana supported the Democrat, Franklin Fierce, 
in the 1852 presidential campaign. But the Louisiana Demo­
crats had not put up a united front* The Impending dissolu­
tion of th© Rational Whig Party and the consequential 
weakening of the Louisiana Whigs presented the Democrats with 
a secure situation in which to conduct a factional quarrel. 
Events would prove the folly, however, of the meeting of th© 
slavery crisis in a one-party situation*
Factions were divided under the lead of two dominant 
personalities, John Slidell was demonstrating his finesse 
at the game of political arithmetic, becoming boss of Louisi­
ana politics through combination of the unified support of 
New Orleans Irish and the Jacksonian farmer of the "inter­
ior.” Pierre Soule provided leadership of th© opposing fac­
tion from his post as United States Senator* The personal 
ambitions of these two men for political power became
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1352 
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entangled with the Issues of slavery and the possible gain 
that might follow fro® supporting one of the opposing streams 
of thought within the Democratic party* Bach leader became 
a political Hamlet*
During the decade of the 1850*s both Slidell and Soule 
shifted positions *^ ® At the beginning of th© deoad© th© 
national affiliations of th© two men were in contradiction 
with their local stands* Slidell*s supporters favored 
Buchanan and the radical wing of the national party, but 
Slidell was a Unionist* Soule * s local support was sym­
pathetic to Douglas and the conservative wing, while Soul© 
himself was a seetionalist• While the situation in the 
national Democratic party remained unchanged, in i860 Slidell 
had turned seetionalist and Soule was an ardent Unionist*
It was written, "unto thine own self be true*w These two 
men had been more concerned with alignment with a winning 
team than with the political resolution of a very serious 
problem* It was too late in i860.
In the gubernatorial election of 1858$ the American 
Party had appeared in Louisiana* It was unique In this sec­
tion of th© country, for nationally it had repudiated the 
Catholics* The bulk of the membership of the old-line Whig 
party found haven in th© ranks of th© American Party* They 
had believed the Democrats were voting the Hew Orleans Irish 
and other foreign born against them. Apparently, the anti-
3®Gr©er, op, clt»* XII, 331, and XIII, *f62.
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democratic tendency of the old Whig combined with the anti- 
foreign sentiment, overruling the solidarity of Catholicism. 
Still, although forwarded by the sugar parish Whigs, the 
Know Nothing candidate, Charles Derbigny, found strong sup­
port in cotton country, also. Perhaps the American Party 
had been supported because there was no other alternative 
than vote Democratic*
The Democratic candidate, Robert G. Wickliffe, was 
another of the West Feliciana elite* He had conducted him­
self so well in the legislature that he was boomed as a 
gubernatorial possibility* Wickliffe was a Douglas supporter 
and influenced the state nominating convention to endorse the 
Douglas Kansas-Nebraska Act as just legislation* The Louisi­
ana Democrats then pledged cooperation with the northern 
Democrats so long as this branch accepted the ruling of Con­
gress on slavery as set forth in the Act
The American Party was strong in New Orleans, and when 
the 1856 vote m s  counted, the city had given a very slight 
majority to Derbigny* The most significant result was the 
loss of support in many of the old-time Whig parishes of the 
sugar country* (See Figure 11.) Still, continued solidarity 
of cotton and sugar voters is to be noted* Wickliffe had
39T. B. Landry, !&£ Political Career a£ BafePXl Charles 
air! 1 tfn (unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State Uni­
versity, 1939), p. 21? Horton, Readings, p. 158s W. D. 
Overdyke. "History of the American Party in Louisiana," 
Louisiana Historical fflaaHfiZto Vol. XV, XVI (1932-33).
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1856 
VOTE FOR ROBERT WICKLIFFE 
BY PARISHES
1st quarter: 27,5% - 49.1$ 
2nd quarter: 49.3$ - 54.3$ 
3rd quarter:
4th quarter:
55.2$ - 61.1$ 
61.9$ - 93.1$
\ \ \ \ \  \ ♦♦♦♦»y s y j s m
onrc • • • • • '♦’♦'V * _
Source: Journal of Senate. State of Louisiana. 1856
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gained the support of the Democratic hill farmers again, and 
his appeal had apparently made some inroads on voting sup­
port in the Mississippi delta area# The Democrats had lost 
some ground in the Florida parishes, and Wickliffe had ;just 
barely won in his home parish of West Feliciana. Obviously 
the electorate was in favor of Democratic rule, but appar­
ently, the issues of this campaign gave no directive as to 
alternatives. The planters in both north and south Louisiana 
demonstrated their anti-Demoer&tic Party tendency, but that 
was about all*
The national Know Nothing Party ceased to function in 
1857, but the New Orleans organisation still showed some life. 
They controlled the city and did not want to surrender that 
control* Likewise, the large settled foreign population 
and the constant immigration of more foreigners was a factor 
working for them* The Know Nothings could continue to say 
they were the bulwark against Democratic manipulation of 
these groups# However, 1858 marked the climax of party ac­
tivity. Speaking in 1859, Pierre Soule summed up the 
political situation in Louisiana $
Partyisms are entombed in the past* The American 
Party, the Whig Party, exist no more as national or even 
state parties, though we may at times still see their 
shadows flit around our municipal halls and elective 
precincts* Their scattered fragments are in process 
assimilation with £hg i s M  Bt&gfa J&& Sm&~
cratlc EarS A&
^Norton, Headings, p. 163, italics mine; M. L. Mature, 
"The Election of 1860 in Louisiana," SiHftE-
terly. Vol. IX (1926).
65
The gubernatorial election of i860 became a struggle 
for control of the Democratic Party* Soule faced Slidell 
for the showdown* The firmly entrenched support of "King 
John" prevailed in the nomination of Thomas 0* Moore. In 
final desperation, Soule organised an opposition party which 
was a coalition of "purifiers," or anti~311dell Democrats, 
and the remnants of the Know Nothing party. Thomas J. Wells 
received the nomination of this group. The campaign issue 
boiled down to "for or against Slidell." The resulting vie* 
tory for Slidell could have been forecast from the beginning. 
The electoral balance of two decades had been destroyed as 
Moore received a convincing 62.0 per cent of the votes cast. 
Soule’s candidate retained majorities in only two parishes, 
Orleans and Terrebonne, although the Jefferson vote was a 
toss-up.
The distribution of Moore’s highest voting percentages 
is scattered in parishes throughout the state? however it 
is clear that the greatest anti-Slldoll sentiment was seated 
in plantation parishes. (See Figure 12.) With the statewide 
support of Moore so strong, an interpretation of the voting 
percentages favoring the Slidell faction must remain In rela­
tive terms. This election had been a battle of factions and 
it was obvious which one had the greater support. Slidell 
sentiment was widespread, although most generally found con­
centrated in hill parishes or prairie* This vote was a Demo­
cratic one. In the previous election, for example, the four
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION I860 
VOTE FOR THOMAS MOORE 
BY PARISHES
1st quarter: 40.5# - 58.4#
2nd quarter: 59.3# - 64*3#
3rd quarter: 66.9# - 74-4#
BZS 4th quarter: 74.7# - 95.4#
Source: Journal of Senate. State of Louisiana, i860
Figure 12
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hill parishes of Bienville, Jackson, Caldwell, and Winn had 
registered votes in the highest quarter support for the 
Democratic candidate, Wickliffe, who had been a Douglas man. 
In i860, the same four parishes recorded votes of over 70 
per cent for Mo ore, who with Slidell1 s backing was in the 
other camp. The hill farmer voted Democratic out of tradi­
tion and did not look behind the party label.
The same could not be said for those parishes where 
planter groups were dominant § opinions appeared to be di­
vided, since the electorate might have known more of what the 
factions stood for* Sugar parishes along the river marked a 
continuation of a trend toward Democratic support observed 
as early as 1850* Parishes of the upper Mississippi appeared 
on the list of Slidell supporters, although here Madison and 
Concordia, Know Nothing in 1856, were weaker in support of 
Moore’s candidacy* Factional support in i860 was divided, 
but no clear pattern emerged indicative of a clarity of 
issues.
E. Evaluation 2? fjaU&sal lIMrlMQ,
and the Tragedy -Secession. It has been fashionable, fol­
lowing Roger Shugg,*1^  to make a socio-economic interpretation 
of the issues which led Louisiana to Secession. (jKis thesis 
maintained that the planters were a dominant minority, who,
r# w* shugg, satolM &£ 9Mm, amMflji to smXsAsm,
(Baton Rouge* Louisiana State University Pres®, 1939)*
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Imposing their will, led the state out of the Union in order 
to proteot their Interests.^ A cleavage was found between 
the planter of the delta-lands and the farmer of the hills* 
Without doubt| such a cleavage did emerge in Louisiana 
polities* But the proposition to be maintained her© is that 
this plant er-farmer antagonism was a much later development 
which emerged from the actual factors which brought Secession 
and its aftermath,
Shugg’s collection of detail and analysis of existing 
social classes was a masterful work* However, he wanted to 
go farther than the data allowed in the matter of describing 
actual class struggle, in this period* Exaggeration, though, 
is forgivable. If there was no manifest class struggle, 
Louisiana was the setting for a lively political struggle in 
which members of farmer, worker, and planter gfpups could en~
■ i
gage, (in the 1850#s there certainly was a growing sentiment 
of class consciousness in Louisiana society* The upper 
class was exploiting the lower white classes* This solidarity 
was reflected in the vote for parties* The Irish, for example, 
voted Democratic because the party took care of their inter­
ests. Success and failure In the political side of society 
marked the way to Secession* j
In the preceding analysis, It has already been sug­
gested that the establishment of a traditional Democratic 
vote and a subtle shifting of party labels and alignments 
guaranteed, when the issue became crucial, that Secession
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was Inevitable• (to be sure* analysis of voting support dem- 
enstrates that the settlers of the "interior* parishes, the 
farmers of the hills and prairies* brought with them and 
practiced the ways of Jacksonian Democracy, j On the other 
hand, it had been shown that the planters of both the sugar 
and cotton country tended to line up behind different labels* 
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a spelling 
out of these political tendencies and their consequences*
Louisiana had become the land of the planters?1*2 and 
by 13$0 Louisiana had come of age. Most of the fertile 
lands of the state were devoted to the plantation economy* 
Early French and Spanish masters had followed the practice 
of giving large grants of land along rivers and bayous? 
hence, large-scale land-owning became an integral part of 
Louisiana's development as an agricultural state. With the 
introduction of the two staples, sugar and cotton, in the 
nineteenth century, the great estates already in existence 
beeame even more profitable. Slaves constituted the laboring 
base of this economy, and their importation Into Louisiana in 
ever increasing number before i860 meant that the vested in­
terests of the planter became more and more lucrative. The 
problem is to ascertain through what political channels these 
Interests were protected and forwarded.
^2W. E. Highsmlth, Louisiana Mriaa Beopnatructlan 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 
1953), P* 16.
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At the same time, American Immigration into Louisiana 
was continuing apace* The planter having preempted the more 
desirable land, the farmer pioneered the piney woods and the 
empty prairies, developing a subsistence agriculture* Un­
deniably, there was a striking contrast between the ways of 
life of farmer and planter as between two social worlds, but 
the farmer was not voiceless* (ah electorate emerged from 
both groups; and it was discovered that the farmer was a 
die-hard Democrat. He made a fine pioneer because embraced 
within his political philosophy was a vital individualism; 
the farmer in coonskin was the first Mrugged Individual*" ]
Sew Orleans was the "New fork" of the South* Thou­
sands of immigrants cam® to the city, many from foreign shores. 
By i860 there were over 81,000 foreign-born in the city* Of 
these there were 28,207 of Irish nativity, 26,61^ people of 
German lineage, and over 1^,000 from France*^ The Irish, as 
a general rule, became manual workers here as elsewhere; al­
though they would work indisorlmlnantly with the Negroes,
the Irish were given the privilege of the franchise* In the 
%
New Orleans of i860 the whites outnumbered the Negroes three 
to one, an indication of the Importance of the white labor 
vote which could be mustered* Planter unity was a phenomenon 
of the country, where Negro outnumbered white* The City of 
New Orleans regularly contributed over one-fifth of the total 
state vote, and hence the Immigrant vote was one to be
**3 (freer, irfJfcM P* 387*
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reckoned with,
There were, then, in the prosperous Louisiana of the 
eighteen-forties and fifties, several population elements of 
political consequence* Political parties were dependent upon 
the alignments of portions of these elements* An understand­
ing of Louisiana politics circa the decade of the 1850*s re­
quires an analysis of certain political tendencies * ^  The 
planter element was certainly the dominant minority **- together 
with the closely allied commercial interests, this element was 
master of the economic resources•^
Traditionally, however, the historian has separated 
this block of voters into cotton and sugar planters* There 
is evidence presented above which indicated that it is more 
realistic to isolate Mplanter" Interests and identify them 
with the Louisiana Whig tendency* There was a general rap­
prochement between sugar and cotton planters in the decade be­
fore th® war* [the Immigrants were the groups of number* The 
farmer of the hills and prairies was numerically more power­
ful than the planters of the delta; likewise, the laborer of 
the city occurred in greater number than the businessman and 
professional, the city cousins of the rural elite^ Determina­
tion of which way these groups voted will explain the complex 
of events which led to the great Secession*
In order to discover the political tendencies of the 
Louisiana electorate during the fifteen year period which 
preceded the Civil War, a map has been compiled which registers
POLITICAL TENDENCIES 1846 - 1860 
AVERAGE QUARTILE DISTRIBUTION OF 
DEMOCRATIC VOTE BY PARISHES
1st quarter: 1.00 - 1*74
2nd quarter: 1.75 - 2.49
3rd quarter 2.50 - 3.24
B B  4th quarter 3*2 5 - 4.00
m
Journal of Senate. State of Louisiana. 
1846 to 1260
oource
Figure 13
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the average incidence of each parish In a quart lie compute- 
tion of the gubernatorial elections held within the period* 
(See Figure 13.) The quartlles are represented by numbers 
1 - *ft from low support to high. There were five such elec­
tions 9 each won by the Democrats? usually they had also 
gained control of the General Assembly. With the aid of 
the map it will be possible to ascertain the regularity of 
party support within different areas of the state, and to 
make a judgment concerning the groups of citizens involved.
The most striking observation which can be mad© Is 
the general geographical distribution of the predominant 
Democratic tendency* It is seated within the ”interior” 
where, with increasing populations, numerous new parishes
tad t ~ n  c r - t l .  ( a .  I k t a t a .  frtati.tataa tad ( » « . W
the land of these parishes* Investigation will show that the 
core group of parishes of the north Louisiana hills had 
registered strong Democratic majorities In election after 
election. Lafayette Parish, on the fringe of the south­
western prairies, and Calcasieu Parish both show strong Demo­
cratic leanings.''] These, also, were predominantly "farmer” 
areas. One would expect to find the Florida parishes pre­
eminently among the strong supporters of the Democracy? 
yet this was not wholly the case. It may b© recalled that 
these parishes had been settled by Americans, also, but at 
an earlier time than north Louisiana. The Americans here had 
developed a plantation economy which paralleled the way of
7*f
life of the Creole planters to the south of them* The po­
litical tendencies of these parishes were influenced by more 
complex factors than had been felt by the American farmers 
of the northern hills* (Plaquemines Parish sticks out like a 
Democratic thumb; close to New Orleans, Its electorate was 
subjected to political machinations even in those early days* 
John Slidell assured the Louisiana electoral vote for Polk 
in I8*f0 by floating a voting contingent down the river from 
New Orleans to the Plaquemines parish seat, where a sizable 
majority was registered for the Democrats*^
The sugar planters had found repose within the ranks 
of the National Whigs* (The party was to die nationally, 
engulfed by the issues of slavery and the force of the Aboli­
tionist movement. It could no longer hope to sustain the 
alliance between north and south* Whiggish sympathies were 
not to die out in Louisiana y however; even without party, 
the sugar planters and commercial alliances could not whole­
heartedly support the Democratic cause. The distribution of 
Whig tendency, then, would be seated within the sugar country.) 
Within the deep delta, more slavish than the parishes to the 
north, the support for anti-Democratlc candidates remained 
firm* Likewise, among the parishes of the old German and 
Acadian "coasts,” along the Biver above New Orleans, the Whig 
tendency continued to the bitter end. These parishes had 
gained less population from immigration, and the planter unity 
prevailed* The most significant political expression within
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the period under analysis, however, Is to be found within the 
cotton country of the upper Mississippi delta, and as far 
north as Caddo on the Red River* Concordia, for example, 
was one of the original Louisiana parishes, and had emerged 
as a supporter of Whiggery in the forties and ’fifties *
|A1 though cotton was King in the southern nomocracy, yet in 
Louisiana, at least, the cotton planters did not give the 
undying Democratic support which was evident elsewhere*) in 
the eight cotton parishes, where slaves greatly outnumbered 
whites, half of them registered Whig tendencies after ISM)* 
These were the four Mississippi delta parishes $ in three of 
them, Concordia, Madison, and Tensas, the whites were out­
numbered by ten to one, and in Carroll the ratio was three 
to one* Cotton was king and dependent upon slave labor* Yet 
prosperity was too great to risk all without first searching 
for a party of moderation* These were conservatives, and the 
Whig party had been the home of conservatism as well as 
aristocracy, in Louisiana* )
The conclusion to be drawn is that Louisiana had come 
of age in the ’fifties, and very definite cleavage between 
conservative planter and Democratic farmer was the dominant 
political tendency.) With the breakdown of the Whig party 
organization and the division of the Democratic party into 
Slidell and Soule factions, large groups of Louisiana voters 
were left politically voiceless when the issue of Secession 
became crucial* It was too late in l86lj the conservative
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sympathy for Union* compromise, and moderation had been ren­
dered helpless in the political struggle for control of the 
Democratic party.
With a failure of party in i860, the forces of Slidell 
captured the state for the Democracy, The farmer groups sup­
ported the "real0 Democrats* out of tradition? victory was 
guaranteed. Factional strife among the Democrats and lack 
of party organisation among the old-time Whigs merged in the 
presidential election of i860 in such manner that a golden 
chance was missed to register a stand for moderation. The 
combined votes for the conservative Bell ticket and the com­
promising Douglas ticket would have been enough to have won 
the electoral vote of the state. As it was* the Breckinridge 
forces won? moderation was overwhelmed.
In the call for Secession which followed the next 
year* the electorate lined up, for or against, in the elec­
tion of membership for the convention. | Wow, it was farmer 
and sugar planter who Joined forces —  neither desired to 
resort to bloodshed in the protection of vested interests? 
but there were not enough hill Democrats, or planter Whigs, 
to halt the now Inevitable move for disunion • \
Inexorable circumstance had done Its work. Party strife 
and failure, and cumulative political experience brought the 
great tragedy of Secession. And In Louisiana the tragic was 
touched with irony, for, how curious that It had been Jo slab
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Quincy of Massachusetts who had protested Louisiana’s admis­
sion to the Union In 1811, and the Abolitionists of 
Massachusetts who vehemently protested her secession in 
1861.
CHAPTER III 
A NEW LOOK AT RECONSTRUCTION
♦I certainly think that It is better to be 
impetuous than cautious, for fortune is a woman, 
and it is necessary.••• to conquer her by force.-
Machiavelli
A- E1SSS&8 1B&-1868. A failure of par­
ties destroyed the opportunity to master fortune in the events 
which led to Secession, If it were correct that the war had 
been begun by and conducted for a slave-holding minority, 
then the probability was certain by 186V that the dominated 
majority of 1861 could become the master of Its own fate«
For Federal forces controlled the Louisiana parishes sur­
rounding New Orleans and vicinity; the Confederate troops 
stood in force beyond the Mississippi and up the Red River in 
north Louisiana. The people were to be allowed to pick up 
the pleees of Statehood and begin afresh the political strug­
gle for power. A new Constitution was to be drawn and state
offices filled. Within the Federal lines were the old con­
servative Whigs, who at the end had stood firm for the Union,
and remnants of the Democracy in the persons of farmer and 
laborer. That farmer and laborer had built up an accumulation 
of grievances was to become manifest In the constitutional
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instrument written in 186V*
Unionist sentiment* in 1863, was divided on the issue 
of the constitution** One group favored Negro suffrage and 
held that the old constitution had been destroyed by the 
Secession* On the other hand, a more conservative group felt 
that only mul&ttoes should be given the vote, and they pro­
tested that the state government had been suspended, and that 
It should be revived. In January of 186V, General Banks or­
dered an election be held for state offices, and further, 
that in April delegates should be elected for a constitutional 
convention* The moderates nominated Michael Hahn for governor 
and James Madison Wells for lieutenant-governor* The radicals 
gave opposition with the nomination of B* F. Flanders. Upon 
becoming elected to the governorfs chair, Hahn reiterated the 
views of the conservatives concerning Louisiana's constitu­
tional status; in March, President Lincoln transferred to him 
the powers which had previously been exercised by the mili­
tary governor* The governor allowed the call for a constitu­
tional convention, Issued by Banks, to stand*
The move for the Constitution of 186V, and the later 
one of 1868, may be viewed as a manifestation of a social 
revolution in which white labor and the newly-freed black
A. D. Da spit, Governors1 Massages a£
t860-1900 (unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State Uni 
verslty, 1932% p. 5 ff.
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successively gained ascendancy.2 It has been suggested that 
the Constitution of 186^ must have been written by Loulsianans 
whose memory of the problems of the state were fresh. They 
recalled the machinations whereby in 1852 the conservative 
Whigs had gained unequal strength in representation at the 
General Assembly. Perhaps this was one reason why no Negro 
suffrage was put forth at this time* HIt was said that any 
grant of the suffrage Itself to the Negro might well serve to 
re-establish the control of those on whom the Negro must de­
pend for his livelihood.
This constitution, rather, was to be a vehicle whereby 
the grievances of farmer and laborer would be redressed.
The suffrage was extended to all white males of twenty-one 
years of age or over who could meet the one^year residence 
requirement. The constitution established representation on 
the basis of qualified voters, with no restrictions placed 
upon New Orleans. It revived the 18**5 restriction on banks 
and corporations. A progressive Income tax was inaugurated. 
Minimum wage and maximum hours for laborers In public work 
were established. There should be public schools for whit® 
as well as for black. Finally, slavery was abolished. This
(Baton
196-197. The year 1879, then, may be viewed as the In 
table counterrevolution.
^R. W. Shugg, Origins &£ Class In I m U U m
PP*
i evi-
^ n s tltu t^ a lD e v g l^ M iM  
ulsiana (unpublished mas-
5HtyTl9W, p. 73-
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was the first Louisiana constitution which had mentioned 
slavery* The constitution was ratified on July 23, with a 
vote of less than the ten per cent desired by Lincoln#
Louisiana, it appeared, was off to a good start in re­
establishing her Statehood# Governor Hahn gave up his post 
in 1865 to serve as United States Senator$ Wells succeeded to 
the post ©f governor, and although many felt that the recently 
adopted constitution was invalid, Governor Wells called for 
an election for state offices that year in accord with the 
provisions of the new instrument of government# Wells was 
nominated for the office of governor by the Democrats, and 
another group, appreciative of the merits of Louisianavs war­
time governor, Henry W. Allen, nominated him for the position# 
This was little more than gesture, for Wells was elected by 
a large majority# Wells had been candidate for governor in 
unsuccessful opposition to Moore in 1860| he had been a Union 
sympathiser# Wells had by proclamation given full legal 
status to the Confederate parishes which had held out until 
the end of the war# His attitude was instructive*
Whatever may have been the cause of the outbreak and 
however bitter may have been the feelings engendered in 
the hearts of some, it is better that all such matters 
be buried out of sight forever# It is not the past, 
but the present and future, we have to deal with# You 
must go to work to organize civil government in your 
respective parishes#^
U. Norton, Headings la Saslal MSQfifi* IgBlglam 
l60Q-l876 (Baton Rouges Franklin Press, 1935), P* lob#
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A contemporary sums up the feeling toward Wells In a 
letter written to ex-Governor Moore, exiled In Cuba*
Governor Wells bears,.*, the same happy relation to 
Louisiana that President Johnson bears to the whole 
South. Their instincts, if not of the States Eights 
school are yet & £  lagJkjcg t& j&e South and they are and 
will show themselves to be true to their instincts*«*. 
Governor Wells from a combination of circumstances *. * * 
jxzj the most fortunate selection which could be mad© to 
carry out the true policy — « the Presidents policy 
the patriot’s policy —  a reconstruction of the Ghlon 
on the basis of the perfect equality of the states
A study of the distribution of the election returns 
in favor of Governor Wells might be instructive, revealing 
some indication of the appeal of his actions* Figure I1* 
shows that in fourteen parishes Wells had received 95 per 
cent of the vote or better; and there was a consistency in 
the distribution* It might be supposed that this electorate 
was anxious to have the affairs of government in order once 
more. Along the entire length of the Mississippi, the par­
ish vote was overwhelmingly for Wells* These were plantation 
areas; the cotton parishes of this group had moved for Se­
cession, whereas the sugar parishes had been in the ranks of 
the Cooperationists in i860* Wow they were in accord once 
more. The bulk of the remaining voting interest a had followed, 
as there were only five parishes which had not given a majority 
vote for Wells.
5w. M. Lowry, Iftg Political £a££SE teas JMlSffi 
Wail* (unpublished master’s thesis, Louisiana State imlver-
sltyT 19*+7), P.
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1*65 
VOTE FOR JAMES WELLS 
BY PARISHES 
r 1st quarter: 7.8$ - 60.0$
2nd quarter: 61.0$ - 79.
3rd quarter: 80.0$ - 94.0$
4th quarter: 95.0$ Above
Journil of Senate. State of Louisiana. 1865source
Figure 14
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The nature of the support given Wells in the ©lee- 
tion of 186J seemed to assure that Louisiana would be able 
to realise a good reconstruction* However, there were other 
elements of the populace seeking political fortune from dif­
ferent premises than those of Governor Wells* The name 
Warmoth first made Its appearance on the Louisiana scene $ he 
was claimed by the Radical Republicans to be the delegate to 
Congress for the Territory of Louisiana* At the same time, 
political fortunes on the national scene bode ill for Louisi­
ana. In 1866-67* the Republicans carried congressional elec­
tions by such majorities that they became determined to 
carry radical reconstruction into effect. When Louisiana re­
jected the lVth Amendment along with other southern states, 
the die was cast In the National Congress. The First Recon­
struction Act of 1867 was passed, and Louisiana once more fell 
under military rule*
Wells had apparently been a man of moderation and 
sympathy for the problems of his statef he was also the only 
governor who served during Radical Reconstruction Who had 
been a native Louisianan* After his election in 1865, how­
ever, he experienced trouble with the Democratic legislature* 
Although he had shrewdly enlisted the support of the numeri­
cally strong and Influential ex-Conf©derates in furtherance 
of his own political fortunes, the old dominant groups had
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ambitions of their own.^ Walls had pressed for th© ratifica­
tion of the l*fth Amendment , but of course this did not fit 
into the plans of the conservative Democrats. But this was 
no time for the ex-Confederatea to assert themselves with the 
expectancy that the social and political orders would fall 
back into the old slots* The Negro problem must be solved, 
but not through legislative actions bound to raise the anger 
of the Northern Radicals*? No new black code, no matter how 
mild, could stand for long* Radical Republicans were organ­
ising in New Orleans, and of course they too would have am­
bitions and plans of how best to attain them*
b. PQiin.qtang a t loztm .a« J M  fiam&feagg,gtst 126S-
1.876* The rapprochement of ex-Confederates with Unionists 
with such views as Wells entertained might have indicated 
that in a few years the former would be in a position of 
dominance and security, once more. However, this was not to 
be; in 1866 Wells joined forces with the radicals and reversed 
his stand on Negro suffrage. His remarks at this time stand 
as revealing testimony of the impending struggle for power 
between radical and conservative. He said, M*»*only by giv­
ing all Negroes the right to vote could the large Democratic 
or conservative majority possessed by the ex-Confederates in
6J. R. Ficklin, Htatorz s i As AfisAfii-
ana (Through 1868) (Baltimore, 1910), pp» 10^ ff.
?Shugg, ££• brl-t*« p* 212*
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Louisiana bo overcome.”® There could be no doubt now but 
what, with the renewal of Federal supervision, the lot of 
the white conservative would be dire*
General Sheridan Instituted a registration of voters 
under provisions of the Reconstruction Act# Delegates for 
the constitutional convention were chosen and an equal num­
ber of whites and Negroes convened in 1868. The Constitution 
of 1868 was the first in Louisiana containing a Bill of 
Rights; a phrase from the Declaration of independence was 
utilized. The social revolution inaugurated in 186** had been 
continued. The Negroes were granted suffrage, and the politi­
cal fortune hunters who were filling New Orleans established 
the residence requirements in such manner that they could 
proceed to act with the full privilege of citizenship; re­
strictions were placed upon unrepentant ex-Confederates.
This meant that with the aid of the native scalawags, Repub­
lican domination would be guaranteed, providing the Negro 
vote could be influenced. It was possible to outnumber, or 
at least to outmaneuver, the Democrats.
The Constitution of 1868 was adopted by the eligible 
voters, and in the election for state offices Henry Clay 
Waraoth was elected governor. His lieutenant-governor was 
Oscar J. Dunn, a Negro. During the ensuing administration, 
Louisiana was to witness an unprecedented struggle for
®Lowry, o p . clt.. p. 119*
political powar* Democrat and Republican alike sought to 
use means, legal or otherwise, to ensure success for their 
side in the quest for state offices • The Negro had become 
an important political factor and «...Republican politicians 
organised the Negro vote, massed it, and carried it to the
Q
polls.” Without education and with no previous political ex­
perience, the Negro was easily swayed | since the Negro popu­
lation of the state was slightly larger than the white, the 
inference is obvious t the Negro vote would dominate any elec­
tion. It was to combat this advantage that Democrats organ­
ised such secret societies as the Knights of the White Camella 
in order to intimidate the Negro and to secure white supremacy
Prior to the gubernatorial election of 1872, then, the 
Louisiana Democrats became radicals* Finding peaceful means 
to gain the upper hand would fail, they utilized their “white 
man's association*” Warmcth had charged the former govern­
ing group with disgraceful acts of intimidation as early as 
the presidential election of 1868* Reconstruction was in 
full swing in 1871 j but as occurs in any power struggle of 
such open admission as this, coalitions were transitory*
The Republicans commenced to quarrel among themselves, and 
two factions emerged, each with a candidate for governor*
One faction consisted of the governor, Warmoth, and his sup­
port ers* the other faction consisted of the “customhouse 
crowd,” which handled patronage and was close to the Radicals
^Norton, pp. clt♦« pp# 192-193•
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of the National Congress* The former group nominated John 
McKnery for governor, while the candidate of Packard and the 
customhouse group was William Pitt Kellogg*
In this quarrel the Democrats thought they saw an op­
portunity, and they fused with the farmoth faction in opposi- 
tion to Kellogg* When the returns came in, victory was 
claimed by Mc&iery, but the rival "returning board11 of the 
Kellogg group counted victory for their faction* Two rival 
governments were set up? but the customhouse group gained of­
ficial recognition from the Federal government, and the count 
of their Returning Board was established*
It is a political paradox worth noting*0 that the Demo­
crats, who had heaped so much scorn upon Waraoth earlier, 
should now have gone down in defeat with him* For, given 
the alignment of support they were able to muster, the move 
of the Democrats for fusion had seemed a wise one* The re­
turns which had been made official gave Kellogg a majority 
of over 17,000 votes; the Hew Orleans compilation was allowed 
to stand with a 6,000 majority for McBnery* The Republicans 
piled up their count, apparently, in the parishes with large 
Negro registration, where it could be safely assumed they 
were strong.
In defeat, the distribution of the fusion support for 
MeEnery demonstrates the part the Democrats had played*
*°Horton, £££*, p. 196*
(See Figure 15.) The parishes of the northern hills and of 
the southwestern prairies, and the Floridas, registered anew 
their Democratic tendencies. The vote from West Feliciana 
Parish, one of the richest plantation districts in ante­
bellum days, was pro-Republiean, but the Florida parishes to 
the east, where the Negro was less numerous, tended to sup­
port the Democratic cause* Already in emergence is to be 
found the "fracture line" of subsequent Louisiana politics* 
The parishes along the length of the Red and the Mississippi 
rivers show a unity of electoral support, in 1872, of course, 
held together by the vote of the Negro. Here the pattern 
that is going to be typical in the future appears for the 
first time but "in reverse," so to speak*
This was a struggle to the political death* Governor 
Kellogg showed no disposition toward moderation! his rule was 
absolute. Louisiana became an armed camp in l8?3 as a result 
of the "Colfax riot" which had resulted In the death of a 
number of Negroes* Federal authorities had a necessary ex­
cuse for keeping troops in the state* The Negro had found a 
place in Louisiana politics, but his position was an uncom­
fortable one. Salvation of the state lay in overthrowing the 
rule of the Negro, the Democratic majority of the whit© 
people of Louisiana believed. It might be true that the Negro 
became the scapegoat in the development of this critical 
situation in the state. “It is...* impossible to trace White 
political Issues and cleavages without reference to the Negro
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as the common enemy, the red herring across all political 
trails
The point of view has merit, but It has generally been 
utilised incorrectly. in 1865, during the constitutional de­
bate, it was seen that neither the Democrats nor the Conserva­
tive Unionists had been for Negro suffrage$ but since such a 
fact as Negro suffrage was to become a political reality, 
most certainly the conservative Democrats would have developed 
sentiment one way or another concerning it* Negro suffrage 
was a stem reality, and the block of Negro votes became 
enormously important. It was a support worth struggling for 
if political fortune was the goal.
The first inclination was to attempt to discredit the 
Negro at the polls $ the planter would insure that his former 
slave would look ridiculous as a citlsen. The events which 
actually followed lend credence to the remarks of P. B. S* 
Pinchbeck, Louisiana's only Negro governor?
Democrats In many portions of the state instigated 
and thrust forward the most ignorant colored men that 
could be found for election to the Constitutional Con­
vention with the view of making that Constitution 
/l86Jy a farcef and In order to make success certain, 
they put no competing candidate in the field.... The 
illiterate men returned home successful statesmen and 
from that day to this nearly every man In Louisiana has 
felt himself every inch a statesman and from this policy 
has arisen in a great degree the ignorance that has found 
its way into the public offices of our state.
n P. Levinson, Race. Class, agd Early (New York* 
Oxford University Press, 1932;, p. **>
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There were other ways of attempting to meet the problem of
manipulation of the Negro vote* After the defeat of 1872,
in the looal elections which preceded the next gubernatorial
election, the Democrats prepared for drastic action* The
Shreveport Times published this warning?
The carpetbaggers * careers are ended } we are deter** 
mined to tolerate them no longer} and if they care for 
their infamous necks, they had better stop their work 
right now and look out for a safer field for rascality * ■*
Federal control made it impossible to overthrow Negro rule in 
a legal manner, so it was decided to circumvent Negro domina­
tion by subterfuge or extralegal action*
In 1876, the Democrats overcame the carpetbaggers} 
and since there was an Increase in the total vote of over 
30,000, it is not feasible to believe that they won by sup­
pressing the Negro vote, though they might have stuffed ballot 
boxes. In fact, the Democrats went all out to woo and win 
the Negro to their cause. The cumulative results of carpet­
bag misrule likewise weighed heavily against the Republicans. 
Particularly, the exploitation of the state coffers by these 
political adventurers, and the fact that the Negro had gained 
little by these financial maneuvers, weakened Republican 
chances* It became evident early in the campaign that the 
Negro vote would again play the deciding factor, and the 
P i c a 17*? keynoted the policy of the Democrats?
^uorton, 211* £l&*» P* 196*
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We must convince the Blacks that we are In earnest In 
our expression of good will, and they, for their part, 
must evince a disposition to meet us half way* As ours 
is the superior race, at least by culture and experi­
ence, it becomes us to take the Initiative * bet us en­
deavor to persuade the colored people that an alliance 
of the two races Is necessary to the preservation of 
their common safety* *
This policy must have borne fruit, as the Democratic candi­
date, Francis T* Nicholls, from Lafourche Parish, polled a 
clear majority over the Republican candidate, Packard*
An Inspection of the distribution of the Nicholls vote 
will indicate, however, that If the Negro had voted Democratic 
in some numbers, the resultant was a general spread of the 
total vote; for it is clear from the compiled map that the 
parishes predominantly Negro were still foremost In the Repub­
lican count* (See Figure 16.) Future events were to prove 
that the Democratic party control remained with the old 
planter elite. They won their victory, however, with the 
strong support of the farmers vote. The bulk of the highest 
quartlle of the Nleholls* parish vote was distributed in the 
hills and prairies. The ancient Democratic prejudice re­
mained a factor to be reckoned with*
And what of the old Whig country? All of the parishes 
of the sugar country were predominantly Negro; together with 
New Orleans they were the seats of Republican strength.
Coupled with remaining Negro strength In Red River and
l!+H. M. McDaniel, Francis Tlllon ills Had.
of Reconstruction (unpublished master1® thesis, Louisiana 
State University, 19**° )j p. 29*
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Mississippi delta parishes, the Republicans were formidable* 
Still, whit© Democrats had achieved a signal victory, but 
there was no pronounced political change, in the results of 
this election, either way* One student of the period sum-* 
m&rized*
The change of political control did not bring forth 
any outstanding modification of political principles nor 
any great improvement in public morals* With the excep­
tion of Governor NichoILs and a few others, the new pub­
lic servants were not especially concerned with 
improving the lot of the masses.1?
Governor NichoILs had promised not to be counted out 
by a carpetbag Returning Board should he be elected; he 
would beat the Republicans at their own game* After a year 
of Republican opposition, in 1877 President Hayes recognised 
the HichoUs government, and Federal troops were withdrawn 
from Louisiana* Packard surrendered the State House to the 
White League; "Reconstruction" was over* This event did not 
signal the establishment of white supremacy, however, for 
there were still many parishes where Negroes were entrenched 
in local office. Likewise, one of the institutions of Re­
construction, the Louisiana Lottery Company, remained a 
force of political influence* It had donated funds to the 
administration in 1877 and, with great strength in the legis­
lature, was seeking to perpetuate its Influence by an exten­
sion of Its charter, first established in 1868*
**0. McOinty, Louisiana Redeemed (New Orleans* Pelican 
Publishing Co*, 1 9 W ), pp* 2*f7-2H-o*
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Hicholls began his opposition whidh was to culminate 
successfully in 1892$ lie vetoed the legislative enactment*
The Lottery Company gained relief from the Federal courts, 
however, and in 1879 Joined its influence with the leglsla- 
ture in a move for a constitutional convention. This was 
the inevitable counterrevolution of the movements of 186s* 
and 1868. It was not surprising that the Constitution of 
1879 should have imposed strong restrictions upon the legis­
lature and granted the executive powers rivaling 1812.
As it appeared on paper, this constitution was not a 
reactionary instrument! there had been no move to disenfran­
chise the Negro at this time. Of course such an action was 
prohibited by fear of the action of the Federal government*
No, it was the attitude of the new ruling group which was 
reactionary, as the events of subsequent decades were to show* 
The actions of 1879 mark the emergence of the wlllywhites,w 
for the Democratic party, under the direction of the conserva­
tives, became the tt. ♦ institutionalized incarnation of the 
will to White Supremacy
It was the planter-merchant elite which re-emerged 
triumphant. White support for the new Democracy might have 
appeared solidary, but the ability to use the hindsight of 
the present day suggests that the dominant group in the Demo­
cratic party would make the moves to protect its position
l6». J* Cash, The Blind of tfoe South (New Yorks Alfred 
A • Knopf, 19^1), P* 128.
9?
whenever the tine and the event should present Itself* Any 
rebel would have to oppose the established hierarchy of the 
one political party to achieve redress of a grievance* In 
the end, the Yankee failed in his mission to Reconstruct the 
South and especially the southern attitudes* Cash reminds us*
So far from having reconstructed the Southern mind**.* 
in Its essential character, it was the Yankee’s fat© to 
have strengthened It almost beyond reckoning, and to have 
made it one of the most solidly established, one of the 
least ©*er developed*1”
C. 22& BffiftSfflPMfl fi£ £ &  LJJLygMteg. ( ?he experience of 
Reconstruction took on proportions of a first class traumatic 
episode within the ideological structure of Louisiana’s 
governing elites a political bill of goods was fashioned 
which depicted carpetbag political adventurer and Negro sup­
porter as the bogeymen*| Catharsis lay in action designed to 
perpetuate forever the assurance of political supremacy.
 ^Drawing from the experience of the past, elements of 
both Whig and Jacksonian philosophy were accepted as dogma 
The planter groups, which had shown a tendency toward political 
alliance, before the issue of Secession arose, were to con­
tinue the spirit of Whiggeryf and the farmer groups, whose 
Democratic tradition was utilised by elements of the former 
groups before the War, were to continue to be susceptible to 
the appeals of Jacksonian Democracy*
However, the struggle for power was to become more
17Ibid.. p. 107.
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naked, and groups of cotton planters, using the machinery of 
the Democratic party to their own ends, were to fall to prac­
tice the political responsibility which had gone hand in 
hand with the political authority of the old sugar country 
Whig* In revamping the economic losses brought by the War, 
the sons of planters became ,frugged individualistsw and man­
aged, through continued alliance with city commercial inter­
ests and the establishment of an avaricious credit system, 
to maintain the dominance of large-scale agriculture* 'j It has 
been concluded that IT**.the end result was that the dogma of
an individualistic democracy became the accepted political
l Atheory of a state permeated with the spirit of thlggery*nA 
It has been said that Reconstruction ended with the 
withdrawal of Federal troops In 1877# (A recent evaluation 
of the period, however, Indicates that more realistic, if un­
popular, justification lies In closing the period with the
Democratic success in the elections of I87B ^  j In this year 
white supremacy was established through Democratic fraud, 
violence and Intimidation against the ffegro* A contemporary 
had written*
The election of 1878 marked the final overthrow of
the Bepublican party in Louisiana* In 1878 we had
elected Nicholls governor on a state ticket, but it took 
1878 to finish the work# So complete was the overthrow 
of the Radical-Republlcan-Uegro party**.* at that
l®Prothro, g£# cit*f p« 15^. 
19,^0. A. Singletary, Heassertlon &£ flUta 
in Louisiana (unpublished master1 s Wes is, Louisiana State
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election, that from that time to this, It has never been
able to elect a constable, even in the parish. "
The Democrats were taking no chances and fanned the flame of 
white solidarity;^ reigns of terror had been established In 
several parishes in an attempt to intimidate the Negro.
These disclosures are revealing, as they indicate the extent 
to which Reconstruction experience became a rationalization 
Justifying actions as severe as had been practiced earlier by 
the former rulersj and this after 1876, when the whites had 
attempted to persuade the Negro that a vote for the Democrats 
was more in line with his Interest.
Singletary has revealed the duplicity of the whites* 
action. Their first reaction had been non-recognition of 
the facts of 1878, but the Democrats were actually too proud 
of their achievements to remain discreetly quiet. The claim 
was prevalent that the Negroes had voluntarily voted the 
Democratic ticket, but the facts of actual violence robbed 
this argument of support.  ^A favorite theme of Democratic 
rationalization was that the actions were not the resultant 
of prejudice against the Negro as Negro, but against the 
Negro as a political leader. ; "From a moral viewpoint, the 
negro was, on the average, a good citizen$ the negro 
politician vile. From a political viewpoint, both were
2QIbld.« quoted from letter of Newton C. Blanchard 
to John R.Fieklin, Feb. 9* 1903*
21Ibid.. p. 66 ff.
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bad.* (Therefore, whether "accidentally" or "Incidentally/* 
tha Negro In 1878 became the object of white terror based 
primarily on political grounds* The inescapable conclusion 
is that in 1878 the Republican party was not given a free 
ballot in a fair election. \
Ifhe emergence of the reality of White Supremacy, 
through the use of such desperate measures, marked the mood 
of the time.^ The important question to answer la this con­
nection is who gave doctoral support to the standard bearers 
of this movement, (a planter-merchant elite reestablished 
itself in the political saddle, but it could stay there only 
through gaining support of the farmer groups and a portion 
of the Negro group, or through intimidation of either or both.)
The thesis that race prejudice, per se, united the 
whites after the War in the ascendancy of the Democratic 
party must be r e - e x a m i n e d . ^  It has been supposed that the 
presence of the slave before the War had given the poor and 
white, farmer and laborer, a privileged position on the 
social ladder. There was someone lower t© be looked down 
upon| hence, the farmer did not turn justifiable rage against 
the wealthy planter who had dominated him politically. Bace 
prejudice filled the void of class hatred. (^ The .Tacksonians 
of the forties could effectively escape the fear of the
22Ibld.. p. 68.
“^ Stage's popular contention.
ioi
Negro, whereas the farraer-Democrat of the Seventies and 
’eighties could not afford to ignore hiza*^
Bat is It absolutely necessary to hold that the Jack* 
sonian hill-farmer should have been concerned about the race 
problem unless his way of life were threatened? then he 
would quite naturally protest the necessity of fighting some- 
one else’s war. After all, the Negro was conspicuous by his 
absence in the areas of settlement predominantly farmer.
r
( Moreover, as Cash has pointed out, the farmer of the south 
was not directly exploited by the plantation system, @ither$ 
the farmer could act as a relatively free agent within so- 
ciety. / Could not the old Jacksonian think for himself and 
vote his traditional beliefs? We shall never know, for 
aside from the evidence of his vote there is no record. The 
hill-farmer as the south Louisiana Cajun had no press through 
which to articulate his opinions, for such mediums of communi­
cation were established and dominated by the self-styled 
aristocracy of planter-merchants*
The events of the l880*s would more likely substanti­
ate the thesis concerning incipient class struggle and the 
fanning of the flame of racial prejudice. Economic exploita­
tion of the farmer would become more apparent through the 
development of the crop lien system. The white family farmer 
became dependent on the cotton merchant through indebtedness, 
and the merchants and planters controlled the (new)
2lfCash, ££• cit.« p# 39*
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Democratic party Hera lay the foundation for group strug­
gle culminating in the political explosion of the 1890*s* 
With fears of economic insecurity, the farmer might admit to 
the compulsion of using the Hegro as the political whipping 
hoy, just as In another age the fear of the communist threat 
was to lead good •hearted men to condone the slander of the 
Liberal*
D* MLttftrtfr &  & &  m u g ’ 1879-1892* If the domi­
nating elements of the Democratic party were prepared to 
fight to make the state safe for white democracy, then they 
must turn to the hills for support* Without the threat of 
the Hegro vote, experience had shown the natural majority of 
the Democratic party support in the state* The quest for 
political supremacy was more arduous now and required the 
dogma of solidarity* An investigation of the distribution of 
the Democratic support by parishes, in the period of a little 
more than a decade in the Eighties, will reveal the pattern 
of success of the lllywhites* An election by election dis­
cussion will be followed by a summary and evaluation of the 
tendencies which are revealed*
In 1879, following the successful ratification of the 
new constitution, the Democrats elected Louis A. Wilts 
governor of Louisiana* Of the total vote cast, 63.5> per cent 
was in favor of Wilts\ his majority of over thirty-one thou­
sand was a large increase over the rather close majority of 
some eight thousand which Nicholas had received in 1876.
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Significantly, there was a sharp decrease in the number of 
Negro rotes, assuming that the Negro rote was a Republican 
rote. Since the total white rote was smaller, also, in 
1879, the indication is that some thirty thousand fewer 
Negroes had gone to the polls; and there were more Negroes 
registered than white voters# Suggestion of intimidation 
once again appears when an Inspection Is made of the distri- 
button of voting support#
Although the support for the Republicans remained 
seated in the sugar country of the southern delta, in the 
election under discussion, the continuation of the political 
"fracture line" up the Red River and along the upper Missis­
sippi delta appears disrupted# The parishes Involved were 
composed of populations of Negroes outnumbering the whites# 
Since the voter registration figures favor the Negroes, also, 
only one conclusion is feasible*
Ten parishes registered a Democratic vote of more than 
98 per cent# This was solidarity; or it might just as re* 
alistlcally have been the effect of Intimidation or machine 
pressure# Host of these parishes had consistently given Demo­
cratic majorities, but never such proportions as these# 
Likewise, the predominant group in each was the farmer# These 
were the hill parishes where the Negro had never resided in 
great number; at least this was the situation in most of the 
ten parishes under consideration# In the two decades since 
i860 the Negro had actually migrated in large number into the
ICft
parishes bordering Arkansas* Winn and Sabine had shorn de­
creases in Negro population*
The incidence of this high voting percentage, however, 
would not assume such significant proportions were it not 
for the fact that it occurred In a clustering of parishes*
(See Figure 17«) Stretching from Franklin and Richland, on 
Macon Ridge, to Sabine and Vernon, on the Texas border, the 
group is broken only by the parishes through which the Red 
River flows, and of course the planter was the dominant ele­
ment here. Almost all of the parishes fringing this Demo­
cratic core area had also produced relatively high votes for 
the sane party.
The factor which counts heavily in favor of interpret­
ing this pheaxmesioa as a demonstration of Democratic manipu­
lation Is the diversity of the composition of the population 
in some of the parishes. Desoto, to the west, and Ouachita, 
Richland, and Franklin on the eastern fringe, were parishes 
where planter interests were great and where the Negro popu­
lation outnumbered the whitej and in the case of Ouachita, 
there was also the commercial town of Monroe to take into con­
sideration. Ouachita gained around 3,000 in Negro population 
from 1800 to 1880. In the core parishes of the hills, the 
Democratic tendency was already strong; it had not been so 
readily visible in the parishes of the fringe.
This pattern of voter solidarity again appeared in
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the next gubernatorial election of 188*** (See Figure 18.)
Once more the seat of Republican opposition is found in the 
sugar country, with some vestiges of Republican tendency 
showing in Grant and East Carroll* However, this time, 
there were twelve parishes with a vote favoring the Demo­
cratic candidate, McEnery, by more than 98 per cent. West 
Carroll and Tensas Joined the block of solid Democratic par­
ishes, and these had compiled votes of over 80 per cent for 
the Democratic candidate the previous election* The former, 
another Macon Ridge parish, was predominantly an area of 
farmers, although the Negro population outnumbered the white, 
in the population count of this decade. But East Carroll, 
on the Mississippi, was planter dominated in contrast to a 
large farmer class in West Carroll* In the former the 
Negroes outnumbered the whites by ten to one; the proportion 
was nearly equal in West Carroll* Tensas was a parish of 
planters which had, of course, registered high Republican 
votes in the years of Negro support of the carpetbaggers*
The results of the gubernatorial election of 1888 show 
a slightly different distribution of voting support* (See 
Figure 19*) There was not only the appearance of gaps in 
the block of sugar parishes which favored the Republican party, 
there also appeared to be a shift in the distribution of par­
ishes with strong Democratic leanings. Seven of tho parishes 
which had given over 98 per cent of support to the Democrats 
continued to do so; and two new parishes, Morehouse and
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Madison, were added to the list* However, West Carroll and 
Richland, registered less support in this election. Like­
wise, Winn Parish, in the heart of the hills, no longer ap­
proached one hundred per cent solidarity in its voting 
tabulations* Cameron and East Feliciana round out the group 
of parishes which approached perfect unity* The lure of 
Democratic solidarity was fading, or the accomplishments of 
Democratic administrations, perhaps, was not all to be desired.
The most significant aspect of these political tenden­
cies which were expressed in the l880*s lies in the emergence 
of the events of the next decade* This will be discussed 
below in the following section. However, this phenomenon of 
Democratic solidarity also must be viewed in light of the 
actions of the time. The Democrats had regained control of 
state politics in the "seventies, and although the Republi­
cans remained a determined, if out-voted opposition, they 
continued to put up a ticket for each gubernatorial election*"^ 
To win elections, the Democrats had to somehow counter the 
numerical strength of the Negro vote.
Unless some other alternative is brought forward, the 
thesis must stand that the emergence of the Bourbon Lilywhites 
was a political paradox. Their support would have to come 
from plantation-Negro areas of cotton country and from farmer 
areas; but these groups had nothing to gain from acceptance
25P. D. TJzee, ?SXXt*lSSL ill Loolalana. 1877-
1900 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State Uhi- 
versity, 1950).
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of such political bedfellows* Ota the planter-merchant group 
which dominated the Democracy sell the farmer the idea that 
the Negro in politics was bad for him, or did they control 
the vote In both Negro and farmer areas?
The necessity for white solidarity had been forwarded 
by the dominant minority* The theory of the “self-fulfilling 
prophecy11 states that as people define the social situation 
so it shall become through their consequent actions* The 
grand old Democratic party was threatened by the vote of the 
Negro, so he must become a scapegoat* Racial hatred might 
have been an exaggeration of the Bourbon, but the solidarity 
of the farmer was a reality.
The most striking Democratic success at the polls in 
this period occurred in those parishes where a unified front 
was least needed* Solidarity would mean little in the ten 
parishes with a support of over 98 per cent for the Demo­
cratic candidate of 1879, for example* For the combined vote 
of these parishes would have been but a third of the majority 
of the total Democratic vote for governor* Moreover, the 
combined white registration outnumbered the Negro registra­
tion almost two to one* What the Democrats wanted, then, 
must have been control of the local parish political machinery, 
to augment their state-wide control? and no logic could deny 
that the predominant farmers groups of these parishes would
^ R .  E* Merton, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,M The 
Antioch Review (Summer, 1 9 W *
Ill
prefer white to Negro control in the political offices on 
the leeal level.
As the voting results of the decade have shown, there 
was little trouble in gaining solidarity* In this endeavor 
the Democrats were eminently successful, if the statistics 
have any meaning. It would be far easier to control a par­
ish where the predominant political tendency had always been 
Democratic, and where the Negro vote was small. The politi­
cians were intent upon spreading the techniques of sueee&s 
as widely as possible! and in the end it would prove easier 
to deal with the Negro populations than with the whites of 
certain parishes, at least. Whereas in the political strug­
gle the party could draw upon a traditional vote in the farm 
areas and forward the ideology of racial solidarity, events 
were to prove that in the accompanying economic sphere the 
patent lack of a union of interests in this alignment worked 
against the Bourbon.
Competent research has amply demonstrated the fact 
that by the end of the 1880*3 the plantation system had not 
only survived in Louisiana, but had also become established 
as the predominant agricultural s y s t e m . T h e  political con­
sequence of this is the fact that the agrarian base of the 
old Jacksonian Democracy, Louisiana style, was destroyed!
27Shugg, SSL* sit.; also W. B. Highsmith, Louisiana 
During Reconstruction (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Loul- 
slana State University, 1953)* Highsmith had special Census 
data which Shugg had not used.
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gone was the self-sufficiency of the frontier farmer, gone, 
in fact, the frontier* The pre-Civil War pattern of large 
land-holdings still prevailed In the delta lowlands, and al­
though the farmers of the hills still worked their small 
plots, they devoted their efforts to raising cotton* Many 
farmers enjoyed a prosperity rivaling the planterf hat the 
results of one-crop farming were Insidious* As more and more 
Louislanans devoted their lands to cotton, the crop lien be­
came established* In bad years Indebtedness Increased, 
fans were lest through forfeiture, and farmers were forced 
into tenancy* An economic situation was established whereby 
the farmer class might find itself building up new and real 
resentments toward the planter-merchant elite which could 
manage to ride out the failure of a bad crop*
The difference in the Incidence of Negro participation 
in elections was striking to the south, In the sugar country.
Here was seated the continued support of Republicanism in
28
Louisiana during the l880!s. The party had survived, after 
1877, due to the fact that it controlled the Federal patron­
age in the state during much of the period from 1877 to 1900* 
Funds were available with which to maintain party organiza­
tion and a sizable following* However, this factor alone 
cannot explain away the large Negro vote in the sugar country 
which brought to the Republicans the label of the MBlaok"party.
2^Uzee, ££*
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To be sure, the predominant Negro registration would 
guarantee a Republican majority in most sugar parishes, but 
the question could be asked as to why the Negro could vote 
here while his participation in elections was discouraged in 
cotton country* In the first place, the sugar plantation, al­
though it had been devastated by the events of the War years, 
had remained the stable economic unit of the area* large 
land-holdings were maintained and sharecropping was far less 
prevalent. let, the primary conclusion concerning lack of 
widespread Negro intimidation in south Louisiana must be a 
sociological one* There was a cultural tradition 'manifest 
in the French background and the presence of the Catholic 
Church. The more "tolerant" mood in regard to Negro voting 
in sugar country also happened to coincide with the planters' 
Republican leanings, which were of an economic basis.
E. JQ& Ponullst-Bepubllcan fotgAw lft.92-3.9PQ. Becon- 
struction, as generally viewed, had ended by 1880, but po­
litical reconstruction was not over, for the ascendancy of 
the Bourbon-Democrat was not fully assured; and the assertion 
of the Dogma of White Supremacy not fully accepted. The 
Populist Party appeared on the Louisiana scene in the elec­
tion of 1892 and made its strongest inroads in that part of 
the area of Democratic solidarity which had been manifest In 
the eighties. The success of the Populists was to set up a 
severe challenge to the continued supremacy of the Bourbons; 
to maintain their economic security there was nothing more
1!**
rewarding than political success.
The Democrats had somehow established a solid front 
against the opposition of the Black Republicans; but now the 
farmer groups, upon whom the Democrats had depended so heavily, 
became Populists, in head-on conflict with the party of their 
formerly Intense preference. The Democrat had shown the 
farmer of the l8809s that In unity there was strength; how 
well the farmer had learned his lesson would be demonstrated 
In the political battles of the 1890*8. It could be held 
that the Bourbons no longer needed the support of the farmer; 
but the actions of the Democrats in the decade of the nineties 
in Louisiana were to dispel this notion.
Why did the farmer of the hills lose faith and disavow 
the established Democratic solidarity? The answer to that 
question can be stated in socio-economic terms. The movement 
for Populist-Republican fusion became one in which elements 
of farmer groups became class conscious and joined others who 
sought economic redress through political action. Self- 
sufficiency for the farmer had vanished with the passing of 
the frontier, and the heavy concentration upon the one cash 
crop of cotton, served to place him in an untenable situation. 
He was under the mercy of the merchants of the country towns; 
with a crop failure the farmer must find credit to fill his 
needs or lose farm and go down into tenancy. The conclusion 
is valid that "••• the plantation system not only survived, 
with modifications of labor and finance, but extended to the
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upland farms to make trouble for the future*h2^ This pattern 
was not peculiar to Louisiana, but was a familiar on® through­
out the south.
The historian of Populism, John Hicks,placed the 
movement in the common perspective of the south and the 
nation when he wrote:
The Populist Party was almost exclusively a farmers1 
affair. Its roots lay In the acute agricultural distress 
that overtook both the New West and the New South toward 
the end of the eighties* Impressed with the occasional 
effectiveness of labor unions and eager to win compar­
able victories for agriculture, the farmers of both sec­
tions began to band themselves together into farm orders 
of various names and natures *31
Two great branches, the Northern and the Southern Alliances, 
met with great success in their forays into local and state­
wide politics* So much so, that in 1892 a movement was ini­
tiated to merge the two into a national People’s Party*
This was accomplished despite much southern reluctance in 
making a move for a third party which might upset the newly 
won White Supremacy* There could be found little reluctance 
amongst the Louisiana Populists when they went into political 
battle in the gubernatorial election of 1892*
In 1892 the Lottery issue split the parties with the 
results that four candidates were entered in the race for
29ghugg, clt*. p. 2731 Highsmith, 22* Jail** Ch. X 
"Problems of Money ana Lands
3°J. D. Hicks, 2&e Ponallst HfiZ2l£ (Minneapolis* 
University of Minnesota Press, 19317.
31J. D, Hicks, The American Nation (Boston* Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 19*+?), p. 2 %.
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governor. The Democrats split between the factions headed 
by Morphy J• Foster and ex*-Governor MeEnery• Fearing that 
solidarity would be breached, the Democrats called for a 
state-wide vote to solve the Issue of candidacy. This move
Mefinery was the candidate of the Lottery Company, although 
he denied the claim* When Foster became the choice of the 
Democrats, McBnery decided to run anyway* Foster had fought 
the Lottery in the legislature* He was a gentleman from St. 
Mary, and in the fight against the Lottery he had gained 
many friends. It has been said that he had w..* led the 
forces of morality to victory over the graft and corruption 
that permeated the state government • n33
If it were true that the Democratic dogma required ab­
solutes, then they had found the man for the Job, a man 
versed in the imagery of persuasion. Concerning the Lottery 
he had asked "... the mothers of this land when they kneel 
with their little ones at prayer to teach them to prays 
Lead us not into this temptation, deliver us from this evil 
and save us from this polluting monster."^
32S. J. Romero, Jr.. l&e faH.Upftl £&£&££ SL Morpto J-
tor’s thesis, Louisiana State Univer­
ves the forerunner of the party primary in Louisiana *32
lbid.T p. 19*
quoted from New Orleans New Deltar
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The Republican® were split, also, over the Lottery 
question, with the WArmoth Faction opposing, while the 
Kellogg faotion championed it* the former group nominated 
John S. Breaux, and the latter nominated Albert H. Leonard. 
The newly organised People's Party nominated R. L. Tannehlll. 
The Lottery issue was robbed of significance prior to the 
election when the TJhlted States Supreme Court upheld the con* 
stltutionallty of the anti-lottery postal law.^ 5>
Something was wrong with the old Democratic unity, 
when the "real* candidate of the party, Foster, was given but 
¥*■•? per cent of the total vote cast* Even without the de­
fection of MeEnery, the Democratic party would have polled 
some six per cent less votes than in the previous guberna­
torial election* In this situation, the Republicans might 
well become enthusiastic about chances in the next elections* 
Even though the Lottery question had lost force, yet the can­
didates had lined up more or less on that basis* Hence it 
is interesting to find the quite sharp split in the vote be­
tween north and south Louisiana, Perhaps the issue of the 
Lottery had a religious or cultural connotation* At any rate, 
the distribution of highest parish support for the candidacy 
of Foster clustered along the Arkansas Border in north Loui­
siana, although he was at home in south Louisiana, Here, in
35uzee, o p . qifr
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south Louisiansy the only overwhelming *oster support was 
found in St, Mary and neighboring Acadia and St. JShrtin*
The Floridas were likewise safe for the democracy.
Support for the candidacies of MeEnery and the Repub** 
liean hopefuls was seated in south Louisiana almost exclu­
sively, save for the Republican support of Leonard in Tensas. 
(See Figure 20.) Leonard, fro® Caddo, received pluralities 
in seven parishes strung along the Mississippi from Points 
Coupee to St. Charles. In this election, at least, the color 
line was not apparent in the political support within the 
area. The emergence of this situation made the possibilities 
of new alignments in the quest for political supremacy more 
certain.
The highly significant result of this election of 
1892 was the emergence of support for the Peopled Party? 
but the significance lies not so much In the support, but in 
its location. (See Figure 21.) The break of the near- 
perfect solidarity in behalf of the Democrats which had ex­
isted in the hills in the eighties was the acre striking in 
its suddenness • Tet, the beginning of the shift of the uni­
fied support to the parishes of the Arkansas border was seen 
In 1888. Five parishes, in 1892, registered pluralities In 
favor of the Peopled Party, and this when there were four 
other choices. Each of these parishes was comprised of a 
farmer population, where the whites outnumbered the Negroes. 
Moreover, there were seven other parishes with a sizable
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Populist veto clustered adjacent to the core group $ and In 
these parishes there were also goodly numbers of white farm* 
ers* In fact, the whole group of parishes with these Popu­
list leanings comprise the bulk; of what are popularly known 
as the “hill parishes'* of Louisiana*
From the hills of north Louisiana, then, to the piney 
woods of Washington Parish, the farmer had sought a voice to 
protest his concern at the condition of things* the economic 
ailments confronting him evidently could not be cured by the 
party of his traditional choice* Conscious of himself as 
part of a specific grouping within Louisiana society, the 
action of the farmer indicated he no longer was willing to 
put up a solid political front along with the planter, In 
behalf of the quest for White Supremacy; the Populist farmer 
became elass conscious.
The untenable situation in which the farmer found him­
self, as the eighties became history and he faced the nineties, 
was one of crisis. Once before, the farmer had faced crisis, 
in 1361, at which time he had voiced his protest, in vain, 
in opposition to the impending Secession. The farmer had re­
mained a Democrat after the war and through the struggles of 
reconstruction. Now, the pleasure of solidarity was not 
enough, since it had brought no great benefits to the vast 
majority of the Louisiana farmer groups.
In the decade of the 1890*s chances looked as good for 
the Republicans as for the Democrats. The bulk of
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carpet bagger-sc&lawag influence had haw softened and the 
opportunity for fusion with the "people* of the white race 
had been found* fhe election of 1896 found the Democrats 
facing a three-headed opposition comprised of the union of 
Republicans, disgruntled sugar growers, and the People *s 
Party* fhe sugar Interest were hurt by the Tariff of 189**> 
and these planters, many ex-Democrats, Joined forces with the 
opposition. Considering the cluster of anti-Foster support 
in the sugar country in the previous election, it is not sur­
prising that a community of interests could be established*
The Democrats ran Foster for a second term as governor In 
opposition to the Fusion.
fhe Hegro vote again became a factor of great impor­
tance, and the Democrats made much of the distasteful political 
bedfellows embraced by the Fusion, and particularly the Popu­
list element • It is not known whether the Fusion candidate,
J. B. Pharr of the Peopled Party, spoke for the membership 
of his party or not, but his words concerning the Hegro in
I896 were far different from the views of the Democrats 1
I was reared with the Hegro and worked side by side 
with him for twenty odd years. I may say for all my 
life, I never have found him other than a good laborer 
and as honest as most other men* If he has*cut a bad 
figure in politics, we are to blame for It***
For good or bad, the Negro still had a vote in 1896, 
and this worried the Democrats. Foster had fought for the
^Romero, op * clt.. p. 76,
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unity of hia party all his political career, and the elec­
tion of 1896 was to he his toughest battle. He had believed 
that only with the Democrats in power could the commonwealth 
prosper, and of course this meant the Negro vote must somehow 
be managed $ this meant White Supremacy. The main issue of 
the election of 1896 for the Bourbon Democrats was the prob­
lem of Negro suffrage*
Not only did the intrusion of the problem of Negro 
suffrage irk the Fusion, which stood to gain by the Negro 
vote, also, the Populists had become antagonistic to Foster 
as a result of the governors action while in office his 
first ten. The Louisiana Populist had claimed that "...the 
first thing Foster did after he was counted into office was 
to take the farmers by the nape of their necks and the slack 
of their trousers and dump them outside the party lines.
If the faner wanted to try his luck with the Peopled Party, 
then the Democrats could do without him; and the election re­
sults proved the Democrats to be correct.
When the voting returns were counted, It was revealed 
that the Democrats had won with 56.2 per cent of the total 
vote. Foster claimed 116,216 votes to Pharr1s 90,136*
Fraud was claimed, and with some justification, since Foster*& 
largest majorities came from parishes where the Negro
37ftomero, ££• £ & m  P* 61+*
IZh
registration was heaviest*3® $he Fusionists were sure the 
Democrats had stuffed the ballot boxes and insured victory*
Ho one will ever know? but after an investigation of the cir­
cumstances, each may draw his own conclusion*
The distribution of the parish support of Foster shows 
the marked pattern of the fracture line in Louisiana politics* 
(See Figure 22*) It shows the Foster support in the parishes 
of the Bourbon Democrats, where to this day the large propor­
tion of Louisiana’s Negro population resides* Very signifi­
cant was the strong voice of the farmer manifested In the 
"People’s1* vote of West Carroll* The faimer was anti-Democratic 
party wherever he predominated a parish in 1896.
The motto of the Democrats in I896 was apparently "if 
you can’t beat ’em, keep ’em away from the polls•** The sup­
port of the Fusion, as registered in the count which was 
made official, was seated in those parishes where the Negro 
was not predominant. (See Figure 23*) In general, the par­
ishes which had shown Populist tendencies in 1892 were the 
ones where the Fusion of 1896 was successful* The people 
had found their voice, but in so doing they had discovered 
their common enemy, the Bourbon Democrats* The people would 
not be heard again until the advent of Huey Long*
38i. E. Daniel, Jfcft LftUiai&fla. ££&el&l£ E&llZ (un­
published master’s thesis, Louisiana State University,
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F. ika &£ asftCQ.es, sM IhlM*
1898-1900. the reconstruction, which was to shape the course
of Louisiana politics in the twentieth century, was completed 
in 1898* The Bourbon Democrats had successfully met the 
challenge of the Populist-Republican fusionf now the destiny 
of Louisiana was in safe hands. Yet some further safeguard 
must be devised to assure that no rebel farmer class nor 
Negro voters should again have the opportunity of upsetting 
tbe status quo. Once more a call was made for the convening 
of a body to write a new constitution, since the general 
feeling was that the instrument of 1879 had served its pur­
pose and changed conditions made necessary a new one. How­
ever, the real reason for the convention was to consider the 
problem of suffrage. It interpreted its mandate from the 
"people** to be, to disenfranchise as many Negroes and as few 
whites as possible, without violating the Fifteenth Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution.
Several of the constitutional provisions brought 
forth reflected the general temper of the age. Legislative 
provisions, for example, increased the power to control cor­
porations, a Populist idea. The legislature could no longer 
enact either local or special legislation. The governor was 
made ineligible to succeed himself. Yet, the constitutional 
provisions extended the practice of putting detailed re­
strictions on legislation; and this despite the fact that 
Negro dominance would be gone. The Constitution of 1898 was
128
still under the shadow of Reconstruction•
The main problem was to construct provisions concern­
ing the suffrage which would aooomplish that which the Demo­
crats were under compulsion to achieve, and at the same time 
to meet the limits of legality as the United States Supreme 
Court might interpret them. The scheme devised was to pro­
vide for several alternative suffrage requirements;^ if 
Hegro could not be refused the vote under one provision, 
then he could be banned under another* Certain educational 
and property qualifications were required of all voters, 
except any whose fathers or grandfathers had been legal voters 
in 1867* This meant that four classes of men would be allowed 
to votes literates, tax-paying property owners, sons of 
property owners, and men who had voted in 1867 or their de­
scendants* This action assured the successful completion of 
the struggle for reconstruction*
Poster had been influential in leading the move to 
change the constitution* An investigation of his message 
concerning the 1898 constitution reveals, perhaps, the domi­
nant attitude which prevailed within the membership of his 
partyi
The white supremacy for which we have so long strug­
gled at the cost of so much precious blood and treasure, 
is now crystallized into the Constitution as a funda­
mental part and parcel of that organic instrument* and 
that, too* by no subterfuge or other evasions* With 
this great principle thus firmly imbedded in the
^constitution of 1898, Article 197*
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Constitution* and honestly enforced* there need be no 
longer any fear agAto the honesty and purity of our 
future elections•
The results of this principle of suffrage will be invest!** 
gated below; suffice it to say* the immediate results were 
to disenfranchise store than the estimated twenty to thirty 
thousand whites which the grandfather clause11 provision had 
proposed to maintain on the registration books# Overt subter­
fuge* most likely* genuinely was not desired* The remarks of 
a member of the convention are instructive of the objective 
consequence of the actions of I8981
By the irony of fate* as it were* this ultra conserva­
tive convention was called upon as its first chief duty 
to do the most radical thing known to legislation; to 
falsify the accepted teaching of history and roll back 
the wheels of political revolution without bloodshed; to 
take away the ballot from almost* if not quite* a ma­
jority of the voters of the state. *
The registration statistics* before and after 1893* 
and the results of the gubernatorial election of 1900* provide 
an eloquent finala to the struggle for Bourbon supremacy*
The voter turn-out in 1896 had been extremely great* indica­
tive of the Issues at stake in the election* The more than 
two hundred thousand votes cast was a new high; and 70*1 per 
cent of the registered voters had gone to the polls and cast 
ballots* In the election of 1900* not only was the total
^^LouAslana Senate Journal* 1898* pp* 33-3?*
^^T* J* Kernan, "The Constitutional Convention of 
1898 and Its Work." The Transactions of the Louisiana Bar 
Association* (1899), pp* 56-57*
vote considerably smaller than in the previous election, due 
to the great disenfranchisement, bat also, the participation 
of the electors fell off* In 1900, only 53 P«f ©ant of the 
registered voters actually went to the polls# Quite obviously 
the Democrats had not only managed to keep many from voting$ 
they had also discouraged interest In the utilisation of the 
suffrage#
fhe registration of voters reached Its highest peak 
in 1897, the year following the attempt at Fusion* At that 
time there was still expectation that the vote of the people 
held a promise of victory* The total registration reached 
29*+,*+32, of which some per eent were Negroes. However, 
this strong numerical position in whleh the people found them­
selves was to be of no avail* For, in the registration which 
preceded the gubernatorial election of 1900, the total count 
was but 130,757 qualified, registered voters* The decrease 
in Hegro registration was over 95 per cent 5 the suffrage 
elauses had done their expected work* However, far more sig­
nificant is the fact that the percentage decrease in the 
number of idiite registered voters was 23#5* Almost *f0,000 
less white people had registered in 1900 than in 1897* More­
over, a glance at the distribution of the greatest percentage 
losses among the parishes will indicate that it was the poor, 
illiterate, but certainly not necessarily Ignorant farmers 
who had lost the suffrage#
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As if it had been calculated, the parishes which showed 
the greatest drop in white registration were by and large the 
same which had supported the Fusion* (See Figure 21**) At 
any rate, such a distribution is a strong reenforcement to 
the proposition that the People’s movement was a farmers1 
movement* And the impact of disenfranchisement hit north 
Louisiana and the south alike* In some parishes white regis­
tration actually increased? most of these were planter domi­
nated. In the enforcing of the new suffrage provisions, no 
breach of honesty need be made, for so long as the registrar 
of voters could pass on minimum qualifications, there was no 
need for Bourbon support to suffer* In the northwest and 
southeast parishes an increase In white population had oc­
curred, blunting the general decrease In voters* The move 
of whites into East and West Garroll was a forerunner of the 
large migration Into the Eacon BIdge parishes of Bichland and 
Franklin which would occur after 1910* An overall gain was 
likewise registered in Vernon and Washington parishes, where 
increased lumber operations had already brought an Influx in 
the white population in these areas* Still, the statewide 
distribution of losses in white registration was a commentary 
of the indignity imposed on the farmer groups*
The Democratic state convention nominated the incum­
bent state auditor, William W. Heard, for governor in 1900*
He was the preference of Governor Foster to carry on the Demo­
cratic duties of the state* The Regular Republicans nominated
/ r X \ ;
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Eugene S. Reems, while the Lilywhite Republicans and the 
Populists Joined in the support of the candidacy of Donelson 
Caffery. Although the campaign was spirited* the result was 
never in doubt. Heard became governor with the support of 
78.3 per cent of the total vote cast* In examining the par­
ish distribution of the 1900 vote, the pattern of final domina 
tion is discovered. The situation found in 1872 had been 
reversed•
The Bourbon Democrat and his urban allies emerged as 
the dominant minority, at the beginning of the twentieth cen­
tury, in Louisiana. Solidarity of support was again estab­
lished, but this time in the parishes where it should have 
been. (See Figure 25.) The parish vote was over 90 per cent 
in favor of the Democrats In the plantation areas of the cot­
ton country, up the Mississippi, down the Red River, across 
the Felicianas. Also clustered about New Orleans, there was 
another seat of support. Most of these were the parishes 
where the Negro registration had outnumbered the whites, pre­
viously, and where the plantation remained a potent force in 
the economy. These were the home parishes of the Bourbon 
Democrat, the conservative, unreconstructed southern gentle­
man. For them ideology had become fact.
Despite the overwhelming victory of the Democrats at 
the polls, and despite the decreased white registration, the 
white Republican-Populist fusion carried pluralities for 
Caffery in Cameron, Ascension, and St. James$ and Impressive
Source: Journal
13?
support was given In many other of th© parishes which had 
demonstrated the Populist tendencies before. Th© tradition** 
ally Whig-Eepuolioan sugar bowl supported a sizable Republican 
vote in backing Caffery on the Republican ticket. The distri­
bution of Caffery support on the Populist ticket brings into 
sharp relief the block of "hill" parishes where yet th© 
farmer1s voice was heard*
In general outline, the pattern of support for th© 
People's Party and its Republican allies has remained a sig­
nificant one in the history of subsequent Louisiana politic®. 
(See Figure 26.) The "people" had been frustrated in their 
attempts at gaining the political upper hand In the struggles 
of the decade just finished. But a precedent had been estab­
lished which would bear observing in th© future# The protest 
of the farmer in the decade of the 1890's had been effectively 
frustrated by the dominant elit© within the Democratic party. 
In his ascendancy, the Bourbon forced th© farmer to re-define 
the situation the elite had structured for him. Participation 
in elections after 1900 was far from what it had been in the 
grand straggles of the eighties and nineties. It was after 
1908 before white voter registration figures again reached 
the count of 1897. So far as total vote for gubernatorial 
candidates was concerned, there was no appreciable rise In the 
count until 192*+, when there were over 95*000 more voter, than 
in 1920, In the ©lection of 192*+, Huey P# Long had thrown 
his hat into the Louisiana political ring.
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 1900 
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CHAPTER I?
ONE-PARTY POLITICS AND THE RISE OF LONOISM
-A wise Prince should devise means whereby 
his subjects may at all times* whether favorable 
or adverse, feel the need of the State and of 
him and then they will be faithful to him.-
Machlavelll
Machine Politics * With opposition effectively 
eliminated, the Democratic Party had a dear field in Louisi­
ana politics* The sole problem became one of maintaining 
control of the party machinery* The Bourbons were not at a 
loss in knowing what to do* There were allies to be had in 
the city. For, New Orleans had regularly polled about twenty 
per cent of the total statewide vote. For purposes of repre­
sentation in the state legislature, the City of New Orleans 
was divided into districts (wards), each of which sent a 
representative to the legislature. Utilising the ward as a 
unit, the city could be organised into an effective political 
machine* With the ability to deliver the city vote, the 
selection of a gubernatorial candidate with a reasonable de­
gree of strength outside the city would be tantamount to vic­
tory. Organized in 1897, the New Orleans Choctaw Club, the 
Ring, or the fl01d Regulars1 as they were known to their
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friends* developed a machine along these lines and began to 
play an influential part in state politics^ Experience m s  
to demonstrate that intra-party factional struggles could be 
Just as bitter as the previous struggles between parties had 
been.
The gubernatorial election of 190** was a very one­
sided contest* The Republican candidate, W* J* Behan, re­
ceived but ten per cent of the total vote. The count of the 
votes polled in this election revealed a drop of more than 
twenty thousand below the total vote for 1900* What littl© 
Republican support remaining in Louisiana was seated in the 
sugar country* The Republican support reached as high as 
*tl per cent in Ascension parish, and in total there were 
fourteen parishes which had registered a Republican vote 
higher than the state average of 10 per cent* Three of the 
previously strong Populist parishes, Natchitoches, Winn, and 
Catahoula, registered vestiges of the former protest? these 
were not yet willing to let Democratic ascendancy be complete.
In the Democratic primary which had preceded the ©lec­
tion, the total vote was some 12,000 more than the Democratic 
total in the general election of 1900* Part of this gain 
came from south Louisiana Democrats who had voted for Caffery 
then, now back in the Democratic camp* The distribution of 
the support for the winner of the primary, Newton Blanchard,
1G» M. Reynolds. Machine Politics in fey Orleans. 1997- 
1926 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936).
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demonstrated the pattern of the new one-party t e n d e n c y  when 
a candidate had the endorsement of the Choctaws, (See Figure 
27*) The prediction of Blanchard^ victory might have lain 
in the fact that he registered 71 per cent of the Hew Orleans 
vote. Part of the highest parish percentages favoring the 
machine candidate clustered in the Mississippi delta and in 
the sugar country* Reynolds suggested2 that the surprising 
support of the ring candidate in the hill parishes was due to 
the successful campaign appeals of Martin Behrman, Choctaw 
leader, who ran for State Auditor on the Blanchard ticket.
The election of 190*f demonstrated the assurance that Louisi­
ana had become a one-party state.
The Old Regular Democratic organisation supported 
Lt .-Governor J. Y* Sanders in 1908, Re had been a law partner 
of former Governor Foster, and in the primary was opposed by 
Hr, Wilkinson, a friend of Governor Blanchard and his choice 
as successor. But the line of gubernatorial descent was evi­
dent in this period. The politicians mad® the choices, and 
their alliance with the Bourbons was a leading tendency,
Sanders received 56,3 per cent of the state-wide vote, but 
the machine produced a near 10,000 majority in Hew Orleans 
with which to offset any close margins in the country parishes. 
The distribution of support in this election approached the 
classic pattern; Bourbons from the Mississippi delta parishes
2Ibid.. p. 99.
GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY 1904
VOTE FOR NEWTON BLANCHARD 
BY PARISHES
EZZ Above State Average, 5*3*0#
Source: Report of Secretary of State. Louisiana. 1905
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and from sugar country aligned with the cluster of support 
about New Orleans. (See Figure 28.) The appearance of par* 
ishes from western Louisiana within the ranks of the Demo­
crats of this decade gives reason to pause. These parishes, 
Vernon and Sabine in particular, were predominantly composed 
of a fans population, and yet after the experience of the pre­
vious decade they turn up in the Democratic column, with 
stronger than average majorities!
A study of population increases within Louisiana from 
1890 to 1910, however, will demonstrate that the group of 
parishes under discussion falls into a class which ranked 
among parishes with a rapid population increase in these de­
cades.3 Extensive lumbering operations were carried on dur­
ing this period, bringing in their wake large numbers of 
farmers and laborers. The population of Sabine, for example, 
doubled in the period from 1390 to 1910? and that of Vernon 
had tripled. In 1910, the racial composition of the two par­
ishes was 79.0 and 78.6 per cent white, respectively. Vernon 
had shown a thirty-three per cent increase in voter registra­
tion in the period from 1397 to 1900. This is more understand­
able against the fact that the population was increasing so 
rapidly, but this does not mean that the poor and whit© 
farmer might: not have lost his right to vote. :iaybe only the
3t. l. Smith, X M  Growth Population in 
1890 to 1222? Louisiana State University Experiment Station 
Bulletin, No. 26**, p* 9*
GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY 1906
VOTE FOR J« Y. SANDERS
BY PARISHES
Above State Average, 56*3
Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns
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upper classes and the more fortunate farmers and workers voted* 
It Is likewise understandable why a decade or so later 
a parish like Vernon, enjoying such a boom in this period, 
should show a decided change in political tendencies* For 
the lumber combines came, cut and moved on to fresher forests, 
leaving a devastated cut-ovar area, where farmer and lumber 
worker became hard pressed to eke out a bare existence J*
The machinery being perfected by Bourbon and city Demo** 
crats was not to remain unopposed* It would seem inevitable 
that sooner or later some one or some groups within the elec­
torate would become dissatisfied with the political arrange­
ments . The cry of "corruption and Inefficiency in government" 
could be raised even in those halcyon days, and there was 
strong possibility that the cry would be heard among the rural 
electorate- At the same time that opposition was being con­
solidated, there had emerged a problem which would serve as 
another source of dissatisfaction and of the desire for "re­
form," The Constitution of 1898 had failed, as would the 
subsequent one, to fit the processes of government to the tem­
per of the time. Louisiana was faced with industrial growth 
which would reshape her society* Hew groups and new problems 
emerged requiring satisfactions and solutions* The governor 
was head of an administration largely beyond his control. It 
is well taken that "the two governing bodies had become the
Si. 0. McWhiney* Socialist Vg&g la taalalaijf
la Historical tatOTmflllaa aafliskl fgas m  < ^ * > 1  
master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1951).
constitutional convention and the Indifferent electorate which 
voted on the flood of amendments which came in the twentieth 
century.
The name of John
Parker emerged in Louisiana polities in the gubernatorial 
election of 1912.^ Two years before, Parker had been instru­
mental in organizing the Good Government League, whose leader 
he became. The League was established in an effort to work 
for a more efficient local government in Hew Orleans* The 
move was parallel with action on the national scene, where at 
the turn of the century a new rationale of public adminis­
tration came under the impetus of reform movements. In 
1910, for example, Taft had established the "Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency in Government 5tt the business men got 
behind ltf and apparently old attitudes hang on, for the 
slogan, even then, was "let’s make government more business­
like." Parker meant business, and in 1912 the League put for­
ward the candidacy of Judge Luther Hall for governor.
As the League candidate, Hall was in opposition to 
the New Orleans machine, which had put forth John T. Michel 
as their candidate. He was Secretary of State and an Old
5jr. w. Prothro, A study si Constitutional Developments 
la ihe Office s i ifce Governor la Louisiana (unpublished mas­
ter*. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1 9 W ,  p. 88.
6S. Phillips, Administration si £&£&§£ (un­
published master's thesis, Louisiana State University, 1933)•
Regular of long standing* The race took on a new form when 
Dr* James B* Aswell resigned the presidency of the State 
Normal School at Natchitoches and announced his candidacy 
as an independent J  Aswell had been elected State Superin­
tendent of Education during the administration of Governor 
Blanchard, and he had established a reputation for having 
guided the progress which had been made in education. The 
rural people had reason to appreciate what a lack of educa­
tional advantages could mean. At Natchitoches, Aswell had 
worked for improvement of rural schools in the hill parishes. 
In this election he had gained stature through refusal to 
place himself in the hands of the Good Government League and 
withdraw from the race.
The race lay between Michel and Hall, although th© 
entry of Aswell was to demonstrate th© support that could be 
had for an appeal in the hill parishes. Hall won the primary 
election with *+3.2 per cent of the total vote. The machine 
candidate, Michel, gained but 37*^ per cent of the votes cast. 
Even without the candidacy of Aswell, who received 19A  per 
cent of the vote, it is doubtful that the machine could have 
won; for the strength of both Hall and Aswell was found in 
the rural parishes. The machine did, however, maintain its 
strength in the city, for again New Orleans gave the ring
T. Chevis} Tiie Educational aa£ Political, fiagegr &£ 
James Beniamin Aswell (unpublished master*s thesis, Louisiana 
State University,1937)•
Ik6
candidate a plurality of almost 10,000 over the opposition* 
The appeals of reform had spread too widely to enable the 
machine to swing the election of 1912*
The Old Regular, Michel, was able to gain pluralities, 
outside New Orleans, in but eleven parishes® The distribu­
tion was instructive, indicating that th© Bourbon-machin© 
alignment could still register the old pattern, despite the 
strong opposition. In the rural areas, Michel won plurali­
ties in plantation country. Caddo Parish does not disturb 
the pattern, for along the Red River were many large planta­
tions and the Bourbon predisposition of Shreveport would be­
come stronger with the passing years.
The distribution of the parish support for the Good 
Government candidate was widespread. (See Figure 29*)
Nearly all of south Louisiana voted Hall in a block, and he 
also won pluralities in the parishes of the Arkansas border* 
The parishes of the hills, however, gave their plurality sup­
port to the candidacy of Aswell. It is not surprising that 
here, in the parishes which had produced so recently the 
strong Populist tendency, the electorate would have been en­
thusiastic for the one candidate who had been a genuine In­
dependent. At any rate, the cluster of parishes which gave 
Aswell his pluralities was the heart of the country of the 
People's Party. Even Washington Parish, In the extreme 
eastern edge of the Floridas, once again manifested the po­
litical tendency of similar farm parishes.
nGUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY 1912i
PLURALITIES FOR CANDIDATES 
BY PARISHES
tza Hall
B B B  Michel 
Aswell
Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns
Loulsiana. 1$T2
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The appearance of lumber corporations in the hills 
and prairies of central and southwest Louisiana after the 
turn of the century brought not only an Increased population 
of farmers and workers and momentary economic gain, but also
p
the organisation of the lumber worker by Socialist groups* 
When Eugene Debs spoke in Winnfield in 1908, the local 
Socialist party was well organized and elected half the of­
ficials of Winn Parish* This parish had only a decade before 
taken the lead in the Populist movement* The struggle for 
economic betterment through the use of th© ballot was not 
completed* In 1912 Winn Parish gave almost 36 per cent of 
its vote to the presidential candidate for the Socialists, 
Debs* Two more parishes, Vernon and West Carroll, voted 
more than 30 per cent for Debs, and Caldwell, Grant, and 
LaSalle each supported the Socialists with more than 20 per 
cent of the total votes cast* Where the lumbering industry 
was important, the Debs vote was high*
The phenomenon of such a radical vote In Louisiana 
would not be so important except that the very people mani­
festing this tendency had come from or resided In th© par­
ishes of Populist protest and were of or related to th© 
farmer class. For as the lumber operators worked th© Louisi­
ana hills, the farmer had grasped the opportunity to augment 
his meager subsistence by engaging in lumbering* The work
o
°McWhiney, gp. cit.
I*f9
did not appreciably increase th© level of living of th© hill 
people, for there was a plentiful supply of labor among th© 
farmers willing to work at almost any wage. The farmer had 
experienced the "corporation**
Bfcmmoured with the pure principles of Progressivism, 
John M. Parker decided to run himself in 1916, He was op­
posed, of course, by th© Old Regulars, whose candidate was 
Ruffin G. Pleasant* In 1912 Parker had become an active 
Progressive, endorsing Roosevelt in the fight for national 
Republican leadership 5 he resigned his position as chairman 
of the Good Government League, as it was a faction of the 
Democratic Party. In so doing he voiced his determination 
to be found fighting, still, for good government in Louisiana. 
Parker said he had become a Progressive out of respect for 
Theodore Roosevelts "I am for Roosevelt because I believe 
he is one of the most active and progressive men in the TJmlted 
States, and does things *"^ Parker would need to do things and 
to become quite active himself, if he desired to win the gov­
ernorship from the control of the still active New Orleans 
Ring. Parker announced his candidacy in Crowley, during the 
fall of 1915* He advocated a limited constitutional conven­
tion am  a protective tariff on sugar and rice. This stand 
should have had sympathetic appeal among old-time Republican 
groups in Louisiana*
^Phillips, oli*« p. 11
1?Q
An interesting anecdote coming from the campaign re­
vealed the forthrightness of Parker.10 The New Orleans 
Protestant Ministers1 Association asked three questions of 
the candidates| concerning the enforcement of gambling and 
Sunday laws. With a straight face, Pleasant had answered 
that he would enforce the laws under question, and of course 
all other laws within his jurisdiction. Parker had answered, 
however, in no such virtuous terms. Where there were regula­
tions on gambling, these would suffice, if followed. Be­
sides, it was a matter for the people to decide, whether they 
wanted to gamble or not. Anyway, the enforcement of such 
laws generally was left to local authorities.
There had been mixed feelings concerning the candi­
dacy of John Um Parker. No one wished to doubt the personal 
qualifications of the man, but it was felt that inasmuch as 
the Democratic candidate, Pleasant, had been duly nominated 
by the party primary, it was a bit unfair for Parker to merely 
nominate himself* clear this feeling, the Progressives 
held a nominating convention in which Parker was overwhelm­
ingly endorsed. Nevertheless, it was felt that Parker and 
his ticket were foredoomed to failure* ‘fo beat the combined 
efforts of the established Democratic party and the New 
Orleans Bing would be singularly difficult* Even if Parker 
should win, however, his power of performance would be
l0Phillips, q e * clt*. p. 13*
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negligible In the face of a probable hostile legislature*
As good men as Parker had tried in that unequal struggle and 
failed* The editorial opinion of the Alexandria Democrat 
adequately summarised the situation*
We are willing to admit that the conditions In 
Louisiana are bad politically, and there is much room 
for improvement, but considering the fact which everyone 
knows that Parker is a man of splendid character, great 
personal integrity, rugged honesty and extraordinary 
business ability, in the event of his election, which 
nobody for a moment thinks probable, what would he be 
able to accomplish? He would be absolutely powerless 
as has been the present governor whom Mr* Parker assisted 
largely in elevating to the executive chair, and whose 
honesty of purpose and sincere desire to put into execu­
tion plans for the upbuilding and advancement of the 
State and all its people have never been questioned by 
any except his political e n e m i e s  *^ X
The reformers might be able to capture the governor- 
ship, but without some friendly support in the legislature, 
no great reforms would be forthcoming. Th© platforms and 
appeal of the Good Government faction of the Democratic Party, 
and the earnestness of the Progressive movement might find a 
widespread support among an electorate still dominated by the 
Bourbons. However, the Democrats had found the necessity for 
organization in the struggle for power, and control of local 
parish affairs, and particularly control of the legislature, 
was in their hands.
In 1916, however, the Old Regulars and their country 
allies emerged triumphant, anyhow* Pleasant received more 
than sixty per cent of the vote cast, piling up a majority
n phiiiips, as., cit.. p. m .
1?2
over Parker of about 32fOOO votes* New Orleans voters gave 
Pleasant a majority of 10,000, which was apparently what had 
come to be the usual safe lead the Bing produced* Neverthe- 
less* Parker had gained majorities in sixt@envof the state*s 
sixty-four parishes* The distribution of these majorities 
indicated the impression that Parker had made upon voters 
within the sugar country and among parishes of rice produc­
tion. (See Figure 30*) The majority parishes* taken along 
with those in which the percentage vote was above the Parker 
state average of 37«3 per cent* describe a pattern outlining 
quite precisely the borders of French south Louisiana*
A number of factors could account for this phenomenon. 
South Louisianans, slightly less adverse to the sins of 
gambling* may have supported Parker on that count* His stand 
on the tariff may have been widely accepted $ and finally* the 
Progressive label of 1916 was akin to Republicanism* whose 
seat of support had ever been In the south of the state* 
Parker received his weakest support In the parishes of north 
Louisiana* along the Mississippi, and along th© Arkansas and 
Texas borders* as if there had been an anti-gambling judgment 
among hill farmers. Too* this was Democratic country* There 
was one exception* West Carroll on Macon Bldge* which had 
supported Aswell in 1912* now continuing to show its Indepen­
dence in support of Parker.
GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY 1916
VOTE FOR JOHN PARKER 
BY PARISHES
Above State Average, 37*3# 
n * n  38.7# - 49.3%
V//A 51.9% - 68.7%
[«•»
Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns
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c ‘ t m m f A w t  A BMMfltfcttLe failure« Failure by 
John M. Parker in firmly establishing his political position 
may have been part of the success of Huey P. hong* Although 
not a “man of the people,” nevertheless the rather “pro­
gressive” program of Parker was somewhat different from that 
of other state politicians up to this time* At any rate, 
the present section, in outlining the activities of Governor 
Parker, will highlight the political philosophy and program 
of Parkerisa. Another gubernatorial aspirant was to likewise 
draw from Parker *s experience as mid-century reached Louisi­
ana, although most likely Hobort Kenmn was unaware of the 
parallel* Parker had demonstrated there was some truth to 
the idea that if a candidate kept right on running for office, 
sooner or later he would be elected* In 19^8 as in 1916, the 
defeated candidate learned the value of organisation*
In 1952 as in 1920, on© of the primary concerns of 
the campaign was the pledge for governmental reforms* In 
both years, the chief issue was !{antl,f —  anti-Long and anti- 
Bing. Finally, in elections where the rural vote was going 
to be close, the value of organization in Hew Orleans was 
recognized* Kennon, as Parker before him, managed to capture 
a sizable vote in the city to Insure victory. In 1920, John 
M. Parker was recognized by the Old Regulars as the man to 
beat, and the resulting campaign between Stubbs and Parker 
was bitter.
It appears that time may corrupt, In terms of
155
political longevity. Past mistakes, th© actions of opponents, 
and perhaps even some corruption, had made the Bing machine 
the target of cries of corruption. Moreover, th® experience 
of success had given hopes of more, and even established pat­
terns for the future. After all, Mayor Bateman, the leader 
of the Choctaws, had recalled that in twenty years of politi­
cal struggle there was plenty of time to make many enemies*
He philosophised that "most people remember what you did to 
them rather than what you did for them."3,2 the theme of 
corruption in government had a long and notable record of 
usefulness.
Parker realized full well that if he were to defeat 
the machine he would have to gain a sizable vote In New 
Orleans, to this end he established the Orleans Democratic 
Association with which he hoped to cut deeply in Ring support* 
With the provision of enough votes to insure victory in the 
gubernatorial primary, it was Parker’s Intention to use the 
appointive powers which would be at his disposal to take 
patronage away from the Old Regulars and defeat Behrman in 
his race for the mayorship with a candidate of his own choos­
ing. Parker proved successful, in 1920, on both counts*
In the game of politics, it is axiomatic that to de­
feat organization, it must b© opposed with better organiza­
tion. There was a danger that Governor Parker might have
^Reynolds, op * cit*. p* 216.
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created a machine not different from the one he was set to 
defeat• The claim has been made that Parker failed in his 
attempt at defeating the Choctaws and putting them out of 
political business due to his realization of this fact 5 he 
was reluctant to use the tactics of the Ring to defeat the 
Ring. J The old Ring, defeated by Parker in 1920, promptly 
made a comeback. The organization Parker had established, 
in order to defeat the Ring, had been composed of many dis­
gruntled members of the Old Regulars| and there are always 
the opportunists who sense that a change of horses might be 
advantageous. The elements which made up the organization 
of the Orleans Democratic Association were too discordant, 
and composed as It was of reformers and disgruntled Old 
Regulars, it could not hope to become the permanent opposi­
tion to the Choctaw Club, which had been Parker’s aim.
However, in Louisiana politics it was necessary to 
organize, and to make organization relatively permanent, for 
with the advent of Democratic supremacy only the strong and 
the politically wise could hope to wrest control from the 
Bourbons. For their successful domination they had worked 
long and hard. If it were impossible to beat them without 
joining them, and copying their methods, then join them and 
beat them at their own game. This was part of Huey Long’s 
success»
Who supported Parker in his successful overthrow of
13Phillip3, Eli-, p. 156.
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the Ring in 1920? First of all there was the organised sup­
port in New Orleans, where old members of the Choctaws had 
formed the Orleans Democratic Association in Parker!s behalf. 
The city vote favoring the candidacy of Parker constituted 
per cent of the total city vote* The consistent spread 
of some 10,000 votes in favor of machine-backed candidates 
had been narrowed to 5,000. If worker groups were In support 
of the Choctaw machine, It appears likely that Parker*® gain 
had come from the support of the more privileged groups of 
the city,
Parker received his largest country vote in the Third 
Congressional District, which embraced the heart of th© sugar 
bowl. (See Figure 31 •) His most impressive gains over the 
1916 Parker support came from north Louisiana, however, there 
being fingers of support pushed up the delta and up the Red 
River country* It Is likely that planter groups of both 
north and south were in favor of Parker*s candidacy* But 
Parker gained likewise In the hills, from Vernon Parish across 
to Franklin. The Ring candidate, Col* Stubbs of Monroe, 
gained far less support than had the machine candidate of th© 
previous election in the hills. Farmer groups must have 
voted for Parker since Huey Long had stumped for Parker In 
1920, believing he favored the sort of economic reforms Long 
had been proposing as Public Service Commissioner* It is ap­
parent from the election returns that Parker*s support had
1
been wid espr ead. The success of the program for which he had
w , GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY 1920 
VOTE FOR JOHN PARKER 
BY PARISHES
1st quarter: 17*5$ - 50.
xzzz 2nd quarter: 51 *5^ - 58.3$
3rd quarter: 58.9$ - 65.7$
m  4th quarter 6603$ -  84.9$
Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns
Louisiana. l9?0
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campaigned so vigorously lay in th® hands of th® new legisla­
ture which Parker hoped to influence.
Ask some old-timers about John M, Parker, and they will 
assert he was the best governor Louisiana ever had5 in turn 
they will scoff at th® name of Long* Yet, if the measure of 
success be political longevity, Long managed to perpetuate 
his position, while Governor Parker failed in his endorsement 
of a successor in 192b. However, the measure of success 
might just as well be th© resultant of the establishment of 
a constructive program of governmental reforms* Ascending to 
the governorship in 1920, after the completion of World War I, 
Parker was to meet with a prevalent mood of sympathy among 
the electorate in behalf of the principle of reform* The 
social and economic changes wrought in Louisiana, as else­
where in America, as a consequence of the first World War 
meant that whoever became governor must be prepared to solve 
many practical problems* Moreover, natural reaction of puri­
tan morality which gripped the country after 1913 provided a 
fertile ground in which to emplant a sweeping reform against 
the corruptions of machine politics* Th® political indepen­
dence of Governor Parker likewise tended to demonstrate to 
the voters that the man was more important than the party.
During the campaign the Parker forces never allowed 
attention to be diverted from the main issue —  that of King
lk
rule* Their platform has been summed ups
Phillips, an- Silk** P* 3^*
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1 . fh© ring rules New Orleans and rules it badly.
2. If th© ring elects a governor, the ring will rule 
the State and rule it badly.
S£22» defeat the Ring. Ihis much of the Parker platform was 
successful, for the time being at least. Upon the first meet­
ing of the legislature after Governor Parker took office, a 
series of proposals were forwarded at regular intervals to 
the representatives which rivaled in scope and detail those 
of the Republican President of the United States in his direc­
tives to the Eighty-third Congress, the ten points may be
l1?summarized thus* ^
1. Financial program
a. severance tax of 2 per cent
b. inventory of state property
c. construction work
2• Good roads
3. Labor legislation
*f. Oil and gas laws (including ways and means of 
regulation)
5. Political program, Including constitutional con­
vention
6 . "Blue Sky” law to protect investors
7. Legislation for New Orleans
8. Changes in executive department, including admin­
istration of state charitable institutions
9. Cost of living aid by encouragement of agriculture 
and invitation for business to come to Louisiana
10. Conservation and reforestation.
l5Phillips, ££. clt.. p. k6; cited from Messages of 
Governor, 1920.
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Important portions, at least, of all the ten points 
mare enacted Into law by th© regular session of 1920* Parker 
has been called the "Gravel Roads" governor because of the 
steps taken under his administration to create a workable 
highway system in Louisiana.^ H© negotiated a so-called 
"gentlemen’s agreement" concerning the proposed severance tax, 
and proceeded to the building of a greater agricultural and 
mechanical college on a large tract of land Just south of 
Baton Rouge • Still more of his program became effective 
after the Constitution of 1921 was ratified* Yet for all 
this efficient and forward-looking administration, Parker 
was unable to perpetuate his influence. In 192*f the Ring 
made a comeback and aided in the election of Henry L« Fuqua* 
Any governor in the early twenties would have had to 
do much of what Parker did, anyway* There were pressing 
problems concerning which policy had to b© formulated § and 
there did not appear to be anything amiss in the particular 
steps which Parker had taken* Reform makes a popular appeal, 
but Parker would have had to make good on hi® reform of the 
Hew Orleans Ring if his administration were to be called a 
success. In that he had failed, and the Parker program was
not carried for another four years*
Why was Parkerism a respectable failure? First of 
all, because there was nothing wrong with the program of the
l6G. McGinty, A. History g£ 
position Press, 1951)* P* 2p0«
(New Yorks Ex*
1 6 2
governor. In fact, the spectacular success of Huey Long four 
years after Parker left office might serve to demonstrate 
that he should have given more of the same. Where Parker had 
built gravel roads, Long built concrete roads| and they were 
good roads, even if "...a few miles were paved in ©very par­
ish to let the people see the superiority of concrete over 
g r a v e l . T h e  programs of the two governors paralleled In 
many respects, but the popular support of the two leaders was 
singularly different. Long*s appeal was more broadly to the 
masses, whereas Parker, half a Republican anyway, had not 
sufficiently disassociated himself, in the peopled eyes, from 
the dominant economic groups of the new Louisiana.
Moreover, Parker never seemed to realize that more 
than the New Orleans machine could be politically evil or 
corrupt* "The corruptor of politics in the form of privileged 
business he did not see, or seeing, was unwilling to break its 
strangle hold. His reforms failed because they were not in 
reality carried out and because they did not remove the econo-* 
mie causes of machine control." The failure of Parkerlsm 
to perpetuate itself rests essentially upon the factor of 
electoral appeal. For the people of the hills, who were to 
give Long such strong support, had some pretty definite ideas 
about the reforms necessary in Louisiana society* The
17Ibid.. p. 252.
^-^teynolds, o p . q,it** p. 233*
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generation which had felt the exhilaration of the movement of 
the People’s Party, and the sting of disenfranchisement, had 
not yet died off# Reform has become fashionable in Louisiana, 
bat only after the masses had been afforded the opportunity 
to make a mess in Choices of leaders. A clean-up campaign 
whose purpose was to perpetuate the domination of the Bourbon, 
or his big business cousin, lacked broad popular appeal#
Like the Whigs of the last century, the program of Parker, 
no matter how good, must fail# It failed because it was not 
conceived of and for the "people.”
Xtongisa: An Appraisal. The nice arithmetic of
one-party politics had been finally worked out by the conserve 
tives; and it provided easy calculations, too, for the Negro 
had been effectively blocked from political activity since 
1398. The struggle for political control was narrowed to 
participation by members of factional alignments, all of which 
were representative of some dominant groups in Louisiana so­
ciety, The only numerically dominant group which had been 
left out of political calculations was the "people," the have- 
nots, farmers and laborers. Political monopoly had been added
to economic monopoly.
In this political situation, two possible combinations 
for political success were available.1^ The country could be 
united solidly against the city, or, as was more likely, the
^Reynolds, op. jslt## p# 19^»
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city could be organized and victory achieved with some seg­
ments of the country vote* The Choctaws, as well as the "re- 
formers11 In opposition to the machine* utilized the latter 
combination. Planter and rural town elite combined with city 
cousin. It was the old story of the dominant minority which 
maintained its political ascendancy* Machine candidates or 
reform candidates, it made little positive difference which 
won, none of them manifestly represented the interests of the 
"people* of Louisiana.
The "chance" that consensus might be found among farmer 
and laborer, as a group, was great, for there had been oppor­
tunity for significant societal tendencies to have been es­
tablished . Such an analysis might not be able to produce 
objective, quantitative demonstration of the presence of a 
class struggle in Louisiana, however. Yet, the results of 
elections of a "crisis" nature have indicated the presence 
of a latent consensus which might lead to group action. The 
peculiar institution of "gentleman rule" in Louisiana po­
litics could generate an opposition among the masses, the 
numerical majority. Events might force a dormant conscious­
ness of group solidarity into action against the status jgu&.
So long as the avenue of political expression remained free, 
the farmer, as a group, voiced his opposition. Protest had 
been registered concerning the actions leading to Secession.
A reaction of political solidarity occurred among the farmers
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of the hills in the 1880*s. the farmer found voice to pro* 
test his frustrations in the Populist movement* during the 
economically depressed 1890's, and even flirted with Socialism 
in the 1910's.
Historically* then* so long as the procedures of democ­
racy remained in force* the frustrations of the ^have-nots*1 
might find release through the utilisation of the suffrage*
The people might make known desires and interests through 
the ballot* and while this channel of expression was opened* 
the effects of privation and frustration were blunted* and 
the probability of latent consensus becoming manifest was 
that much slighter* "Misery loves company*" the old adage 
goes; but so long as lip-service was paid to the cult of de­
mocracy* the opposition of serious group action was averted*
However* the actions of the dominant minority In taking 
away the ballot from the Negro, and in so doing from the poor 
and white* might well have spelled its political doom* 
Democracy in Louisiana had become perverted• A plutocracy 
struggled amongst itself for the plums of political victory. 
With the traditional channels of expression closed* group 
frustration might lead to group action* With the right com­
bination, the dominant minority could yet be overthrown. The 
"people" needed merely to be drawn out* The farmer of the 
hills would most certainly respond to the political appeals 
of one of his own*
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The advent of Longism in Louisiana, then, was the cul­
mination of long-time tendencies. There had always been the 
possibility of a "peopled” party gaining ascendancy in Loui­
siana; up until Huey Long appeared, all actual attempts had 
been frustrated by the dominating elite. The evidence that 
Longism was a political phenomenon explainable in terms of 
the support of social groupings lies in analysis of voting 
> behavior. Definite political tendencies emerge and have* 
since 192V, remained relatively constant. Attention has all 
too often been focused upon the organisational apparatus of 
Long machines, upon the personal appeal and ability of Huey 
Long, or upon the corruptions of Longism; far more important ^  
is the sociological basis of Longism.
The social situation existing by the turn of the cen­
tury made it certain that it was only a matter of time before 
the people would have been heard» Huey Long * s appearance 
upon the political scene in the 1920’s was merely a happy 
circumstance —  despite our personal predilections. Huey 
Long upset the nice arithmetic established by the Bourbons, 
came to power with the vote of the "people,*1 and established 
a political algebra of his own.
Huey talked the language of the people;* whether he was 
aware of his choice of analogy or not, Long*® famed 
"Evangeline Oak" speech hit home with the "rednecks" and 
"cajuns" of hill or bayou*
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... It is here under this oak where Evangeline waited 
for her lover Gabriel, who never came. This oak Is an 
immortal spot, made so by Longfellow1© poem, but 
Evangeline is not the only one who has waited here in 
disappointment.
Where are the schools that you have waited for your 
children to have, that have never come? Where are the 
roads and highways that you send your money to build, 
that are no nearer now than ever before? Where are the 
institutions to care for the sick and disabled?
Evangeline wept bitter tears in her disappointment, but 
it lasted only one lifetime* Your tears in this country, 
around this oak, have lasted for generations* Give me OA 
the chance to dry the eyes of those who still weep here I^
The people had waited a long time for someone to do something
for them. With Longism, there emerged a pattern of appeal,
support, and political program which has set the opposing
pattern of all subsequent attempts at reform within the state.
The election of 192*4- indicated the pattern of voting 
support which was to emerge in producing Longism In Louisiana, 
(See Figure 32.) Against the machine's candidate, Fuqua, and 
the candidate who was Governor Parker's personal choice, Huey 
Long gained more than fifty per cent of the vote in twenty- 
one parishes. Except for three, these parishes clustered In 
north Louisiana; St. Helena, Livingston, and Washington, in 
the Floridas, were also areas where the farmer was predomi­
nant. The significance of the pattern was that it cut across 
the "country" quite broadly. While still limited to north 
Louisiana hill parishes and some cut-over areas of the 
Florida parishes, Longism had a class appeal. While his
20H. P. Long, Every Man 4 King (New Orleanss National 
Book Co., Inc., 1933)* P* 99*
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opponents had fought the election on the Klan issue with its 
religious overtones, Huey Long spread his name and record 
among the "people." Were Long to extend his country support 
into French Louisiana in a subsequent election, next time he 
would win*
There was a next time, and Huey Long did win* In 
1928, the area of support was extended to include most of the 
country vote aside from the areas of planter domination in 
both north and south Louisiana, In fact, the opposition man-* 
aged to gain pluralities in but seventeen of Louisiana^ 
sixty-four parishes* Only the country parishes of the upper 
Mississippi delta and the plantation parishes of the Fellel- 
anas, with neighboring Pointe Coupee and St, Landry, with­
stood the challenge of the "rural demagogue." (See Figure 
33*) Urban parishes, among them Caddo, Ouachita, and East 
Baton Rouge, and a cluster about New Orleans, showed anti- 
Long predispositions.
The fact that St * Landry appeared in the Bourbon pat­
tern was not a contradiction* Although popularly thought of 
as a "farmer" parish, actually St. Landry has characteristics 
similar to planter dominated parishes.. The proportion of 
Negroes residing In the parish Is close to 50 per cent, and 
there Is an old layer of planter-commercial influence In 
this, one of the original Louisiana parishes. The pattern 
of a high degree of farm tenancy here also gives 8t« Landry 
further similarity with planter areas* In 1930 two out of
GUBERNATORIAL PRIMARY 192S 
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three white faro operator® were tenants * Parishes with such 
factors have usually recorded a conservative vote, through 
domination hy Its elite groups or through indifference on 
the part of the poor and white*
To say that Huey Long failed to carry the cities ob­
scured the influence of some of the “factors" which influence 
Louisiana voting behavior*2^ There are social groupings la 
the urban areas whose economic and political sympathies were 
part of the old Bourbon complex» Anti-Long opposition has 
consistently shown in the upper limits of the socio-economic 
layers of the city populations. Yet a clear differential in 
urban voting behavior exists, reflecting the tendency among 
the workers to support candidates with programs closer to 
their interests than Bourbon ideologies. As Long established 
his machine and organised support in New Orleans and other 
cities, Long support in working class districts became 
clearly visible.
In 1928 the victory of Huey Long was complete, sup­
ported as he was by the great solidarity of th© farmer groups 
in both north and south Louisiana. Th© rise of Huey Long was
op
therefore no political accident. Long, as well as other
^B. Heberle and A. L. Bertrand, "Factors Motivating 
Voting Behavior in a One-Party State," Social Forges. Vol. 27, 
No. b (May, 19**9).
22P. H. Howard, % M  Political fifiBlftgy q£ ____
(unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State university,
1951).
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southern politicians of the period, had his origin among 
lower class whites hut gained his support from a wider ap~ 
peal. His rise to power, likewise, was a result not so much 
of an uprising of poorer whites as of a rising tide of oppo­
sition to intolerable economic and social conditions.2^
It is more than a coincidence that Winn Parish, the 
boyhood home of Huey Long, should have been the center of 
Populist and Socialist support, and a later stronghold of 
Longism. Vith the rise of Huey Long the political balance 
in Louisiana tipped in favor of the farmer class* If exten­
sion of appeal and organization has reached other groupings, 
such as urban workers, and gained their support, the core of 
the strength of Longism remained among the farmers. Moder­
ately strong coefficients of correlation have been computed 
between the parish support of Huey Long in 1928, and the sup­
port of Socialism and Populism previously. Rank-order coef­
ficients of correlation of </.621 and </*kOO have been computed 
between the parish support of Long in 1928 and of Populism in 
1896 and Socialism In 1912, respectively#214. Statistically 
these coefficients may not be "highly significant,1* but they 
indicate a continuity in the geographical pattern of a po­
litical tendency which found expression In these election®.
The state had suffered an arrested socio-economic
^Heberle and Bertrand, clt.T p. 3^* 
toward, clt.r p. 133 ff •
development which had flavored the political climate, estab­
lishing the potentiality of political group action among 
farmers and workers* For it was the farroer-lumber worker 
element which contributed to the continuity of support in 
these elections* In Populism and the appeal of Huey hong 
the "people” of the uplands and the French lowlands believed 
they had found deliverance from the domination of the Bourbon 
classes♦ One portion of the population enjoyed the fruits 
of a way of life guaranteed by their political domination*
By 1928 Louisiana was found to be neither Inherently solid 
one-party nor completely right wing. The latent possibility 
of opposition to the Bourbon Democrat, which had been dormant 
for more than a quarter century, had become manifest* Huey 
Long's election ended single-class political domination In 
Louisiana*
As if to demonstrate that other factors were being 
felt, the results of the 1928 presidential election in Loui­
siana did not follow the general pattern which V* 0* Key has 
found for the South as a whole*2^ f0 be sure, the sixteen 
parishes with a Negro population outnumbering the white gave 
Alfred Smith a majority in maintaining the solid front of the 
Bourbon* But Smith polled a majority in every parish! And 
there were parishes with fewer Negroes which gave Smith an 
even greater majority over Herbert Hoover* The lowest
z<h .  0. Key, Jr., Southern pfrUfrlfig (He* Yorkt Alfred 
A. Knopf, 19^9), P* 317 ff.
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Democratic support m s  found In parishes where the farmer pre­
dominated # The significant aspect of the Louisiana Smith 
wot© was that the parishes of south* Catholic Louisiana con­
tributed the greatest majorities# Hence it seems more realis­
tic to say that the issue was religious rather than racial.2^ 
The results of this election showed there were cracks in the 
Bourbon solid front.
Huey Long was a master politician! significant was the 
way in which he entered the political arena in the first 
place* as B&ilroad Commissioner in 1918* and later Public 
Service Commissioner as the agency changed names# His po­
litical ideology, if Long had one* was in th© tradition of 
Populism as it had been experienced in his native hills# 
Intentionally or otherwise, Huey Long mad® corporate domirn- . 
tlon his constant target. Once having scored victories for 
the "people” he demonstrated his political acumen by his con­
troversial activities which kept his name constantly on the 
lips of Louisianans. Long had successfully opposed vested 
corporate interests and could run on his record.
Long became governor of Louisiana in 1928 on an "anti” 
platform; but it was not the old anti-Ring, anti-corruption 
and inefficiency in government platform which mad© him so 
popular and gave Long his support with the people. The hill
26D. K. Walker, Louisiana & &  Jjfee 
of 1928 (unpublished term paper for Sociology 161, on file in 
Sociology Department, Louisiana State University)#
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folk from whose ranks Huey himself emerged might not he aware 
~ Of the theoretical and legal subtleties behind the exploita­
tion by corporate interests* But a politically frustrated 
and economically destitute farmer-worker class could under­
stand what the championing of Huey long was all about when 
he demanded protection of the "people’s” rights and the e$- 
tablishment of public utility rates and tax relief designed 
to put more money in their pockets* Bong chose his opponents 
carefully in his political fights against the domination of 
vested interests* Just say that Huey was fighting the 
Bourbons and absentee corporate interests, and the farmer of 
the hills knew what long was doing*
The ideology of "share our wealth” was perhaps illogi­
cal and economically unworkable. But the simple program of 
330 per month Old Age Pension for clti sens over sixty years 
of age, the limitation of poverty and working hours, a bal­
anced agricultural production which prevented price-lowering 
surpluses, and the taxation program which would reduce big 
fortunes was something the lower classes in Louisiana and 
elsewhere could readily appreciate. The appeal was disarm­
ing, since Long buttressed his talks with liberal quotations
07
from the Bible and from great leaders of all times. ' Huey 
Long had a record of stepping on the toes of vested inter­
ests, and there was no reason for the people to believe he
27H. p . Long, Sharp j2jj£ Wealth (Washington, D.C.,
1935?).
would not successfully make "every man a king" If he were 
elected governor*
Lack of legislative support might stand in the way of 
Huey Long carrying out his program* However, Long had ob­
served the traditional maneuvers used to assure success* If 
the legislator votes right, he receives the plums of patron­
age at the governor1s disposal, with which the legislator 
must satisfy the constituents back home* Long got his program 
through and penalised the opposition. He likewise faced the 
problem of gaining control of the decentralized boards and 
commissions* Again he was successful* His enemies and the 
intellectual articulates were severely critical of Long13 
methods, but Carleton Beals, one of those who deplored Long’s 
"dictatorship," justified his actions in this situations
Hot Huey, but the political system, was to be blamed. 
Theoretically the various boards had previously been 
taken out of politics. But as a single party and a sin­
gle machine had dominated Louisiana for decades, all 
governmental agencies were an integral part of the cor­
rupt system* Non-poliiicallzing the board In effect had 
merely permitted Ring henchmen to enjoy perfect immunity, 
creating foci of permanent political power* Though not 
subject to the spoils system of each governor, the boards 
were all part of a complicated powerful regime of a vi­
cious political clique tied up with large corporations 
and the underworld. Huey had to do exactly what Im did, 
or else be another meek corporation and underworld puppet 
like his predecessors* Whether his purposes were genuine, 
whether the reforms he espoused Wire worthy and important 
are separate questions entirely
28C * Beals, £&& Story Huey £* Long (Philadelphia 
J* p* Lipplncott Co., 193577 P* 92.
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Huey Long ensured the establishment of his program 
for the state, and no Louisiana governor since 1928 has felt 
it expedient or wise to throw out the general pattern of 
governmental functions of Longism* He made a public record 
to which his partisans pointed with pride Property assess** 
ments were reduced by some 20 per cent* Huey Long distributed 
free school books in the amount of 600,000* At free night 
schools 175,000 illiterates over twenty^one years of age had 
learned to read and write* Long established L* 8* U. as an 
institution with an A-l rating $ enrollment was increased from
1.500 to 5,000* The Long highway program was responsible for
2.500 miles of new paved roads, 6,000 miles of new gravel 
roads, and numerous new bridges. He built the $5,000,000 
State Capitol, the $150,000 executive mansion, and the State 
University’s School of Medicine in Hew Orleans* The charity 
hospital program had been Increased to care for some 1,800 
patients per day, and mental hospitals generally improved* 
Regardless of the cost and who was to pay, Huey Long estab­
lished a record of achievement which was tangible and durable*
The politics of Louisiana have been called bifactional, v 
since the rise of Longism.3° It is true that since 1900 only 
the Democratic party has been preeminently effective at the 
polls. The Democrats managed this, however, with the suppression
iftpazlnc. October 3, 1932*
Q& Impl­
ant* t920-19*32 lunpUDxisnea ra*w. uxssyi-i>«.i>Ion, Harvard uni-*
versity,
3< W ,  OKJatt.! A. p. Slndler, PoU 
L, 1^ 5 (i ipubli h d Ph.D di sertation,
►sity, I953T •
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ef legitimate portions of the electorate» faking the long 
view, the era of "one-party* politics was transitory* For 
the tradition and economics of two-party politics have been 
present in long standing*^ Becent politics could just as 
readily be viewed as the on-going struggle between the haves 
and the have-nots •
Longism had become one brand of party in this historical 
process; and the haves, since 19W, manifest a strong desire 
to revolt against the party they had made supreme* By 1952 
it had become apparent that the Long faction inclined to 
follow the "real* Democratic party In platform and outlook*
The main Long tendency built up over a twenty-year period has 
shown a remarkable consistency, and in the last two extremely 
important presidential elections in Louisiana, the coalition 
which had been strong in support of Longism has likewise 
stood firm for the Democratic party. Emergent elements in 
the social structure had created the possibility of Longism, 
and in consequence it was discovered that national and state­
wide political behavior paralleled one another again*
Longism, as the Hew Deal, brought more people to the  ^
polls than had ever voted previously? in Louisiana, the in­
creased turnout was immediately apparent* In 192^ there were 
nearly 100,000 more votes counted than in 1920, and four
c* Havard, Jr*, "Louisiana and the Two-Party Sys­
tem," Proceedings of the Louisiana Academy of Sciences, Vol* 
XVI (1953).
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y e a l a t e r  the total vote of 1920 had been doubled* At the 
sue time | during the census decade of 1920«*3G, the popula­
tion of the state Increased by%&y>l6*9 per cent# The ap­
peal of Huey Long brought out the electorate to the polls, 
and the Long faction got the larger part of this increase In 
ballots# Long, as Franklin D* Roosevelt nationally, mas 
doing something for the "people,” and regardless of how much 
it was costing, and who was going to pay, the people regis­
tered their satisfaction upon election day# By the election 
ef 1936, not only had the tradition of Longism become estab­
lished, the people had registered their strongest approval# 
Governor Leche had been given over two-thirds of the record 
total vote of over one-half millions the same year, President 
Roosevelt gained the electoral votes of every state but Maine 
and Vermont.
Then came the crash, when, it was thought, the house 
that Hney built had come tumbling down* let the lower 
classes had not forgotten what Longism had done for them*
In the hotly disputed election of 19*+0, the "reform” faction 
barely managed to secure victory* The social stratification 
of Louisiana about 19M) was not such that a candidate more 
"conservative” in outlook had a dear opportunity of break­
ing the domination of Longism* The middle class elements so 
crucial in the influence of the outcome of the elections of 
the next decade were still in emergence# The traditional 
farmer-planter cleavage remained in the agricultural economy,
and of course the class of number, composed of farmer groups, 
had manifested their strong predisposition to support the 
candidates of Longism*
Prevalence of a plantation economy establishes social 
relationships similar to those present where M g  business 
prevails* Both planter and businessman held such economic 
Influence that a sizable opposition to Longism might be mus­
tered within the electorate, let the growing Industrial capa­
city of Louisiana was bringing not only class elements whose 
political tendencies augmented the old Bourbon complex and 
at the same time created a new power base, but also an in­
creasing labor force which might naturally manifest a politi­
cal support more sympathetic to Longism* Labor organization 
had not made appreciable inroads on Louisiana; even so, a 
large potential block vote was present* Farmer and laborer 
apparently voted for Earl Long in such number that Longism 
was almost perpetuated. He received a vote of over a quarter 
of a million, representing per cent of the total.
Many groups, despite the cost to their tax pocketbooks, 
had registered satisfaction concerning the increased state v 
services which Longism had provided. No “reform" group could 
take this away and still hope to be supported at the polls.
In 19*f0, Sam Jones could only attempt to clean up corruption 
and administer the bureaucracy more efficiently*32 Sam Jones,
3%. H. Weaver, Administrative M  Louisi­
ana (Baton Rouge: Bureau of Government Research, Louisiana 
State University, 1951 )> Ch* p. 31*- ff*
a lawyer from Lake Charles, had defeated the forces of Longism, 
and although his campaign bespoke the urgency of Hcleaning up 
the mess in Baton Rouge,” at the same time it was apparent to 
the politically observant that Jones was also the represents- 
tive of the new big business groups*
The old Bourbon dominant minority had been forced to 
use extreme measures in their ascendancy after 1896 through 
the vehicle of the great disenfranchisement; this was an 
error which must be recognized* Just because the "people” 
tired of the old order had found a champion who would estab­
lish something new was no indication that they were correct 
in their action* The corruptions of Longism would never have 
occurred if "liberals” like Sam Jones had been around in 1928$ 
the wrongs of the past would have been rectified to the 
greater glory of the Bourbon-corporate Interests* But let 
Sam Jones explain in his own words, taken from his first leg­
islative message on May 20, 19^0s
1 occupy a unique position in Louisiana political 
life* I am a liberal who has consistently opposed the 
out-going regime because of its tendency towards dictator­
ship; because of unconstitutional and undemocratic methods 
used, and because of the many flagrant vices evident in 
the system used by it* To me these were paramount issues 
because the methods used were destructive of democracy 
itself. But, I believe in benefits and services on a 
safe and sane basis* I have had the audacity to say that 
the regime which commenced in 1928 came about as a result 
of the faults, defects, and omissions of the administra­
tions which preceded it*
The principal reason for the revolutionary changes of 
1928 was that the great masses of the people were being 
forgotten. In opening my campaign on September 21,
1939* 1 said*
X am mot unmindful of the causes and effects In the 
political world, and of the affairs of the state. The 
present regime- at Its Inception, was ushered in be­
cause of the sins and faults and defects of a pre­
existing group* Many thousands of Louisianians were 
ready for a change which would dig up by the roots the 
power then entrenched and give it to the people —  the 
benefits to which they were justly entitled. Among these 
were many thousands as honest, sincere, and conscientious 
as can be found in the state of Louisiana. Among these 
was my own father, who hated ..with holy fervor, all that 
smacked of corrupt politics.^
The administration of Sam Jones did show some degree of re­
sponsibility for the needs of the “people,” through the estab­
lishment of Civil Service and of "blue ribbon*1 boards.
But as election time came in 19^-, the actions of the 
faction which Jones represented revealed more clearly the 
nature of its outlook. A candidate must be found to fill the 
position of governor until Jones could be eligible to run 
again in 19W .  “Jimmie” Davis appeared to be a safe choice. 
Strumming his guitar, he need not make a stand on any political 
issue* Davis was, as the farmer would say in northeast Loui­
siana where Jimmie was raised, rfa good ole country boy**1 It 
did not seem to matter that quite obviously oil money was 
backing Davis, and apparently was found in large quantity in
the Jonas faction.
In 19+8, the Long faction made a decided comeback, > 
with Bari Long running for governor, supported and aided by 
his nephew Russell, Huey's son and heir to the political magic
33LQu%slam Senate JQj&ml, 19**0.
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of the name Long.^ Karl was thought to be a politician 
close to the lower classes —  at least he posed as a "man of 
the people.** Three other candidates had entered the race, 
although it was widely believed that in the «run-off« the 
struggle would be between Long and Sam Jones , his erstwhile 
opponent. "Jimmie*1 Morrison, congressman from the Florida 
parishes, was running again for the third straight time. 
Robert Kennon was a "dark horse." Politically unknown at 
this date, the Webster Parish judge posed as a veterans*
candidate and appealed to anti-Long people who opposed "High
 ^ \
tot" Sam Jones* close connection with big business *0^& )
Jones had the advantage of being the administration 
candidate, but the fact that he had, by and large, the sup­
port of Industrial Interests counted against him with the 
broad layers of the lower classes. The welfare program pro­
posed by Huey’s brother Sari was quite ambitious; but if it 
had been fostered with hopes of political perpetuation, the 
aspiration was blunted after Long’s victory by quarrels within 
the Long faction itself. Earl’s endorsement at the polls had 
been strong, for he beat Jones with 65 per cent of the vote 
cast and gained majorities in all but two parishes.
The results of the first primary had forecast clearly 
who the ultimate winner would be. Long gained heavy support 
in almost all of the hill parishes of north Louisiana, and in
^Heberle and Bertrand, &£• P* 3*4-9.
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tight of the south Louisiana French parishes# His strongest 
opposition was seated In the urban parishes, such as Bast 
Baton Bouge, Calcasieu, Orleans, and Gaddo* Likewise certain 
of the Mississippi delta parishes showed considerable opposl- 
tion to Earl Long# let here, analysis on the ward level has 
shown that increased populations in Mbackwater" settlements 
during the thirties had swelled the farmer vote and that the 
Long candidate got many of them.35 Jones, weak in his home 
parish of Calcasieu, found his main backing in the urban 
areas about Hew Orleans and Baton Bouge* Kennon*s support 
was generally seated about Shreveport, Monroe, and the hill 
parishes near his native Webster* However, Kennon did show 
surprisingly strong gains In Lake Charles and Baton Bouge and 
in the southern portions of the sugar country? this was per­
haps a forecast of things to come# Morrison scored heavily 
in his native Florida parishes, as he had consistently done# 
With Long,s strong initial support, and the decided shift of 
Morrlsonfs support in his favor, Long had no trouble In the 
second "run-offw primary#
The main tendencies which constitute the Long faction, 
placed in geographical setting, provide the opportunity for > 
isolating certain elements of the electorate# It is then 
possible to check further the expressions of these same ele­
ments in regard to political issues of the national scene#
3^Howard, op # clt * * p. 130#
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On© crucial issue which the Louisiana electorate faced was 
the Dixiecrat revolt of 19^3* The action of the "haves" and 
the "have-nots," the Longs and the anti-Longs, is quite in­
structive of the emerging political situation of the "new" 
Louisiana* For, although Longism and the Hew Deal had done 
much for Louisiana, yet they had done little for the political A 
aspirations of the Bourbons. Rule of the "people" was by no 
means assured. There was little labor organisation in 19**8, 
very few Negroes had been given the privilege of registering 
for suffrage, and party control was still oligarchic*
At first glance, the distribution of pro^Long senti­
ment among the parishes for the two decade period, 1928-W, 
suggests a pattern similar to the old Whig-Jacksonl&n cleav­
age* (See Figure 3^*) At least the strongest Long support 
is found in the northern hills where the Jacksonian farmer 
had made his political choice in favor of the Democracy! and 
the area where the faction was least popular falls generally 
in south Louisiana* However, the composition of th© elec­
torate in Louisiana parishes had changed over the years, and 
it is the parishes retaining a predominant fanner population 
which manifest this political tendency. In general terms, 
the fundamental farmer-planter cleavage with roots in the pre­
ceding century still exists, modified in time by identifica­
tion of farm group and labor groups with Longism and of 
planter and industrial Interests within opposing factions.
LONG TENDENCIES FOR SELECTED 
ELECTIONS - 192^, 1940 SECOND 
PRIMARY, 194^ FIRST PRIMARY 
SUPPORT ABOVE STATE AVERAGE 
BY PARISHES 
>1 None 
One 
Two
BBS All Three
Source: Compilation of Primary Election Returns
Louisiana, 1928. 1940 948
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There have been eighteen parishes which have consis­
tently supported Long candidates# These have been pro-Long 
from the beginning9 have withstood the storm of the scandals 
of 19**09 and found favor with Earl Long again in 1S&8. The 
majority of these parishes cut across north Louisiana, of 
course, and contain farmers and workers of low income groups 
residing in the rural towns * The three parishes along liteeon 
Kidge in the northeast corner of the state stick out as Long 
territory! these parishes, West Carroll, Richland, and 
Franklin, among the largest cotton producers of the state, 
are largely given over to the family farm, where both white 
and colored are farmers. Both St, Bernard and Plaquemines 
have registered Long sentiment, but in both of these parishes 
there has been evidence of bossism,
Special attention must be given to the situation in 
the Florida parishes, for some of them have voter groups who 
have supported Longism. The political career of favorite 
son Congressman Morrison has required support for his candi­
dacy in many gubernatorial primaries. Personal appeal has 
ruled the first primary, but in the "run-offsw the farmers 
and laborers of the KLorldas have voted for th© Long faction. 
An example of the vote in Tangipahoa is typical of electoral 
behavior. In 19V8, Morrison and Kennon were eliminated in 
the first primary, leaving Earl Long and Jones in th© run­
off. Even though Morrison pledged his support to Jones, his 
change to the candidate of big business failed to change the
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political tendencies of his constituents.
Calculations reveal that combination of the Long and 
Morrison percentages of the first primary will total remark­
ably dose to the Long percentage of the second primary*
This holds for the parish total as well as for ward totals.
The entire parish vote for Earl Long and Morrison in the first 
primary was 9*979? in the second primary, Long received 9*550, 
The fact that the same holds true for the vote of the more 
conservative candidates reenforces th© proposition that in 
the Florida parishes the farmer and laborer will vote in sup­
port of Longisa. It is only where plantation influence in 
the hills of the Felicianas or AInfluences in Baton Bouge pre­
vail that the Long following is diminished.
Of course there are farmers in south Louisiana, scat­
tered throughout the sugar country. The Initial appeal of 
Loogisa found favor in nearly all of the sugar parishes.
Tet, it was here that the first conservatism in Louisiana po­
litics was seated, and the old Whig tendency has not died 
out. There has been a steady drift toward Longism in the 
eastern section of the sugar country, whereas the western 
portion has crystallised a conservative opposition. In gen­
eral, the parishes to the east of th© Atchafalaya basin have 
manifested the development of a different social situation 
than exists in the parishes on the western edge*
In searching for a clue which would explain this dif­
ferential, the primary Influence would seem to be th© greater
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industrial development in the parishes along the Mississippi 
between Baton Rouge and New Orleans* Oil and sugar refiner- 
leay and sawmills located in the area have produced a situa­
tion in the small towns where the majority of the resident 
labor force are workers* The plantation economy remains a 
force 9 but the other Influence may be said to be more tell­
ing 9 if for no other reason than the greater proportions of 
Negro registration occurring in these parishes 5 to date, the 
registration of Negroes has been primarily an urban phenome­
non* A cluster of six parishes strung along the Mississippi 
River have revealed a recent tendency to Longlsm*^ These 
are Iberville, Ascension, Assumption, St. James, St* John, 
and 6t • Charles • the combined Negro registration in these 
parishes for 1952 was over 10 per cent of the state total*
The alignment of Negro and white laborer comprises an element 
of the electorate in majority strength within these parishes, 
as the election results have indicated*
The numerical strength of anti-Long support has been 
drawn from the urban parishes of Louisiana* Of course, these 
parishes are the seats of the new industrialism which has 
changed the Louisiana society* The cities had likewise been 
the home bases of the older commercial interests tied to the 
rural conservatives. Election returns from the urban-industrial
Heberle, G. Hillery, Jr., and F. Lovrich, "Con­
tinuity and Change in Voting Behavior in the 1952 Primaries 
in Louisiana." The floathweatflga S S S M  Smatit&tiLZ*
Vol. XXXII, U953T.
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parishes have been consistently below the state average of 
the candidates of Longisau Xet the bong forces could expect 
to poll some one^third of the vote in these parishes due to 
the fact that by and large the laborer has found in bongism 
a platform more amenable to his interests. The events of th© 
elections of 1952, to be discussed in the next chapter, will 
indicate that the growing tendency is that the vote in the 
city will break even, with the conservative elements, perhaps, 
prevailing.
The problem must now be solved concerning what happens 
to tendencies toward Longlsm when transferred from the arena 
of state politics to that of national politics. The issues 
of I f W  are chosen because they are tied to the attempt of 
the conservatives to regain political ascendancy. As Key has 
pointed out ,37 the black belt was the seat of Bixiecrat agi~ 
tat ions. The shadow of the Negro fs presence remained to 
haunt the conscience of the Bourbon Democrat. The Negro was 
no longer a threat to political dominance, ©o long as he knew 
his place; events on the national scene, however, rubbed the 
Bourbon prejudice the wrong way. The threat of "Trumanism** 
set the Bourbons to mending political fences. The political 
climate in Louisiana, however, had been modified by Longlsm, 
and the Democratic party, of all things, tended toward the 
parallel of the national organisation. There was nothing
37Key, stS., fiUfc,
191
left tat for the conservatives to bolt the party* A genera­
tion or two before, the presence of the Negro had guaranteed 
the successful domination of Louisiana by a minority group.
In 19**8, the presence of th© Negro served as an index depict­
ing which areas of the state were most susceptible to the 
appeal of States' Bights,
The Lllywhite, the Bourbon Democrat, had established 
white supremacy by intimidating, and eventually, disenfran­
chising the Negro* Bourbon political prejudice would show 
most strongly in those areas where the Negro's presence had 
meant Republican polities* This minority group, though 
economically strong, would need political allies* The farmer 
of the hills, Democrat by tradition, was the most obvious 
ally* Yet, the Bourbon had most assuredly alienated the 
farmer's affections, in the ©vents of the turn of the century; 
and the emergence of Longlsm had assured the former ruling 
class that other groups than farmer and labor must identify 
with their political and social philosophy if they were to 
attain once more the absolute certainty of domination which 
had once been the glory of the Bourbon's past*
In which parishes was the support for th© Dlxiecrats 
greatest? Without referring to the election results, it would 
be possible to ascertain the parishes with populations com­
prised of high proportions of Negroes, and spot these for th© 
Dlxiecrats* In the top sixteen States' Rights parishes, only 
three showed percentages of Negroes lower than the state
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TABLE II
HIGHEST AHD LOWEST QUARTILES OF DIXIECRAT VOTE IN 19>+8 
AND PER CENT NEGRO, 1950, BY SELECTED PARISHES*
Highest
Quarter
Dixieorat
Per Cent 
Jfesro
Lowest
Quarter
Dixieorat
Per Cent 
Hesro
Madison 66.1 Ouachita 32.9
Tensas 6*+,8 Caldwell 28.5
Concordia 59.1 Beauregard 17.0
Avoyelles 26.0 Allen 23.2
Evangeline 23.8 Calcasieu 22.9
St* Landry w  .6 Jeff* Davis 19.1
Pte. Coupee 53.6 Cameron 9.3
E* Feliciana 58.2 Iberia 38.0
St* Martin 36.9 Terrebonne 20.3
St* Bernard 1^.5 Iberville *+8.7
Plaquemines 38.3 We Baton Rouge — 53.1
DeSoto 56.6 E« Baton Rouge 33.O
Red River % . 9 Livingston 1$.7
Bienville *+9.2 St. James 50.2 <
Claiborne 51.6 St. John *+9.8
Lincoln W . l Orleans 31.8
•Source« Report of Secretary of State, 19*+8j Sixteenth 
Census of U. S., 1950.
average of 35*9 per cent Negro. Seven Dixieorat parishes 
vere predominantly Negro, and in two, the per cent Negro was 
between **9 and 5© per cent • At the same time, inspection of 
the lowest quarter of Dixieorat parishes will Indicate that 
in only two were the whites outnumbered* It is instructive 
to note that in those two parishes, West Baton Rouge and St. 
James, the Negro had been allowed to register for the vote, 
in 1952*
The Dlxleerats polled **9.8 per cent of th© total pre­
sidential vote in 19^8 and the impression would be gained 
that the revolt had wide appeal, as nearly every parish of 
north Louisiana registered strong support. Yet, in the light 
of the diseusslon preceding, to hold this position would seem 
unreasonable. The contention may be made that the Dixieorat 
vote was double-pronged; half of the 11 revolt” was a protest 
on the part of the farmer against the Truman administration. 
In 19*& a vote of from a quarter to a third of a parish total 
was registered in favor of the Republican candidate In north 
Louisiana among many normally Democratic parishes. It is 
maintained that this was a protest vote against administra­
tion policies, in an area with a tradition of protest. For 
where did this portion of the vote go in 19^8?
Taking those parishes which registered a vote for the 
Republican candidate above the state average of 19 per cent 
in 19Mf, it should be possible to trace the direction this 
tendency took in the 19M3 presidential election. Of these
TABLE III
CONTINUITY OF POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN GROUPS OF PARISHES 
PARISH PERCENTAGE ABOVE STATE AVERAGE*
l?Mf
Reoublican
l ? w
States' RiehtB
19kB
Truman
Webster Webster Webster
Winn Winn Winn
Grant Grant Grant
Sabine Sabine Sabine
Vernon Vernon Vernon
Morehouse Morehouse Morehouse
W* Carroll W. Carroll w* Carroll
Richland Richland Richland
Catahoula Catahoula Catahoula
Assumption Assumption
Red River Red River
Natchitoches Natchitoches
LaSalle LaSalle
B* Carroll E* Carroll
E. Feliciana E. Feliciana
Tangipahoa Tangipahoa
Beauregard Beauregard
Calcasieu Calcasieu
Caldwell Caldwell
Franklin Franklin
Union Uhion
Ouachita Ouachita
Iberia
DeSoto DeSoto
Caddo Caddo
Bossier Bossier
Bienville Bienville
Claiborne Claiborne
Lincoln Lincoln
Madison Madison
Tensas Tensas
W. Feliciana W. Feliciana
Jeff* Davis Jeff* Davis
♦Source* Report of Secretary of State,
19?
thirty-three parishes* nearly all shewed up In the Dixiecrat 
column* but with one striking difference* In some the Dixie- 
erat percentage was extremely high, while In more the States* 
Rights and the Truman percentages were above the state aver­
ages* It is this differential which belies the unity of the 
19M* Republican vote. While for the electorate of some par­
ishes It was a protest vote against the national Democratic 
party* in others the 19Mf vote was a protest not against 
party but against policy* In one group of parishes the po­
litical climate was such that the revolt was to carry over 
into the 19?2 elections* while th© rest were to remain de­
voted to Longism and the Democratic party.
There were ten parishes of the 19Mf group which regis­
tered percentages favoring the Dlxlecrats in l$k8 with about 
two-thirds of the vote. Here* the leading tendency was ap­
parent as the geographical distribution of these parishes 
would reveal* They fringed the heart of the Louisiana hills* 
but in none was the traditional farmer vote a dominating ten­
dency* They were planter parishes or those among which the 
farmer class was generally more prosperous. To anticipate 
clinch the contention that these parishes belonged to th© 
conservatives* it will be found that in all ten of these par­
ishes the 19?2 Republican percentages were above the state 
average•
On the other side of the political center* there were 
ten parishes of the 1?M+ group which registered Dixieorat
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proportions above fifty per cent* Th© support could be no 
mere, for the Truman candidacy was also favored by around one- 
third of the electorate* The geographic distribution of 
these parishes stretches from Macon Ridge, across th© hills, 
to the parishes of the Texas border* Within this area was 
seated the old-time traditional farmer vote, a political ten­
dency favoring th© Democratic party and long ism* In 1952 every 
ona of these parishes registered majorities for the candidate 
of the Democratic party* There very definitely has been de­
lineated here a cleavage and a continuity of basic political 
tendencies*
There were, in between the extremes, four parishes of 
the 19Mf group which failed to register Dixiecrat percentages 
above the state average, while the votes for Truman reached 
proportions of from 10 to 15 per cent above the state aver­
age of 31.2 for his party. One of these is Calcasieu, which 
of course contained a sizable worker class vote. On the 
other hand, Beauregard, Caldwell, and Franklin are areas 
where the tradition of the farmer was predominant,
The remaining three parishes of the group which in 
19Mf registered Republican percentages above the state aver­
age, Union, Ouachita, and Iberia, had little in common except 
the 19Mf vote and the near equal split in the 1952 vote be­
tween Republican and Democrat. Iberia belonged to the group 
of parishes of the southern part of th© state traditionally 
Whig-Republican. Ouachita is on© of the urban-industrial
centers of the state whose class stratification is scrambled, 
with an older plater-commercial layer# farmer groups# a 
considerable laboring group, and a middle class of some pro­
portion* In Union there is apparently a Bepublican tendency 
of a number evenly matched against the opposing tendency 
toward the Democratic party.
The north Louisiana parishes which did not fit the 
extremes in voting behavior of the 19k& election tend to 
traditional position In support of the Democratic party and 
of the Long faction* The farmer had learned that a protest 
might bring results, but he also recognized from whence came 
his political bread and butter*
The general pattern, then, in the continuity of protest 
since 19Mt is the cleavage in the geographical distribution 
of the tendency in north Louisiana* The fact that the cleav­
age follows quite generally the outlines of Long country 
would suggest that the differential follows the line between 
the '‘haves” and the "have-nots,” and that it is the "haves” 
which have revolted, this time* For of the group of ten par­
ishes highlighting the political trend on each extreme, the 
control factor, the support of Longlsm, is clearly apparent 
only in the group tending Democratic. In each group the ex­
ceptions do not upset th© rule. Using the three key Long 
elections as an index, in the Democratic group the average 
support for Longism is 2*5 times, whereas In the Dixiecrat- 
Republican group, the average support is only 1*5, with three
198
I
parishes, Caddo, Madison, and West Feliciana “anti* all three 
times.
The conservative-liberal cleavage discovered in north 
Louisiana is carried over in south Louisiana. It might be 
expected that in the sugar country, the home of Louisiana 
conservatism, a consensus of political opinion still existed* 
However, this area was no less immune to the Influences which 
shaped present day Louisiana society. Here, too one may 
look for differentials in political outlook as expressed in 
the ballot* Xet, the outlet for conservatism might be ex­
pected in a different direction than in north Louisiana, since 
the tradition of Whig-Republicanism had remained influential* 
The conservatism of the sugar country contained more of an 
enlightened self-interest than the ideological concern of the 
north Louisiana Bourbon*
The year 1920 was one peculiarly sensitive for Repub­
lican opinion in Louisiana# The Progressive-Republican, 
Parker, had been elected governor with staunch backing from 
south Louisiana, and in the presidential election Harding had 
been favored in fourteen parishes, with a Republican vote of 
nearly 75 P©** cent having been recorded in Iberia* (See Fig­
ure 35.) Ten of these parishes were in sugar country* In 
1920 only the “solid South* carried for the Democrats in the 
electoral college. The Democratic candidate had stood on 
the Wilson record, and the war-weary electorate defeated him* 
There was no alternative candidate, for as one Journalist
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1920
REPUBLICAN SUPPORT IN
SELECTED PARISHES
| y  50*0$ and Above
| | &
Source: Report of Secretary of State. Louisiana. 1920
?* ~ 5? W  ~
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observed, Harding had been elected ?lby disgust*^® In the 
backgroundf releasing the old Whig concern for self-interest 
in sugar country was the subtle question of tariff* Hot long 
after gaining office, the Republicans repudiated Democratic 
concern for trade with exhausted Europe and in 1922 estab­
lished tariff rates higher than ever before in our history*^ 9 
There had been good reason for the sugar interests to exhum© 
and reassert old tendencies*
In 19W, after another “Democratic War,** the sugar 
country once again registered strong Republican sympathies*
The tendency had been nurtured over the years, although by 
this time the numerical support was not what it once had been* 
Every one of the ten sugar parishes which had registered Re­
publican majorities in 1920 had, in 19**8, recorded Republican 
percentages above the state average of 17*5 per cent. (See 
Figure 36.) Still, there was no consensus of political 
opinion within the sugar country, and the remaining propor­
tions of the vote were divided between Dixiecrat and Truman 
sentiments*
Iberia showed the leading tendency for th© cluster of 
sugar parishes west of the great AtehafaXaya drainage basin. 
Here the Republican candidate received a plurality, th©
38J. d . Hicks, Ihe American Ha.tl.on (Bostons Houghton
Mifflin Co., 19^?)» p.y+7.
39g. e . Morrison and H. S. Commager, X&£ Growth of iba
ArmT-innn BarmhUc (Hew Yorks Oxford University Press, 1937),
Vol. II, p. 532.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1948 
PLURALITIES IN SELECTED 
PARISHES
Truman 
Thurmond 
Dewey
Source: Report of Secretary of State. Louisiana. 1948
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returns being b7 per cent in favor of Dewey, the parishes 
grouped on either side of Iberia registered Republican per­
centages above the state average, but In these the plurali­
ties were gained by the Dixiecrais. Perhaps there was a 
feeling among the conservatives that a States9 Rights vote 
would do more in 19^8, but at any rate, the fact remains that 
in these parishes almost three-quarters of the electorate had 
cast conservative ballots. Oil was more prevalent here*
The differential is clearly apparent between these Dixiecrat- 
Republican parishes and those to the east of the Atchafalaya. 
The Republican candidate received the traditional propor­
tions, but the balance of the vote In Iberville, St. James, 
and St. John was decidedly liberal and pluralities were re­
corded for the Truman candidacy.
Within the sugar country, as in cotton country, there 
is indication of a political cleavage, in the so&MSim^part 
of the state aided by the changing attitude toward Negro suf­
frage. Yet, this is not so surprising when It Is recalled 
that in some of these parishes the old Whig tradition had 
been strong, and that here the tradition of Negro voting had
been nurtured longest.
If the sugar parishes along the Mississippi between 
Raton Rouge and New Orleans have shown a definite Democratic 
tendency, they have also been more sympathetic to th© appeal 
of Longlsm. The two tendencies seem to go together.
Lafayette, Iberia, and St* Mary registered Long support in 
1928, but have been conspicuous by their absence in the Long 
columns since that time; and although some parishes in the 
eastern side of sugar country have been slow in accepting 
the appeals of Longism, they have steadily demonstrated a 
drift in that direction* Actually, the breakthrough was to 
occur in the elections of 1952* The parishes of the middle 
ground, such as St. Martin, Assumption, Lafourche, and Terre­
bonne, have recorded rather strong support for Longism, al­
though in the latter two parishes the climate of opinion 
became more conservative* The voting records provide ample 
evidence that if an economic unit, the sugar country is no 
longer unified on political opinion, let, it is to be sug­
gested that the cleavage existent here does not reflect quite 
the same ideological background that can be found in north 
Louisiana* After all, the home of conservatism In Louisiana 
is in south Louisiana; the Bourbon ideology was fostered under 
more trying circumstances and hence carried perhaps a bit 
more compulsion and a little less feeling for responsibility.
Finally, It is necessary to devote a few lines to the 
tendencies of labor groupings in Louisiana Baton Rouge is 
representative of the recent urban-industrial developments 
within the state; quite obviously the development had brought
^P* H. Howard. wVoting Behavior in Baton Rouge," Pro- 
of th© Louisiana Academy of Sciences, Vol. IV,
20**
aa increased population among which wore elements with an ef~ 
fact on voting behavior* At the same time these processes 
brought, on the higher socio-economic layers, a population 
with a "conservative" vote, there has been a growing worker 
class with tendencies to vote "progressive." As expressed in 
the vote, the former groups have backed anti-Long candidates 
and in presidential elections Republican candidates or the 
"defection® within the Democratic party* The worker class, 
in Baton Rouge at least, has not been strong in support of 
Longism, bat will tend to support a Long candidate when 
clearly there is no other choice on the basis of fundamental 
economic issues; and in presidential elections the workers, 
although not organized with definite ties with national un­
ions, will parallel the national tendency of supporting th® 
Democratic party. The phenomenon of voting behavior in Baton 
Rouge will be pursued further in the next chapter.
Investigation has proceeded to the point which war­
rants, in summation, a discussion of generalizations which 
may be entertained concerning the significance of one-party 
politics and the rise of Longism. To do so will establish 
the relationship which exists between the events of the past 
and the situation in which the elections of 1952 were carried 
out. One conclusion Is foremost, that Louisiana politics 
may be understood, but only against the background of the his* 
terieai circumstances which helped make th® present what it 
is. Class support has been hidden behind party or factional
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labels poorly understood* and further* the labels themselves 
may be shifted* Yet* basic tendencies of political expres­
sion may remain consistent*
Political behavior may not always appear reasonable*
In Louisiana politics, significance lies not in the elec­
torate's rational choices of Long or anti-Long candidates 
but in the tendencies behind the unceasing struggle for power* 
Opposing parties or factions are representative of differing 
philosophies of government, with traditional backgrounds In 
Louisiana political experience* Yet the social situation had 
changed and political outlook must be adjusted in some manner 
to the present reality* In 1952 talk arose concerning the 
possibility of two-party politics in Louisiana* Had not 
there always been present at least the necessary ingredients 
for party politics, if not the actual opposition of genuine 
political parties?
The electorate which voted for the Democratic candi­
dates, after 1900, scarcely had an alternative choice*
Those who were able to vote were also fortunate that their 
situation was such they met the suffrage requirements# Such 
people might be expected to have an, interest in the party 
struggle* As industrial plants became more prevalent, as the 
economic situation bettered, the level of living was raised, 
and educational opportunities were afforded, then, the voice 
of the people was heard again* An aspiration for a share of 
the realisable potential in Louisiana’s economy, coupled with
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the pent-up frustration of the masses would produce a con­
sensus among the very group which if united represented a 
majority of Louisiana *s electorate*
Moreover, the history of Louisiana9s political ex­
perience might well stress the strong role of the executive 
in the state government, the legislature, throughout most 
of the state's history, has been secondary to the governor* 
it was expected of the governor to do things when elected.
On the local level, especially in south Louisiana, the poli­
ticians, lawyers, sheriffs, and the priests acted as the 
spokesmen for the people, who, speaking French, were inar­
ticulate of their interests and needs. Against such a back­
ground, is It so surprising that a Huey Long could rise to 
political power, and acting the role of the strong man, per­
petuate his political program? The Whig philosophy that the 
people should be ruled merged with the Jacksonian belief that 
the people should rule. In Longism the people had everything 
to gain.
Yet, if traditionally, the role of the executive was 
a major one in Louisiana government, the dogmas, if not the
kl
spirit, of Jacksonian Democracy were perpetuated. The ex­
panding function® of government were scattered among numerous 
holders of fragment® of the executive power at th© very time 
that rising industrialism made demands of a stronger or more
^Prothro, cit.t p. 99#
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centralized executive* Cnee this had happened9 who could 
gather again the pieces of executive authority except th© 
strong man? Government by bureaucracy became th© accepted 
pattern, and the electorate decided whether direction would 
be through their representative, the governor, or through 
the action of boards* Opinion was split on this decision* 
Implicit in the political philosophy of the Louisiana 
conservative, if his dogma may be so dignified, was the feel­
ing for states1 rights and vested interests*14*2 In the first 
state constitution, "property” was the basic concern of gov­
ernmental activity. The old Whig had protected his interests 
in voting for internal improvements, the banks, and for high 
tariff. Yet at the same time the Whig governed with respon­
sibility, for theirs was an articulate major premise. Th© 
cotton planters likewise could find sympathy for the Whig con­
cern for vested Interests; but the Calhounian doctrines of 
states1 rights, which in the end the cotton planter embraced 
In Justifying the Secession, was a doctrine of another shad­
ing* Embodied in the dogmas of the Democratic party which 
became the dominating party in Louisiana politics, it remained 
an inarticulate major premise*
The dogmas of th© Democratic party were mixed, however, 
and although the dominating elite could be guided by th© con­
cerns of states1 rights and vested interests, the people,
J. Harris, "States* Rights and Vested Interests," 
Journal of Politics* Vol. 15 (19?3)*
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following the traditions of the Jacksonian past, would nur­
ture a more liberal outlook* For th© Calhounian doctrine 
“reserved liberty exclusively to the ruling class, rejected 
the egalitarian doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, 
denied generally the doctrine of natural rights in its tradi­
tional context, and converted the principle of states’ rights 
into an instrumentality primarily for the protection of 
property rights*"^
If on the national scene the Jeffersonian and Jackson­
ian liberalism, and the economic and social legislation re­
quested by the Populists, had become part of th© program of 
the Democratic party culminating in the Hew Deal, then in 
Louisiana a similar spirit might prevail in the Democratic 
factional program of Longism* The electoral support of farmer 
and laborer given to Long candidates would suggest this con­
clusion* Objectively viewed, the actions of the opposing 
conservative faction, since its ascendancy in 1900, and par­
ticularly since 19^8, suggest an attitude of cynicism* let 
subjectively the spokesmen and principal actors In the Bourbon 
camp most likely are motivated by genuine attitudes of concern* 
The most recent anti-Long governor of Louisiana, for example, 
has worked day and night for the cause of states® rights and
I
yet often describes himself as a Jeffersonian Democrat*
^Ibid.. p. *4-59•
Corning Advocate. Baton Houge, Nov. 22, 1953.
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He might more accurately be labeled a Calhounian.
The rise of Longism in Louisiana was made possible 
by the rather severe domination of the populace by one party 
controlled by a dominant minority* The people, frustrated 
beyond endurance, found their champion in Huey Long, and 
quite conscious of their position in society and aware of 
what should be done about it, supported and established the 
reign of Longism. As on the national scene, most of the 
latent class conflict of th© thirties was averted through 
political action in Louisiana, and a generation of small 
farmers and portions of the working class learned to favor 
Longism. Its program was satisfactory for the period for 
which It was meant, but by 1950 the records of the United 
States Census showed that economic and demographic influ­
ences had transformed Louisiana society*
CHAPTER V
THE ELECTIONS OF* 1952 ARP THE FUTURE OF LOUISIANA POLITICS
•We were told fop a half century that if the 
people In the South even thought of voting 
Republican, grandfather would turn over in his 
grave. Well, no noise was heard from the ceme- 
teries• •. • last November•-
Gov. James F. Byrnes
A. Demography and Polities. The good governor of South 
Carolina, in speaking of Hepublloanism in the South of 1952, 
forgot to make clear that those were representatives of the 
very politically dominant minority of which he is a member 
who had exhorted Democratic solidarity. This is no anachro­
nism, either, for the governor meant what he said. It ap­
peared "safe," In 1952, for the conservatives of the South 
to give strong electoral support in behalf of the Republican 
candidate. More than being safe, however, it can be demon­
strated that this move was but an inevitable consequence of 
the demographic factors which influenced the establishment 
of, and reflect the existence of, the "New South." Para­
doxical events transpired In the Louisiana portion of this 
new South, events which could not be clearly understood 
through sole use of old formulae. The demographic indices 
of social structure in Louisiana will be employed to show
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that Louisiana politics, after 1952, will never be quite the 
same as traditionally conceived.
Demographic characteristics, such as the composition 
of the population, have of course always influenced politics. 
The old antagonism between Creole and American, the gradual 
outnumbering of Whigs by Jacksonians, and the importance of 
the Negro vote during Reconstruction, all these and more have 
worked their effects upon Louisiana politics. If, in the 
past, migration peopled the state with a farmer class, it 
was also to work In transforming the social structure of the 
aid-twentieth century. The small farmer groups of the hills 
and "cut-over** parishes developed a class solidarity and be­
came the backbone of support of Longism. The industrial 
labor force present in the Louisiana of 1952 might become 
supporters of a politics of another sort. The tabulation of 
the Federal Census of 1950 Indicated that Louisiana was no 
longer to be characterized as rural, but had become pre­
dominantly urban. There is also an accompanying industrial 
growth which will remake the structure of the formerly agri­
cultural society.
The former traditions, the political symbols of th© 
past, must somehow be adapted to changed conditions. In the 
1950 fs there were new sources of power and of electoral sup­
port. There would be combinations established and tried in 
the ceaseless struggle to man the machinery of government.
The Louisiana of 1950 reflected demographic characteristics
more similar to national trends than to her own past.
The demographic tendencies or trends hinted at were 
observable by 19*+0 and have been evaluated elsewhere.* In 
the next decade, more of the same is dlscernabl® and leading 
features of the trend to industrial urbanity will be pre­
sently discussed. The population growth and distribution in 
Louisiana shows an Increase of people in the cities. The 
urban centers have become the key to political success if for 
no other reason than the sheer number of voters who reside 
there. Industrialization has afforded a host of job oppor­
tunities, and since manufacturing plants have been concen­
trated in but seven of Louisiana's sixty-four parishes, the 
resulting voting labor force Is not only concentrated but also 
tends to outnumber other groups within the electorate. The 
trend to industrial urbanity developed in Louisiana a situa­
tion parallel to national experience, the shift in the class 
structure.
It was a generation ago that Professor Holcombe ob­
served that the old geographic sectionalism in American
LP. H. Howard, She Political Ecology s i teBlataaft 
(unpublished master's thesis, Louisiana State University, 
1951)} B. Heberle, Jhg Labor Force In Louisiana (Baton Rouges 
Louisiana State University Press, lyw)} T» L» Smith and H.
L. Hitt, JEts People of Louisiana (Baton Rouges Louisiana 
State University Press, 1952).
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politics m s  giving m y  or being modified by a rising urbanity.2 
there m s  sectionalism in Louisiana politics, but class cleav­
age, also, as the rise of Long ism demonstrated! now this would 
be changed. As C. Wright Mills has shown, of the three broad 
strata comprising present day society, it has been the "mid­
dle class" which has grown steadily In proportion to the 
whole.3 it could be assumed, in the case of Louisiana, with 
industrial urbanity a rather sudden event, that the very 
population aggregating in the cities would be quite middle 
class in the new sense* Of course the industrial labor force 
would be comprised of a large share of working class people, 
but nonetheless the proportion of people falling into the 
middle income brackets would be appreciable.
As the industrial base of Louisiana Increased within 
the last decade, its influence was felt in the social class 
structure* For the nation, Mills has shown how the decline 
in the older, independent sectors of the middle class was 
accompanied by the numerical rise of the newer groups of sal­
aried employees A  This trend is striking for Louisiana, even 
when using but two census compilations for comparisons* The
A . N* Holcombe, Sis fl§E forty Politics (New fork* 
Harper and Bros*, 1933>5 also Holcombe, 1 M  Mj&fllg la
American Politics (Cambridge* Harvard university Press, 19w;
^c, W. Mills, White Collar (New York* Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1953)* pp. o3-6pT
^Ibld.. p. 65.
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proportion of self-employed had dropped from 27*7 to 19*2 per 
eent since 19**0, whereas there was an accompanying rise in 
the proportion of private wage and salaried workers from 58*9 
to 67*9 per cent* Moreoverf the gain within the major occu­
pational groups of professionals, managers and officials, 
clerical, and sales people, generally falling into the sal­
aried middle class, was proportionately 8*W per cent more in 
1950 than in the previous count.
A word of caution must be given, however, in the in­
terpretation of these percentages* For the newer industrial 
base has been placed over the older agricultural base of 
Louisiana economy* Yet, even agriculture has not remained 
unaffected by recent changes* The farmer was considered a 
part of the older middle classes, but his place, numerically, 
in the new order has dwindled. Part of the decrease in self- 
employed persons and the increase in wage and salaried em­
ployees may be a direct consequence of the proportionately 
fewer farmers in the Louisiana labor force. In 19**0 farmers 
made up 18.3 per cent of the total labor force, but by 1950 
this group comprised only 10*3 per cent of the total* At the 
same time, farm laborers also made up less of the labor force? 
the proportion was 13*6 per cent in 19*+0 and only 6.6 per 
cent a decade later.
The rural sociologist will point out that much of this 
decrease in the number of farmers is a direct consequence of
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the mechanisation of agriculture,5 it is true that owner- 
operated farms are increasing, while sharecroppers and 
laborers are on the wane* At the same time we are told that 
the number of farms is decreasing* There are fewer farms and 
those that remain are increasing in size* This has meant a 
decrease in the rural population, and this helps explain the 
facts concerning composition of the Louisiana labor force*
With no work in the country, even more people have migrated 
to the urban areas* The mechanisation of agriculture takes 
a sectional differentiation. Least mechanized, generally 
speaking, are the parishes Included In the north and central 
Louisiana hill and cut-over areas* Along with mechanization 
there has been an increase in the total value of farm pro­
ducts; this has meant generally a higher level of living*
Hence even as the industrial-urban trend has helped change 
the class structure of Louisiana society, so also mechaniza­
tion has affected the composition of the farmer class within 
the system of stratification*
The population, elements of which will fill the economic 
class positions described above, was characterized as predomi­
nantly urban in 1950, for the first time in Louisiana's census 
history* The urban population made up 5W3 per cent of the 
total. The population as a whole had increased 13*5 per cent
?A. L. Bertrand, Agricultural IMfifaM&a-Uaa S M  iSSlal 
Chance in Rural Louisiana. Louisiana State University Experi­
ment Station Bulletin, No * M>8 (1951)•
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ever 19*^ 0, but spectacular gains were mad® in the urban- 
industrial parishes. The census computations Indicate, for 
example, that almost two-thirds of the population Increase 
In the state was accounted for by Orleans, East Baton Rouge, 
and Jefferson parishes. East Baton Rouge continued its rapid 
expansion with an increase of 79#0 per cent, while in Jeffer­
son Parish the population had increased by 106 per cent.
Such is obvious, for when driving to New Orleans from the 
northwest, it is difficult to discern when one leaves Jeffer­
son and enters Orleans Parish. Jefferson Is rapidly becoming 
industrialized and portions of the parish have become the 
residential suburbs for New Orleans. With Jefferson as the 
latest addition to the group of urban-industrial parishes,
there are now seven whose population represents ^7*2 per cent
£
of the Louisiana total.
The residents of these seven parishes make up an im­
portant segment of the Louisiana electorate. Nearly half the 
people of the state live there, making up WJ.l per cent of 
the total registered voters in 1952. At the same time it is 
revealing of the urbanward migration of Louisiana Negroes 
that in 19?0 over two-fifths of the state total resided in 
these seven urban-industrial parishes. And in 19?2, the 
colored voters there represented 62*9 P®r cent of the total 
who had registered in such large number. The colored
^Jefferson, Orleans. East Baton Rouge, Calcasieu, 
Rapides, Caddo, and Ouachita.
residents made up close to a third of the population in most 
of these parishes,
Even though the Negro was also becoming urbanised, 
there were still fourteen parishes, in 1950, where the white 
population was outnumbered by the colored, These parishes 
follow down the Mississippi, border part of the Floridas, 
and cluster about the northwest corner of the state. In gen­
eral pattern, the rural Negro population follows the seats of 
the former plantation economy still, after all these years,
W. J. Cash had called the Negro the ^Proto-Dorian bond of 
the Democratic party,and with his heavy voting registra­
tion in the urban parishes it is Instructive that little or 
no Negro registration was allowed In the rural parishes 
where in 1952 the conservative vote was so high. The Negro 
had generally found a new freedom but it would b© slow in 
spreading back from the urban centers into the rural hinter­
land •
As a substitute for the lack of a better index of the 
relative Incidence of "capital" and "labor" within the par­
ishes, a ratio has been computed showing the proportion of 
wage and salary workers to those self-employed In each parish 
(See Figure 37.) As expected, the large worker ratio occurs 
clustered about the urban centers. The areas where agricul­
ture Is primary stand out with low ratios. In the hills
7W. J. Cash, X M  Mind g£ South (New tforkt Alfred
A. Knopf, 1951)? P* 213*
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RATIO OF PRIVATE WAGE AND 
SALARY WORKERS TO SELF-EMPLOYED 
1950 BY PARISHE3
1st quarter:
2nd quarter:
3rd quarter:
4 th quarter:
.112 -  .238
.248 -  .395
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.680 - 2.486
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between Rapides and Ouachita, the agricultural pattern is 
broken due to the relatively high worker ratios resulting 
from the presence of lumber industries which draw from farmer 
groups for a labor force* Southwest from Rapides, until Cal­
casieu is reached, there is likewise a cluster similar In 
characteristics to the hill parishes* The distribution of 
high ratios within the sugar bowl probably reveals the asso­
ciation of labor with the processing end of the sugar indus­
try. There are also scattered lumber, seafood, oil, and 
chemical industries In the small towns and cities of south 
Louisiana*
The more concentrated distribution of high worker 
ratios in south Louisiana results from the greater density 
of population in that area of the state where the older 
layer of agriculture, industry, and commerce had flourished* 
Yet the parishes close or adjacent to the Mississippi Elver, 
such as Assumption, St* James, St* John, and St* Charles 
have in each considerably smaller populations than Iberia 
and St* Mary parishes farther west, beyond the Atchafalaya 
basin* (See Table IV.) In the former areas, any substantial 
increase in the number of industrial establishments would be 
felt in the composition of the labor force. Moreover, in 
this area there are no large cities or towns* Iberia, St. 
Mary, Terrebonne and Lafourche, on the other hand, contain 
in each a city with more than 7,000 population. Her© addi­
tions to the labor force in the categories of wage and salary
TABLE IV
DIFFERENTIALS in selected ratio of composition of labor force
IN CERTAIN SUGAR PARISHES AND POPULATION OF LARGEST 
CITY OR TOWN ABOVE 2,^99 IN 1950*
Parish
Ratios of Managers, Officials, 
and Proprietors** 
to Craftsmen, Operatives and 
Kindred Workers ...
Population of 
Largest City 
or Town 
Above 2fk99
St* John .132 ******
St* Charles .182 ******
St* James *161 ******
Assumption •l*fl m**m
Ascension .198
Iberville .300 5,737
St. Mary .302 h ? PIberia .2bb 16A60
Terrebonne .211 11,W0
Lafourche .2k6 7,733
♦Source: Seventeenth Census of the U. 3., 1950.
♦♦Farmers Excluded.
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workers would be counterbalanced by other elements of the 
population already present* However, in the eastern parishes 
worker groups would tend to outnumber the older layers of 
planter and commercial groups and associated classes* While 
in Iberia and St. Mary parishes from 10 to 15 per cent of 
the population was engaged In manufacturing in 1950, in St* 
James and St. John the proportions were from 22 to 36 per 
cent. Likewise, the ratios In the accompanying table clearly 
reveal the relatively greater Importance of worker groups In 
the parishes along the Mississippi. Moreover, as has been 
shown above, there are many more Negroes In these parishes 
who have gained the suffrage* All these factors work to pro­
duce a voting potential different in kind from that which 
exists in the western parishes of the sugar country.
The politician must make different appeals and seek 
different combinations of electoral support in this new Loui­
siana. Cleavages of classes and Interests cut across the 
former alignments. It would no longer be possible to unite 
country against New Orleans, or the latter with a portion of 
the former. The increase of population In urban centers has 
created a new middle class whose favor at the polls must be 
won. Likewise, the class structure of the rural parishes 
has shifted. The farmers of today are generally more secure, 
better educated, and more prosperous than previously. If 
the class position of the rural or urban dweller had been 
altered and generally improved, so the subtle process of
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identification might work in the direction of alliance with 
the older statue groups of prestige and power* Surely the 
predispositions of the old Bourbon Democrat might remain in 
force, reenforced through the aspirations of social mobility 
among the members of the new emergent middle class*
With the establishment of television stations in 
Louisiana cities, a virtual revolution might take place on 
the farm* The values and attitudes standard for the urbanite 
would find their way to alter the rural mind* In recognition 
of the potentials of this phenomenon a farmer recently told 
the writer than in the next elections the candidate who most 
efficiently utilized the channels of television could be the 
governor of Louisiana* On the national scene elections cost 
more and more money because of the expenses Involved in 
using the mass media of communication* This trend must
surely be felt quite soon in Louisiana politics*
B. Rise Qf j&£ "Independent" s 
PMmariftg. of the nine gubernatorial candidates in the Demo­
cratic primary of 1952, only five were given serious consid­
eration, although Dudley LeBlanc counted himself in the 
running, also* The results of the election indicated that 
Louisiana politics could still be understood in terms of the 
Long and anti-Long cleavage.8 let the campaign brought out
8H. Heberle, G. Hillery, Jr., and F* Lovrich, "Con­
tinuity and Change in Voting Behavior in the 1952 Primaries 
in Louisiana," T M  Southwestern gafij&L SSiSSm MXlSZlZ,
Vo. XXXII (1953TT
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dearly the fact that more than the old political battle with 
the former symbols was involved
In the first place, every leading candidate considered 
himself an independent* Even Judge Spaht denied that he was 
Charley McCarthy to Earl Long’s Edgar Bergen; he was dedi­
cated to the program of Longism but pledged himself to admin­
ister it with efficiency and humaneness* McLemore held that 
the "Long-Long" team of Spaht and Boggs was a plot of 
Governor Bari Long and Senator Russell Long to perpetuate 
Longism* However, each leading contender set himself to the
task: of explaining to the electorate what was new and differ­
ent about his program and why he was the ’’Independent'1 candi­
date best suited for the position of governor* The very 
actions of the candidates themselves, then, in 1952 indicate 
that the politicians of the new Louisiana were on uncertain 
ground and had to feel their way, to play safe and be indepen­
dent. The problem was one of who should be appealed to, to 
attempt to be all things to all groups of voters.
The leading political philosophies and slogans which
were present on the national scene were voiced by the inde­
pendents during the campaign, adapted of course for home con­
sumption. A brief analysis of the platforms of the leading 
candidates will make it possible to ascertain the ways in 
which the politicians reached what they thought to be Important
9ffew Orleans Item. This paper ran weekly columns 
printing views and reports of the candidates.
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segments of electoral support. At the same time It will be 
possible to isolate some of the reasons why groups of voters 
had supported one candidate rather than another, the ©lec­
tion was to be a meeting ground between the old and the new.
Although the "reform" administrations of 19*f0 and 
19^f had left much of the bureaucracy of Longisia intact, the 
administration of Bari Long proved to be four years of high 
taxes and heavy spending "Welfare statlsm" was given its 
greatest boost in Louisiana at the same time the national 
trend was to take a rather drastic turn away from the dangers 
of "creeping socialism," the observant politician might de­
tect that the new middle class was among those most receptive 
of this idea. In the spring of I9V8 the Long administration 
Increased the tax collections by 63 per cent# The welfare 
state would cost money, and In the first year of Longfs ad­
ministration the tax take was slightly more than $200 million. 
The other side of the tax coin m s  spending. Whereas the 
state total of the last year of Davis1 administration amounted 
to $170 million, spending rose to $336 million during the 
1951-52 fiscal year. Long attempted several power grabs, 
and In so doing alienated the respect of his nephew Russell, 
Bari was of the old school of Longism, but Russell seems cut 
of a different cloth. The truth may lie in the remarks of a
10New Orleans Item, May 11, 19521 Mr. Edward Stagg 
summarized the "Long Regime,"
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columnist who pointed to Russell’s good standing in the 
Senate and of the cynical summation of a wag who felt that 
"education is the ruin of a demagogue."^ At any rate, the 
Bari Long administration was going out of office» but bene­
fits" seemed to be here to stay* The independents of 1952 
would be expected to take some stand on these matters*
This study has focused upon the presence of groups 
and groupings within Louisiana, of factors which influence 
the development of "climates of political opinion" manifested 
in voting behavior* In 1952, with such a large number of 
"Independent" candidates with an eye on the governorship, it 
might be difficult to untangle elements of support unless the 
various appeals of the candidates are known* Pronouncements 
of "political philosophies" during a campaign are not to be 
taken too seriously, but on the other hand they are about the 
only source of ideological factors available* Nevertheless, 
whether the quintessence of the politicians' "ideology" can 
be distilled from campaign speeches and circulars» there is 
no doubt that the intention of the candidate is to touch sym­
pathetic tendencies of the voter and draw them out in his 
favor* It is with this word of qualification that the fol­
lowing analysis of the gubernatorial election of 1952 is made* 
Dudley J. LeBlanc's appearance in the 1952 gubernatorial 
race certainly fitted the temper of the year. Although an
11New Orleans Item. July 25, 1952; Doris Fleeson, 
syndicated columnist.
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early supporter of the program ©f Longism, LeBlanc had be­
come a successful manufacturer of Hadacol* His approach 
would be that of the business man’s. His idea was to sell 
Louisiana to the manufacturing world by offering Inducements 
more attractive than those of neighboring states* LeBlane 
pledged a business man’s government and summed up his plat* 
form in these words t
Political and economic opportunists like political 
termites are boring into the very foundation of our 
financial structure of government for their own selfish 
aggrandisement* It is time to call a halt to all this.
It is time to elect a businessman to run the biggest 
business of them all, the government of the state of 
Louisiana.
Dudley said he was the man for the job and that If elected 
he would get new industry to offset the unemployment that was 
resulting from the agricultural mechanization in the state*
The campaign platform of Bill Dodd, the estranged 
lieutenant-governor of the Long administration, seemed gen­
erally to accept the program of Longism* He would fight the 
power grab, and having had governmental experience, his elec­
tion would insure a smooth transfer of office* He had coop­
erated fully with the undertaking designed to help the people 
and had openly fought the attempted grabs of lari Long.
Dodd remarked that he had "... always been independent, yet*... 
tried to cooperate with.... friends to carry out the programs
^ffew Orleans Item. Oct. 28, 1951» P» 20.
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designed to help the general welfare of our state Dodd 
felt that taxes could be reduced even under the type of ad­
ministration the people were now enduring* ^odd had many 
friends in the state, especially among labor unions* Tet 
in his campaign reports the impression was gained that he 
often talked to convince himself that he was the man to beat* 
The candidate who proved to have the most conspicuous 
class appeal was James McLemore» The election results showed 
that his support was definitely drawn from plantation areas.
A businessman, McLemore was an avowed independent, by his 
own admission the only "real" independent in the field* His 
campaign headquarters Initiated a "Citizens’ Revolt" akin to 
the "Crusade" which was called later the same year. Toward 
the end McLemore declared the other so-called Independents 
were worried over the swing to McLemore, and the count of the 
vote indicated that there definitely had been a swing, 
McLemore appealed widely among the prestige and power groups 
and the new middle class, too* His line was that the revolt 
against the "Trumanism-Socialism" debacle in Washington and 
the political machine was red hot* Taxes must be reduced and 
state spending lowered. However, McLemore was careful to 
state that he was not against welfare, Kvery needy citizen 
would get assistance —  the political padding would go, and 
the state would save money. McLemore was also the heir
13Ibld.. Sept. 16, 1951, p. 2»t.
apparent to the I9W  Dixie era t movement, for he was openly 
statesf rights. McLemore could sum up his position in this 
maimer«
From this point forward we must have a governor who 
has integrity, who is a fearless fighter, who is an ex­
perienced administrator who knows, from experience, the 
problems of both business and agriculture. We must have 
a governor who firmly believes in states1 rights and is 
willing and able to fight a stern campaign to win back 
those wrested from us, and to defend those the federal 
government is steadily encroaching upon.1
In the new Louisiana the feeling that it was "time for 
a change" was widespread. It was discernible in the opposi­
tion candidates were voicing to the Truman machine or the 
Long machine. The attempt to lump the candidacy of Hale Boggs 
within the endorsement of the Long machine is an example of 
the tendency. The campaigning of Boggs with the aid of 
Bussell Long was an impressive combination of political tal­
ent, for both were highly regarded In the House of Represen­
tatives and in the Senate, respectively. The senator*s 
charge that his Uncle Bari had "mansionitls" was sincere on 
his part. The break within the Long faction was definite.
Even the conservative Shreveport Times denounced the talk of 
a double entry and openly endorsed Hale Boggs for governor.
Boggs recognized the traditional power of the governor 
in Louisiana when he asked that the legislature be utilized 
for more than a rubber stamp. "In Louisiana," Boggs declared, 
"the Legislature has too often been the political football
ll|tIbld.. Nov. llf 1951* p. 8.
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of the executive branch* In thl® state, the governor has 
exercised great powers over legislation —  powers too potent, 
weakening that branch, destroying its integrity, debilitating 
its character* Such a hold is the first step toward complete 
dictatorship*"^ In this, Boggs too revealed his opposition 
to Earl Long, but neither would he throw out all aspects of 
Longism along with the present administration. His platform 
called for an improved old age pension program $ a cost of 
living raise for school teachers? the modernisation and im­
provement of all public institutions? rebuilt, widened high­
ways? flood control and drainage? and the attraction of 
commerce and industry to Louisiana. Under his program It 
would be "Louisiana First."
Carlos Spaht was the choice of Bari Long to succeed to 
the governorship? Spaht was chosen only after Long had tried 
other persuasions in vain, however. The Long candidate would 
stand on the Long program, of course* Spaht pointed out that 
most of the opposition said they would retain all benefits 
of the present state administration and at the same time pro­
mise multiple tax reductions. This was said to be a good 
trick if it could be done. Briefly, Spaht pledged the fol­
lowing
To carry out the constructive and humanitarian program 
of the present state administration.
15IbM*, Nov. 11, 1951, p. 8. 
l6Ibid.. Sept. 16, 1951, p. Sk.
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Not to Increase and wherever possible to decrease 
taxes and operating expenses*
To maintain the old-age pension and welfare programs.
Continue to expand and improve state roads.
Preserve and advance wherever possible hospital, 
dental, and health programs*
Better conditions at Angola and other state institu­
tions through employment of outstanding doctors, penolo­
gists and administrators*
Protect communities and observe home rule*
Safeguard oil, gas and timber, and other natural re­
sources •
Maintain and improve educational program*
Establishment of a Governor’s Advisory Council.
Constitutional civil service*
The Spaht platform pledges were so similar to those of Kennon 
that it is difficult to decide whether the Long forces did 
the copying, feeling that camouflage was needed, or whether 
Kennon copied Spaht* At any rate, it was clear that no in­
dependent could start completely from scratch.
Robert Kennon claimed throughout the campaign that 
his was the first announced platform and that the other can­
didates had borrowed from it as they found that Kennon was 
gaining such favor with the people* Whate%rer the case, the 
Judge from linden had a twelve-point platform which included
these pledges*^
Continuance of $50-a-month old-age assistance.
17Ne» Orleans Tlmea-Plcayone. Jan. 17, 1952, p. 1.
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Businesslike administration of affairs of highway 
commission through establishment of a board .
Repeal two cents additional gasoline tax enacted in 
19W.
Improvement of public health.
Removal of state Institutions from political control 
by creating boards*
Prison reform.
A modern.parole system.
home rule. J f
Constitutional civil service*
?oting machines made available in every voting pre- 
cinct *
Bring new industry to Louisiana.
Encourage agriculture and make an effective team of 
farmer, businessman, and banker*
Were there common elements which tied the platforms of these
candidates together? And were there essential differences
between the platforms of the 1952 gubernatorial candidates?
Taking the two candidates who entered the "run~off," 
Kennon and Spahts their platforms had much in common* If 
it were true that Spaht ran on the Long program, then what 
was Kennon doing with a similar program? Kennon might well 
have considered himself the heir to the Mreform" administra­
tions of 19*f0 and 19Mf, for his platform, like those, could 
not be radically different from that of the administration 
in office* Wo wholesale removal of any Long endorsed prac­
tice was suggested. Welfare aid was to be continued, the 
institutions were to be furthered, Angola was to be improved,
Preserve
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Louisiana highways were a key problem, and home rule was to 
be preserved. The difference was that Kennon was going to 
continue services and at the same time cut taxes* Being an 
independent with no previous record in government, Kennon 
eould more easily make his promises sound legitimate* Kennon 
was clearly in line with the traditions of "reform** in his 
endorsement of government by boards, and in his backing of 
civil service*
The essential difference between the programs of Spaht 
and Kennon appeared to be that Kennon presented his platform 
with the promise of a businesslike administration. Louisiana 
was experiencing an unprecedented prosperity, and who but 
the businessmen had made this possible? Spaht was dedicated 
to the task of carrying on the program of Longism* But this 
smacked of corruption and machine politics* This sort of 
government would parallel "TruiBanism” on the national scene* 
Against this Kennon proffered an administration whose virtue 
would be self-righteousness and whose watchword would be ef­
ficiency. Maybe the Kennon program was not so different from 
past reforms, after all. Yet Robert Kennon made his strong­
est appeals In the urban areas of the state, and did not 
make the effort that other candidates did in the rural areas 
of the state. Kennon, it appeared, was up on his political 
know-how. The people of Louisiana had come to accept the 
good of Longism as an inevitable function of modern govern­
ment. No one dared take it away* Kennon, then, gave the
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Impression that he was a man of the people, the people of 
the 1950*s| he posed as the middle class*s Huey Long*
Whether Earl Long and his political henchmen, or Spaht 
and his personal friends, composed the Long platform of 19?2, 
it was written in such a way as to meet the challenges of the 
opposition* It too would he carried out constructively, and 
with the humanitarian touch traditional of Longism* Lest 
there be any danger at all of any more power grabs, Spaht 
endorsed the establishment of an advisory council In order to 
make the new Long administration the most incorruptible and 
productive*
The program endorsed by Congressman Boggs read more 
like something the national Democratic party might back on 
the local level* Perhaps this is why McLemore labeled Boggs 
the Truman candidate* Yet the congressional record of Mr* 
Boggs Indicated that he was quite middle-of-the-road concern­
ing domestic policies. The Impression gained from studying 
the platform of Boggs was that here was a candidate willing 
to carry on the gains of the past twenty years, and to do so 
with the efficiency and understanding of an administrator 
aware that functions of government work to the people*s good*
The "independent,1* McLemore, was not the independent 
representative of the good of Longism or of anti-Longism*
His candidacy, consciously or not, represented the assertion 
of the older Bourbon Democratic faction, adapting its contin­
uing revolt to the situation of 1952* Truman had beat out
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the Dixiecrats, and now they had ample ammunition to hurl at 
the Democratic party* McLemore, as suggested above, picked 
up a groundswell of support as the campaign drew to a close* 
He was not supposed to have a real chance, and yet he ended 
up fourth and ran ahead of Bill Dodd*
Pick up any copy of Mad.py.lS filmjL and there may be 
found journalistically undigested slogans and slurs opposing 
the Democratic status q u o * Free enterprise and "rugged" 
individualism were proposed as the traditional American answer 
to the evils of ’'creeping socialism1* and "mink coat1* corrup­
tion* Therein may be found the essence of McLemore1 s plat­
form and appeal* It was conservative, with a touch of 
nostalgic reaction* The political climate was such that a 
platform like that one, if clearly perceived, would find 
broad favor within the electorate among all groups Involved 
in the insecurity of the "status panic" or disposed to lean 
to the political right of center. Since more than fourteen 
papers, Including the Times-Plcayune* endorsed McLemore, It 
Is not surprising that the "citizens' revolt*' should have 
ended with a sizable following* It was a select following, 
too, composed of the leading economic and status groups of
city and country*
Longism had been the champion of the small people, the 
farmer, the worker, and the small businessman, whose tradi­
tional support was firmly seated* In 195^j the die-hards, 
the farmers of the hills, remained loyal to the tradition?
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bat even here the area of support had shrunk.*® The clearcut 
differential of farmer class opposed to planter and business 
interests was blurred. Take Macon Hidge, for example. The 
cotton farmers of the parishes located here, many of whom 
had come from the hills, supported Spaht in the first pri­
mary bat endorsed Kennon in the 11 run-off1 with between 52 
and 58 per cent of the total vote. The farmer class itself 
was divided. Good times had brought the farmer security and 
a newly found status, and he looked further up the class 
ladder for his identification. A natural social-psychological 
process had worked its influence.
Spaht1s support had come primarily from the country. 
LeBl&nc and &odd turned out to be "favorite son" candidates 
and failed to gain much support outside their home territor­
ies. The crucial battle of the 1952 elections was fought in 
the urban parishes. Kennon proved the candidate with the best 
organization, and his city vote made the difference. He had 
claimed that with thirty thousand Hew Orleans votes in the 
first primary victory would be hisj more than thirty-three 
thousand Kennon votes were counted. In the second primary* 
the urban appeal of Kennon was overwhelming* for In the seven 
urban-industrial parishes the electorate had favored his can­
didacy with 65.2 per cent of the parish totals. Moreover, the 
contribution of these seven parishes to the total state vote
*®Heberle, Hillery, and Lovrlch, clt.. figures
1 and 2.
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of Kennon was *+9*8, almost one-half of the entire Kennon 
support* Spaht, on the other hand, gained but **2*2 per cent 
of his second primary support in the urban areas*
Recently an attempt was made to identify the six lead­
ing candidates of the gubernatorial elections in terras of 
traditional Long and anti-Long support*^ Computations of 
rank-order coefficients of correlation indicated that whereas 
the combined "anti-Longw group of Kennon, McLemore, and 
LeBlanc was given support from similar geographic areas and 
social strata, the combined "Long* group of Spaht, Dodd, and 
Boggs was given no such unity of support* The conclusion 
was drawn that Kennon not only picked up McLemore and LeBlanc 
support in the second primary, he also gained some support 
from first primary Long candidates* It may be contended that 
the reason for this was the blurring of the traditional 
Long-anti-Long struggle. Political differences were expressed 
in other terms.
Compilations of election results by wards have been 
made available since the Heberle, Hillery, and Lovrleh study 
was published* They have been utilized in the present study 
for two reasons* In the first place, it was felt that a study 
of the relationships of voting support by wards might cancel 
out regional variations and more clearly indicate rural-urban 
and socio-economic differences* Secondly, since the number
^Heberle, Hillery, and Lovrich, o p * cit*f correlation 
tables, p. 336.
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of wards is so much greater than the sixty-four parishes, it 
would he possible to use a more refined correlation formula. 
Computed on the basis of returns in the 532 wards, Pearsonian 
product-moment coefficients of correlation for grouped data 
between the support of the candidates have been established.^
TABLE V
PRODUCT -MOMENT COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN KENNON 
SECOND PRIMARY SUPPORT AND THAT OF LEADING CANDIDATES 
IN THE FIRST PRIMARY, BY WARDS*
McLemore Kennon LeBlanc Boggs Dodd Spaht
----- JasfijL. ____      EA&sl
Kennon Second **.Mf3 ^#319 -**.106 -**.039 -.136 -.7^8
♦Source* Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 
1952.
Only one of these coefficients approaches the range of 
very much significance, yet they are of relative importance 
in the comparison of electoral support of the candidates.
It was discovered that correlations on the ward level, in 
this election at least, do not differ much from those com­
puted on the parish level. The primary reason Is a resultant 
of the clustering of support on a regional basis. Each can­
didate tended to pull his highest vote percentages in differ­
ent parts of the state. The favorite son effect was felt.
20r . C. White, Social Statistics (New York* Harper 
and Bros., 1933).
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Furthermore, the large number of candidates also was a factor 
of importance In this connection* The vote was split into 
fragments of support* These correlations ar® still valuable, 
however, in documenting the types and shifts of support 
found in 1952*
It will be noted that Kennon*s second primary support 
was in closer relationship with that of McLemore than with 
his own first primary support* That Kennon* s support was not 
stable is significant. Whereas his highest first primary 
support had been noticeable in the Florida parishes, in the 
second primary, the followers of McLemore in the north Louisl«
a.
and Bourbon Democrat areas were more highly enthusiastic 
for the candidacy of Judge Kennon# Kennon did maintain a 
good deal of his own first primary support, and it will be 
asserted that this came from the urban areas of the state* 
Where a ward registered a high first primary vote for 
McLemore, it tended to Kennon in the second primary in equal 
proportions* There was a political relationship between the 
appeals and support of Kennon and McLemore*
Weak but positive coefficients correlate the support 
of LeBlanc and Boggs in the direction of the "right1* side of 
the political ledger. Whereas the second primary shift of 
Boggs* support was noticeable as was that of the relationship 
of Kennon support with LeBlanc, yet the almost complete lack 
of correlation would indicate that Boggs, as Kennon, was 
gaining strong support in urban areas# The Boggs candidacy
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found greater favor in the middle class than did that of other 
"Long1* candidates*
The Dodd support correlated negatively with Kennon 
support t clearly indicative that he was more a candidate of 
Long ism. In fact, the Dodd strength was clustered west of 
Rapides within the "cut-over" parishes* It was here that a 
goodly portion of traditional Long support was seated and 
where Spaht maintained majorities in the second primary*
Spaht tended to run second to Dodd in this area in the first 
primary*
The fact that the relation between Kennon second pri­
mary support and Spaht first primary support did not produce 
a completely negative coefficient of correlation deserves 
mention* On the extremes the differential was clear* Where 
Kennon was given strong support, Spaht was weak, and vice 
versa * In wards where Kennon obtained from kO to 60 per cent 
of the vote in the second primary, Spaht received between 20 
and 50 per cent of the vote in the first primary* It would 
appear plausible that In such wards the contraction of tra­
ditional Long support was felt, but not to the extent that 
Kennonfs gain was too detrimental to the chances of Spaht*
For farmers in rural areas and workers in the cities, 
the appeal of Long ism was not so attractive as formerly.
Once again the evidence points to the conclusion that in 
1952 the election was conducted in view of gaining a some­
what different combination of electoral support than formerly.
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Likewise, the electorate itself was interpreting self inter­
est from other premises than in the past. The independents 
were independently representing recognisable tendencies and 
trends which had begun to dominate the Louisiana political 
scene.
The most significant phenomenon in 1952 was the in­
creased Negro participation in the political battle 
Registered in large numbers in the urban areas, the Negro 
became once more an important factor in political success. 
Since the Negro, as a class group, tended to support Long- 
ism, his appearance may be a crucial one in the attempt to 
perpetuate that political program. For as the contraction 
of the area traditionally "Long country" occurred in the 
rural parishes, the addition of new support from the Negro 
would be useful. The new factor of the Negro in politics be­
comes another of the indices which point up the city as a key 
to future Louisiana politics.
The hypothesis that the urban areas of the state have 
become an important key to the understanding of Louisiana 
voting behavior must be further substantiated. It is neces­
sary to identify the "factors" within the social structure 
which influence the political tendencies present in the cities. 
One previous study of urban voting behavior has been published
21Heberie, Hillery, and Lovrlch, olt.
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using Baton Rouge as a crucial c a s e . 22 jt will prove useful 
to summarise the findings presented there and to project the 
analysis to voting behavior in the 1952 elections.
Census tracts have not been established as yet in 
Baton Rouge, so it is not possible to make computations of 
socio-economic characteristics of a statistical nature. 
However, the city does lend itself to a delineation of social 
"ecological” areas. It is "common knowledge" that within the 
city "natural areas," in the terminology of urban ecologists, 
exist, setting apart sections of the city on a residential 
basis as predominantly "worker" or "business~professional" 
areas. The ecological pattern of Baton Rouge residence is 
quite clear and affords the opportunity to draw conclusions 
concerning the voting behavior of various class elements of 
the population, within the bounds of the political units, 
the precincts.
In the 19*t8 elections it was found that Earl long was 
an "also ran" In the first primary, due to the fact that 
Baton Rouge had developed an antipathy towards Longism through 
the earlier episodes of Huey Long's fight with Standard Oil. 
Baton Rouge business would have been hurt as much as Standard 
Oil had Huey's threatened action driven the company from the 
city. Jimmie Morrison had polled strong support in "worker" 
precincts, while Robert Kennon and Sam Jones had found
22p. H. Howard, "Voting Behavior in Baton Rouge," 
proceedings of the Louisiana Academy of Sciences, Vol. XV
(1952n
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support in th© "business” precincts* In fact, Kennon was a 
strong second choice in both "worker** and "business" pre­
cincts —  a forecast of 1952, perhaps* In the second pri­
mary, the "worker" precincts shifted to support of Long, 
whereas Jones gained large majorities in th© areas of busi­
ness class predominance. It was believed that In the show­
down, the workers preferred Long as the minor evil in preference 
to the businessmans candidate, Jones* The same basic tenden­
cies of class support were found to hold in the presidential 
election of that year, when Truman carried the "worker” pre­
cincts and Thurmond and Dewey shared the support of the 
"business” precincts*
Workers at the Standard Oil refinery and part of those 
at the Ethyl plant are organised in a form of company union 
with no statewide or national affiliation* Although workers 
might be expected to share the general outlook of their em­
ployers, yet they live in separate residential areas clearly 
identified as the home of the working man, with commercial 
enterprises catering to their needs* An older layer of com­
mercial and professional classes resides in or near the old 
"core” city by the Mississippi River and downtown, though of 
course numbers of these groups have moved into the more 
recently developed residential subdivisions, also* In these 
latter-named areas, however, there are found many persons as­
sociated with business and Industry who come from the Midwest 
and Atlantic Coast regions, with a traditional Republican vote.
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Likewise* University personnel are mixed with these groups in 
the newer residential areas.
The analysis of the results of the 1952 elections may 
be approached in two ways. The situation can be investigated 
as was done above through checking the support given to the 
various candidates. On the other hand* the situation can be 
approached from the social classes, that is, to ascertain how 
white labor or the businessmen voted as groups. Here both 
approaches will be utilized. (See Tables VI and VII.)
The Negro had little or no voice in the election of 
19**3, but now it will be necessary to isolate this element 
of voters in making a class analysis of voting behavior. The 
precincts have been lumped into three general categories, 
based upon the predominance of some residential grouping. ,
Not all Negroes are workers, but the majority who live in 
distinctly Negro areas are wage earners ? and of course there 
are even Negroes who live in predominantly white precinets. 
Analysis will proceed with the investigation of the tenden­
cies of the "Negro worker class," the "whit© worker class," 
awd the "business-professional-white-collar class." It must 
be remembered at all times that these categories are not 
mutually exclusive.
In the first 1952 primary, the Negro group of precincts 
clearly showed a preference for "Long" candidates? Kennon and 
McLemore together were the choice of only 16.7 per cent of 
the Negro voters. At the other end of the social pyramid,
TABLE VI
DISTRIBUTION OP VOTING PERCENTAGES IN ECOLOGICAL AREAS OP 
BATON ROUGE, BY CANDIDATES, 1952*
FIRST PRIMARY I
CLASS 1|R3BA
Negro
Worker
§pm
38.5 15.0 29.8
K i m
13.9
MeLEMORB
2.8
TOTAL
100
White
Worker 13 A 16.6 12.8 51.9 6.3 100
Business*- 
Professional- 
White Collar
21.2 17.2 8.8 38.9 13.9 100
SBCOWD PRIMARY:
QUASJLAm. SP.MX ssa&ss S O U
Negro
Worker 75 A 2^ .6 100
White
Worker 26.1 73.9 100
Business- 
Professional- 
White Collar
33.7 66.3 100
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:
. m k DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN
Negro
Worker 80.9 19.1 100
White
Worker 61.3 38.7 100
Business- 
Professional- 
White Collar
36.5 63.5 100
♦Source* Compilation of Primary Election Returns, 
Louisiana, 1952.
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TABLE VII
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTING PERCENTAGES FOR CANDIDATES BY 
ECOLOGICAL AREAS OF BATON ROUGE, 1952*
FIRST PRIMARYI
CLASS AREA SPAHT BOQqS DODD KENNON McLEMORE
Negro
Worker
White
Worker
Business* 
Professional- 
White Collar
22 A  
2*f,3 
53.3
10.6 28. 
36.8 35.1 
52.6 36.5
.^0
*f7.1
W . 9
3 A
23.8
72.8
TOTALS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SECOND PRIMARY t
CLASS AREA
Hegro
Worker
White
Worker
Business- 
Professional- 
White Collar
32.6
29.2
38.2
m
if .6
^5.5
**9.9
TOTALS 100.0 100.0
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION*
CLASS AREA
Negro
Worker
White Worker
Bosiness- 
Professional- 
White Collar
DEMOCRATIC
20.7
M+.9
REPUBLICAN
5.3 
30 A
6»f.3
TOTALS 100.0 100.0
♦Source* Compilation of Primary Election Returns, 
Louisiana, 1952*
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the business-professional group showed a much greater pro­
portion of support for these two candidates* Even so* the 
three 11 Long11 candidates shared **7*2 per cent of the choices 
of this block of voters* Here it may be contended that the 
lower ranges of the group* the white collar class* tended to 
show a more decided tendency toward the "Long" candidates. 
The white worker group gave its heaviest support to the can­
didacy of Kennon* 51.9 per cent* with the other candidates 
splitting the remaining votes between them.
What choices were made between the candidacy of Spaht 
and Kennon in the "run-off" election? In the second primary, 
as in 19*+$* it might be expected that the vote would be 
drawn on basic issues and interests* within each of the class 
groupings* The Negro group demonstrated again its predomi­
nant preference for the Long candidate* although Kennon was 
given more support by this group in the second primary than 
the combined Kennon-McLemore vote of the first* The fact 
that the groupings are not mutually exclusive might be raised 
in explanation of this slight shift. Many people within the 
business group who had supported "Long" candidates in the 
first primary must surely have given Kennon their votes in 
the second primary* for he was the choice of 66.3 P©r cent of 
the group. Whereas the Kennon percentage was raised by over 
20 per cent in the second primary, Spaht1s percentage changed 
from 21.2 per cent to 33*7 per cent. The most surprising 
class support was given to Kennon in th© white worker group.
The second primary choice of nearly 75 per cent of this group 
there can be no doubt that Kennon had made a strong impres- 
sion on the workers. Yet it was pointed out that in 19W 
only in the second primary did the long candidate gain worker 
rotes in any number. But Kennon did not have the same iden­
tification with big business as the public had made for Jones 
Moreover, Kennon was known to have made personal visits to 
Standard Oil for campaign purposes, and company feeling had 
been pointed in his direction.
Approached from another standpoint, it is possible to 
indicate the proportionate amount of support each candidate 
had gained from the three groups in the overall number of 
votes cast for him. Table VII shows that McLemore was most 
certainly gaining his greatest support from the business* 
professional elements. Both Boggs and Kennon emerge as can­
didates with business and worker but little Hegro support* 
Dodd's following approximated more closely the proportions 
of Spaht support, marking him as more the r,Longfl type of can­
didate, In the second primary Spaht appeared to draw sup­
port from each class grouping in nearly equal proportion.
Of course Spaht had a surprisingly large proportion of his 
followers among business-professional people because he has 
many social connections In these areas, Still, he obtained 
only about one-fifth of the vote cast in these precincts in 
the first primary. One striking conclusion which might be 
made is that the Negro support tended to act as an index of 
the old Long, anti-Long identification of the candidates.
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Without wanting to anticipate the following section 
devoted to analysis of the 1952 presidential election, it is 
nevertheless instructive to show at this time the rather clear 
class support given presidential candidates, and the similari­
ties with the support of the state Democratic factions* The 
class group preferences clearly indicate the worker and Negro 
bias for the Democratic candidate* Likewise, the similarity 
of support for both national Democratic candidate and Long 
candidate is revealed, even if the worker class finds a 
greater sympathy for the national party than for Long ism.
On the other hand, the business-professional classes tend to 
be much more willing to vote for the national Republican 
party and for candidates a bit to the right of Longlsm*
The present discussion, then, amply emphasises the 
fact that the ballot in present-day Louisiana is a vehicle 
of class expression* Undoubtedly It always was, but it Is 
hoped that the shifting support of different social classes 
has been demonstrated. In 1952 it was apparent that the sup­
port of the more conservative candidates rested further down 
from the top of the class pyramid than previously had been 
the ease.
C. Louisiana Republicanism la IsAsm Louisiana
was to help choose a president a few months after the excite­
ment of the gubernatorial elections had subsided. The student 
of voting behavior would be afforded an excellent opportunity 
to check the consistency of political tendencies. It appeared
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that Governor Kennon felt he could gauge political opinion, 
also, for as th© presidential campaign approached, he stepped 
closer to the political right.
Part of the support of the conservative candidate in 
the second primary had come from initial hackers of LeBlanc 
and McLemore. This added a decidedly more upper class at­
mosphere to the Kennon camp. Added support for Kennon had 
come from the conservative western sugar country and the rice 
country of the prairies which had backed local son LeBlanc. 
Likewise, Kennon gained the support of the Mississippi delta 
plantation parishes and the conservative northwestern parishes 
about Caddo. These had been outspokenly In support of 
McLemore in the first primary. Moreover, it was within the 
parishes which fell in the highest quartile of second primary 
Kennon support that the strongest Dixleorat sentiment had 
been found in 19W*
Recalling the "revolt of the haves" which brought the 
DIxiecrat defection from the Democratic camp, it is not sur­
prising that Governor Kennon should have joined the movement 
in 1952. In the second primary he had found great favor from 
the very groups who had endorsed and supported the DIxiecrats. 
Maybe the decisive win over the Long forces led Kennon to 
believe that he could shake off any disguise of liberal tinge. 
At any rate, the National Democratic Convention was to become 
the stage upon which "real" Democratic support and hidden 
Republican sympathies would be presented*
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LongIsm was not dead, as Bussell Long Joined the ranks 
of the young liberal Southern Democrats and spoke out in 
favor of th© common man# Kennon, by his actions, Joined the 
ranks of anti-Long and cloaked himself in the old Bourbon 
Democrat mantle# In such alignments, of course, th© "people1 
would outnumber the dominating minority, but as traditionally 
th© Bourbons were adept at manipulations* Action at the con* 
vention revealed th© continuing power struggle as the Bour­
bons Jockeyed to recapture or to hold their favorable 
position in the state party organisations•
If Kennon had thought he could take party and support 
along with him in the "safe11 shift from liberal to conserva­
tive banners, he made his calculations without reference to 
the emerging leader of Longism, young Bussell# The election 
results definitely showed the strength of the new middle 
class with its prevailing conservative climate of opinion in 
1952. Likewise, however, the count showed that the traditional 
Long support of farmer and portions of laborer groups could 
combine with a solid Negro vote to outnumber the party bolters.
Governor Kennon had won the fight against the loyalty 
oath pledge which was to have made it mandatory that conven­
tion delegates accept the choice of a candidate made at 
Chicago, and the Louisiana delegation was seated. "It was a 
matter of principle," Kennon said. The conservatives of 
Louisiana had always stood on principle —  white supremacy 
and disenfranchisement had likewise been a matter of principle
among th© members of the old dominant minority# The action 
of Senator Long made it certain that the Democratic party,
£§£ £&» would be In the presidential race backing the choice 
of candidate made at the Chicago convention# Long had said 
he would make his stand against the "walkout" of the Louisiana 
delegation "no matter what it cost me p e r s o n a l l y * " 2 ^  
Politically, it was a smart move, putting Long assuredly on 
the side of the "people" back home and labeling him one of 
the "symbols of the new South." He could be hurt politically 
on neither count#
So the campaign settled in Louisiana between the "real" 
Democrats and the "Democrats for Elsenhower •" The Stevenson 
ticket ran practically unaided by the official party organi- 
sationp the Elsenhower backers had money and used it liber­
ally. But the Democrats had the endorsement of most liberals 
who had ever been associated with Longism and whose political 
names were respected by the Louisiana electorate* That the 
coming election would result In a vote cast on class lines 
was clearly evident as one Inspected the difference In finan­
cial backing and in the choice of local party headquarters 
throughout the state# The sub-deb might be found at an Ike 
rally, whereas a newsboy or Industrial laborer would choose 
a meeting of "Volunteers for Stevenson." And of course
2^SSS Orleans States* July 25, 1952, p#
2Sr. C. Havard, Jr., "Louisiana and the Two-Party 
System." Proceedings of the Louisiana Academy of Sciences,
Vol. XVI (1953)*
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intellectuals rallied in large number to Democratic meetings#
In reviewing the election results, giving the Demo­
cratic candidate 53 per cent of the statewide vote, it is 
plain that predominant farmer parishes strongly supported 
the candidacy of Stevenson; these same parishes formed the 
core of the support for Longisra. (See Figure 38*) ^®t, the
crucial point was found to be within the cities of Louisiana. 
The support for the two presidential candidates tended to 
"break even" In urban areas, and the urban Negro vote, in 
the end, proved to be the deciding factor in giving the Demo* 
crats a bare majority.
Over 100,000 Negroes had registered prior to the 
November presidential election, and all Indications point to 
a unified Negro vote, and with a high participation. Where 
predominantly Negro precincts can be spotted, the Democratic 
support is found to be overwhelming. A "colored box" in 
Merryville, Beauregard Parish, near the Texas border, contained 
116 ballots favoring Stevenson and two for Eisenhower. This 
overwhelming differential could be found wherever the Negro 
voters predominated a precinct* Two such precincts in Baton 
Rouge registered votes of more than 90 per cent in favor of 
the Democrats. In the urban areas, then, the Negro was again 
a crucial factor in Louisiana politics; only, time and circum­
stance had worked a reversal In the direction of his support.
The ballot count on the ward level allows analysis to 
proceed In finding significant areas of support for the two 
presidential candidates as well as layers in the social
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 1952 
VOTE FOR ADLAI STEVENSON 
BY PARISHES
1st quarter: 7.1# - 49.9#
2nd quarter: 50.0# - 54.##
3rd quarter: 55.4# - 60.5#
KB 4th quarter: 61.6# - 76.6#
Report of Secretary of State. Louisiana. 1952
Figure 3$
Source
no
vn0->
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class structure of the electorate. It ©an be shown that the 
vote in the seven urban-industrial parishes broke even, with 
the Democratic candidate favored by only ?0*9 per cent.
Since nearly half the state vote was cast in these urban par­
ishes, it might be feasible to begin the ward analysis by in­
vestigating the distribution of the vote in the wards in 
which are found urban places —  cities and towns with 2,500 
or more population. (See Table VIII.) Seventy-two such 
cities and towns have been utilised, containing eighty-five 
wards. Hew Orleans makes up seventeen wards of the total*
Here the vote was evenly split, with the Democratic candidate 
barely in the lead. On the other hand, the total Republican 
vote, in the sixteen wards containing the other cities with 
a population of 10,000 or more, was 52*1 per cent.
In the larger cities of Louisiana, there was a regional 
difference in the support given the Republican candidate* 
Cities located in the parishes listed in the Republican col­
umn recorded a high Eisenhower vote. Where the parish went 
Democratic, as in Calcasieu, Rapides, and last Baton Rouge, 
the city vote of Lake Charles, Alexandria, and Baton Rouge, 
respectively, was higher in support of the Republican party 
than the parish average* At the other extreme, as in north­
west Louisiana, where factors of oil, planter or commercial 
interests were more influential, Shreveport in Caddo Parish 
and nearby Bossier City in Bossier Parish voted Republican 
by over 60 per cent. In each case, the city per cent of
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TABLE VIII
THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE OP WARDS CONTAINING URBAN PLACES1*'
WARDS REPUBLICAN 70TB DEMOCRATIC 70TB
areas No. %
I n  Orleans 17 85,572 >+8.7 89,999 51.3
Urban Places 
over 10t000 16 87,133 52.1 79,916 W7.9
Urban Places 
2,500-9,999 52 ^+9,629 1+6.1* 57,21+5 53.6
Regaining 
Rural Wards M+7 8»f,591 1+6.1* 97,867 53.6
STATE TOTAL 532 306,925 1+7.0 325,027 53.0
♦Sources Seventeenth Census of the U* S., 19505 Unpublished 
Election Returns, Office Secretary of State, 1952*
Republican votes was some points above the parish average. 
The same holds true for cities in south Louisiana where the 
parish vote was Republican. Opelousas In St. Landry, the 
city of Lafayette, Morgan City in St. Mary, and Houma in 
Terrebonne all registered a Republican vote In such number 
as to influence the parish total In favor of the Republican
candidate.
It was the strong conservative tendency in the cities 
which put the percentages for the larger Louisiana cities in 
the Republican column. Labor groups were numerous, but so
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wore the older layers of commercial groups and the newer resi­
dents representing Industrial interests, business men, pro* 
fessionals, and white collar personnel* Even so, regional 
differences, which will be discussed below, played a heavier 
influence on urban climates of opinion*" Otherwise, the 
situation may have been closer to that of the smaller cities, 
where total ward counts gave the Democratic candidate 53*6 
per cent of the vote* It was thought perhaps the larger in 
this group of cities or towns may have been more inclined to 
the Republican than the Democratic candidate, but when 
ranked according to size of population there was no telling 
difference. There was still somewhat of a tendency for these 
urban wards to register a higher Republican vote than the 
surrounding rural wards, but the lack of a numerous middle 
and upper class population and the presence of more small 
business men and laborers with close ties to the farmers of 
the hinterland all worked as factors strengthening the Demo*
cratic support*
The Democratic percentage for the remaining b$0 rural 
wards was the same as for the wards containing small urban 
places* There was consistently more Democratic support away 
from the larger urban places, indicative perhaps of the pres­
ence of the political tendency of the farmer class. These 
factors of urban and rural influences upon the voting be­
havior In the 1952 presidential election can be brought into 
sharper relief through a delineation of the voter support
2 57
by wards•
As was true for the voting In the gubernatorial elec­
tions, if the presidential candidate gained a parish majority, 
the wards of that parish tended to be uniformly Republican 
or Democratic* A glance at Figure 39 indicate® the broad 
clusterings of the ward support for the Democratic party, en­
compassing in many instances complete parishes* In the heart 
of the hills cutting diagonally across north Louisiana, down 
the southwest corner of the state, through the eastern 
Florida parishes, and along the Mississippi liver to the 
south, the ward distribution of Democratic support spreads 
almost unbroken* Only the influence of country towns, pockets 
of plantation domination, and urban-industrial centers dis­
turb the general pattern. The second and third quartlles of 
Eisenhower support were purposely cut on either side of 50 
per cent so that the break of the vote with the incidence of 
these Influences might be emphasized •
The wards in parishes where the predominant element 
has been the small farmer class and where seats of Populist 
and Long support were located continued in 1952 to show the 
long-time Democratic prejudice* In the parishes of central 
and southwestern Louisiana and in the eastern Floridas, the 
farmer classes evidently did not believe that by 1952 it was 
"time for a change." An ancient "climate of opinion" had 
remained unchanged•
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The cleavage between farmer and planter In rural areas* 
however, has likewise represented an influential traditional 
tendency* If the voters in the strictly "farmer" parishes 
had swelled the Democratic support, it is also essential to 
learn what happened in the wards of the parishes with ves­
tiges of planter domination. In the parishes of the northwest 
corner of the state, along the Red River, up th© Mississippi 
delta, and through the Ouachita River valley in Morehouse 
and Ouachita parishes, planter activity remains in force.
Here there are observed pockets of high Republican percent­
ages, reflecting the political sympathies of the planter class. 
Plantation wards the entire length of the Bed River in the 
parishes of Caddo and Bossier, and extending into Red River 
Parish, all registered Eisenhower votes of 56 per cent or 
above. Likewise, in the tier of delta parishes a string of 
wards can be found with high Republican support recorded. The 
same is true In the area between Monroe and Bastrop along the 
Ouachita River.
In striking contrast, In the wards removed from the 
Mississippi River the low Republican percentages are indica­
tive of the presence of fanners In the "backwater** settlements 
and along the length of Macon Ridge, In West Carroll, Rich­
land, and Franklin parishes. In this delta area it Is only 
where the plantation dominates the agricultural economy that 
the Republican tendency was strong# But th© planter element 
in the cleavage between it and farmer groups is reenforced
by the presence of associates in the country towns* After 
all, the planter is somewhat of a business man, a capitalist 
in his agricultural operations, and the identification of 
his Interests with the commercial elite of the country towns 
has been of long standing.
There seem to be several blocks of voters taking sides 
in the farmer-planter cleavage* Town laborers may tend to 
vote as the farmers do, whereas the merchants, the lawyers, 
and other "business class" people in the country towns tend 
to vote with the planters. With planter support, the factor 
of the country town seems to be more telling In the river 
bottom areas than in the hill parishes, in these small, non- 
industrial towns the planter-merchant groups tend to be more 
Influential, the "working class" consisting largely of 
Negroes or being split by the "color line" —  and these planter- 
merchant groups tend to determine the election results. This 
is demonstrated by the Republican vote in the towns along 
Macon Ridge. Oak Grove in East Carroll Parish, Delhi in 
Richland, and Winnsboro in Franklin all registered a more de­
cided tendency to support Eisenhower than did the wards of the 
surrounding countryside. Even down in Avoyelles Parish, the 
ward containing the planter-merchant town of Bunkie follows 
the pattern.
A revealing situation has emerged in Tensas Parish, 
deserving of mention. There are two adjacent wards in which 
are located the towns of St. Joseph and Waterproof. In the
former, the Republican tendency was strong, while in the 
latter the reverse was true* In St* Joseph the planter- 
merchant influence is deep-rooted, and with the young people 
tending to move away as they attain adulthood th© remaining 
population manifests the traditional conservative prejudice* 
On the other hand, Waterproof's population consists of oil 
workers from the nearby fields of operation and her© the 
traditional tendency is altered. Moreover, a similar pattern 
exists in Concordia, where the parish seat of Vidalia voted 
Democratic while surrounding wards in one of which is the old 
town of Ferrlday recorded Republican sympathies* Across the 
river from Batches, Mississippi, Vidalia has become a boom 
town, a residential suburb of the neighboring city* Many 
worker families have settled here and apparently in such 
number that a Democratic majority was assured.
Northwest Louisiana manifested a solidarity In voting 
Republican which was intense, broken only by defection of 
Webster Parish, Previously McLemore and Kennon, the native 
son, had scored heavy support in this area, as had the Dixie- 
crat candidate in 19*f8. Undoubtedly the dominance of Shreve­
port in th© area together with the presence of planter groups 
as well as white farmer groups with relatively high levels 
of living are deciding factors. Shreveport, an old commer­
cial city and the oil capital for northwest Louisiana and 
adjacent counties of Bast Texas, is a wealthy city. It Is 
more Western” in outlook than other Louisiana cities $ that
is, it is more like Dallas, Texas. Nearby DeSoto Parish has 
developed quite a dairying Industry in recent years. Such 
farming is capitalistic and provides a reenforcement for the 
older layer of cotton planter domination. Webster Parish has 
proportionately more people in the worker groups than sur­
rounding parishes. Here a Federal ammunition plant at Minden 
and a paper mill at Sprlnghlll support a labor force which 
apparently still found favor for the Democratic party.
The contrast of Republican West Feliciana, together 
with adjacent wards of Points Coupee Parish, with urban Bast 
Baton Rouge is marked. The traditional conservatism of the 
plantation past had been carried forward. The traditional 
Republican tendency farther south in sugar country appeared 
diminished, if the whole of south Louisiana is viewed. Yet 
there were numerous pockets of Republican support which in­
dicated that the traditional Influences still existed. This 
was particularly true of the line of parishes from St. Landry 
south to the Gulf in Terrebonne. Within the string of wards 
in this area there exist small town after small town. Here 
the same sorts of factors which influenced voting in north 
Louisiana have been present. There are likewise cities of 
some size like Lafayette, New Iberia, and Morgan City, all of 
which registered an exceptionally high urban Republican vote. 
In the back country on either side of this «conservative line" 
the support of the Democratic candidate was more decided.
Parenthetically, together with the plantation and urban
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factors within the Republican areas of northwest and south 
Louisiana, there was also present the subtle factor of the 
"t id el and11 oil issue* On© could pass through sugar country 
along the old Spanish Trail between Hew Orleans and Lafayette, 
for example, and view huge billboards advertising the presi­
dential campaign in terms of awful determination of the Berao- 
eratic administration in Washington to take the t id elands 
away from the people of Louisiana. This appeal probably 
worked; it also indicated the amount of money the Republicans 
had at their disposal in attempting to win the Louisiana 
presidential vote.
On the ward level, it is apparent that the Florida par­
ishes still showed the old Bemoeratlc leaning. Of course 
wards within the Feliclanas, where the plantation economy was 
present, registered Republican majorities. Likewise, the 
ward in which the parish seat of St. Helena is located sup­
ported Eisenhower. The rural towns of Kentwood and Tangipahoa 
in ward one of Tangipahoa Parish were listed in the Republican 
column. To the south the ward with urban Hammond and Poncha- 
toula and the wards of the "gold coast" along Lake Pont- 
chartrain were also counted in favor of the Republican candidate* 
The majority of Jimmie Morrison's Sixth Congressional District, 
however, followed his lead in support of the Democratic party.
Having extended the discussion of presidential voting 
tendencies to an analysis on the ward level, it is now possible 
to take one step further in the isolation of leading tendencies
through a presentation of a correlation table showing the 
relationships between Republican support and that of certain 
other elections* Previously, analysis of the relationships 
between the support of various gubernatorial aspirants had 
pointed up the similarities and differences resulting from 
the Identification with regional and socio-economic groups# 
How, with an understanding of these tendencies, any correla­
tions existing between presidential support and gubernatorial 
support can be more concisely revealed* Besides the presenta­
tion of coefficients of correlation based on ward data, some 
rank-order computations have been made of parish support for 
a series of elections in which the emergent revolt of the 
"haves19 was a significant factor*
The tables here presented give clear indication that 
for 1952, at least, the relationship between voting in state 
and national elections was a close one* This is particularly 
true for what may be called the more conservative groups of 
voters* The general leading tendencies of groups within the 
electorate show stability in expression of voter choices* 
Moreover, the continuity of the Bourbon Democratic sentiment 
is more clearly tied with the so-called revolt of the "haves” 
from 19**8 on* Very obviously some unified group within the 
electorate shows a persistency revealing of a consciousness 
of identity or aspiration among its members.
Once again the distributive pattern of McLemore sup­
port provides the key to homogeneous relationships* The
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coefficient of correlation between McLemor© and Eisenhower 
support is relatively high because they were backed by the 
same portions of the electorate* With the exception of the 
relationship with the Kennon second primary vote* itself 
swelled by the votes of McLemore supporters* there is a gen­
eral blurring of correlation of the support of gubernatorial 
candidates and the Republican candidate* The political ambi­
valence of the middle class is reflected in the hesitation 
to give wholesale support for one candidate or another* The 
members of the groupings supporting McLemore* ranging toward 
the upper class limits* had no such difficulty shifting 
political allegiance*
The Kennon supporters of the second primary have 
better qualifications to emulate the political expressions 
of the elite groups* It consisted of McLemore followers and 
similar voters bent on leaning away from the center toward 
the political right. For there is virtually no correlation 
between the Eisenhower support and that for Kennon1s first 
primary backing* Kennon*s after-election climb onto the 
Elsenhower bandwagon must have seemed a pleasing gesture among 
the groups of Hhavesn and those who would find Identity with 
the upper class. There is safety in numbers, and the old 
Bourbons were well aware of the exigencies of political com­
binations *
Where the Republican support was high* corresponding 
support for Longism tended to be low. Comparisons with Long
TABLE IX
PRODUCT-MOMENT COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VOTE FOR EISENHOWER AND
LEADING GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATES, BY WARD, 1952*
Kennon Kennon Spaht Spaht
McLemore SasaM LeBlanp gAcal .SfiKKa JBg&L. ELcai SassaA.
Elsenhower -A532 4 M o ¥.030 • A o n  ..053 -.288 -.317 I • ♦r 0
♦Sources Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 1952; unpublished 
election returns, Office of Secretary or State.
TABLE X
RANK-ORDER COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VOTE FOR EISENHOWER 
AND SELECTS) CANDIDATES OR ELECTIONS, BY PARISH*
Kennon Second McLemore Kennon First Bixleerat 1<&8 
Eisenhower -/.61b- -/.518 -/.132 V.395
*Source* Compilation of Primary Election Returns, Louisiana, 19521 
Report of Secretary of State, 19^8f unpublished election 
returns, Office of Secretary of State.
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support, however, resulted In no strong negative coefficients. 
One of the major conclusions which must be forwarded, then, 
is that there was a blurring of traditional lines of cleavage, 
in the elections of 1952.
Rank-order computations did show on the parish level, 
what has been suggested from ward level analysis, the line of 
affinity of out«and*out Eisenhower support with the Kennon 
and McLemore backing and with the Dixiecrat defection of 
This traditional tendency, the unity of support for the domi­
nant minority, remained strong. Is it only coincidental that 
some of the highest Republican support in Louisiana was found 
within rural areas where the Negro tended to outnumber the 
whites? V. 0. Keyfs thesis, if valid, would require a strong 
Democratic majority in these wards.^ But Key wrote before 
1952, and it became clear during the campaign that the Dixie- 
crats of 19**B would find it expedient to make the jump into 
the Republican party. This was not a vote to ensure a solid 
Democratic party in Louisiana, it was a revolt aimed at gain­
ing complete ascendancy once more through a new political 
vehicle.
Members of this privileged group in 1952 extended the 
warm hand of welcome to all those who felt they could meet 
the qualifications. The most striking event of the presiden­
tial election, then, was the subtle hint that perhaps
25v . 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New Yorks Alfred 
A. Knopf, 19*^9J•
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political control might be enhanced and perpetuated if the 
Bourbon should don the cloak of the modern Republicans. 
Articulated in terms of a "crusade," Republicanism in modern 
garb was fitting vehicle to be used by the unreconstructed 
elite»
But members of the very groups against whom the Bour­
bon erected the bulwark of "white supremacy" and one-party 
rule voted in large enough number to thwart aspirations of 
Republican victory. The Negro tenant or farmer in Bourbon 
country appeared a mute reminder of the plantation pastf his 
city cousins helped turn the Republican tide of 1952 by mak­
ing a shift from his previous voting tendencies I
D. The Future of Louisiana Politics If it be cor­
rect that Louisiana experiences in the recent elections found 
counterparts in national politics, then the phenomena desribed 
by Samuel Lubell as requiring a new theory of political par­
ties must have been present and influential in the molding of 
Louisiana polities.2^ Changes in the social structure have 
produced within the American party system a break with the 
traditions and continuity of the past. The former political 
ideologies and party labels may remain, but it does not nec­
essarily follow that today's politicians are the heirs of
2^With apologies and appreciation for S. Lubell, The 
Future American Politics (New York* Harper and Bros.,
27Ibld.. p. 2Qh ft.
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earlier political movements* It is important, then, to in­
vestigate the presence of different groups who may find it 
convenient to speak in terms of the same ideological concepts 
and to isolate the specific voting elements with whom the 
appeals and slogans find favor#
The pattern of national political party struggle has 
been one of alternations between one party or another, of 
the success of a dominant majority party so long as it has 
managed to hold together the support of groupings of the 
electorate. In this process each new majority party brings 
with it an opposition of its own and succeeds through the 
timeliness of its appeal. Therefore, if the theory is valid, 
"the key to the political warfare of any particular period 
will be found in the conflict among the clashing elements in 
the majority party."2® A resume of the 1952 elections may 
substantiate the thesis of Mr. Lubell, and will most certainly 
provide an understanding of the leading trends of present- 
day Louisiana and possible pathways to the future.
The espousal of "independence" by the gubernatorial 
candidates in 1952 was indicative that the politician was 
feeling his way to new alignments of voter elements drawn 
from the Louisiana society which now manifested such change 
in the direction of industrial urbanity. Just as on the 
national scene there was doubt that the old Roosevelt-Truman
28Ibld.. p. 20^
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coalition of voter elements would “stick*1 and guarantee an­
other Democratic victory, so in Louisiana it appeared that 
new appeals must be made* Of course, the success of the Dixie- 
crat revolt of 19b8 must have convinced the anti-Longs, or the 
conservative candidates, that there were appreciably strong 
groups of voters ready to make their political choices in 
other than Long— anti-Long terms*
In the gubernatorial primaries the issues were cast 
In a liberal-conservative language, although all candidates 
were Democrats* In the late summer as the presidential cam­
paign became intense, however, the emergence of a two-party 
situation was noted, even though the choice was said to be 
for the “real” Democrats or the “Democrats for Eisenhower.**
The latter was a contradiction in terms, but was a safe slogan 
for the Bourbons to muster behind; then, if the Republican 
candidate should lose, the one-party struggle could be com­
menced again. The “haves” wanted their cake and to eat it too.
To win these contests it would be necessary to get out 
the electoral siIde-rule and make some calculations in po­
litical arithmetic. What were the groupings in the new Loui­
siana, and what were their desires? Parmer groups remained 
a numerically important element of the electorate. In gen­
eral it was found that this group continued to be Influenced 
by traditional Democratic tendencies and the support of 
Longism. However, the presence of previous consensus of 
opinion among the farmers was missing. There was a “defection*1
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In the farmer vote inasmuch as many who had found prosperity 
under Democratic and Long administrations were now naturally 
inclined to make identification with groups and classes who 
manifested a more conservative leaning* Since they had "never 
had it so good," farmers might want to conserve their gains 
with an "independent" administration on the state level and 
a Republican one in Washington.
Members of planter groups might still think of them- 
selves as part of the Louisiana elite* and their political 
tendencies in 1952 would remain conservative. But whereas 
the traditional Republicanism of the south Louisiana sugar 
planters would insure their participation in the Independent 
and Eisenhower causes* the logic for the support of the Bour­
bon cotton planters started from a different premise. The 
Bourbon was seeking a safe bet in backing the conservative 
candidates. States* rights was the dogma which had replaced 
White Supremacy* though in either case the end result was the 
quest for political domination.
Yet the key to the elections of 1952 lay in aligning 
the support of elements of the new "urban frontier." It was 
the votes of labor and the middle classes which swung the 
vote conservative or liberal. The re-emergence of the Negro 
in Louisiana politics was also an urban phenomenon* and al­
though his number was relatively small* it represented a 
block vote large enough to influence the outcome of the elec­
tions. The Negro* as generally the worker* had made the
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observation that it was the Democratic party nationally which 
had furthered his interests* The middle classes showed no 
such certainty of where support should be placed, although 
again this paralleled national experience, and in 1952 the 
mood of the middle class appeared to be a conservative one*
The year 1952 takes on meaning in retrospect —  
two-party politics was an objective fact even if in the elec- 
tions of that year the people had subjectively denied it*
In the new Louisiana the values and symbols of past politics 
are in the process of adjustment to present-day realities* 
There are new groupings with interests demanding attention* 
Louisiana has once more become a copy of American society —  
middle class, urban, Industrial, with an acceptance of 
welfare-lsm, and faced with the fact of emerging Negro freedom. 
Yet the traditional tendencies have hung on. Bqth 
farmer whites and city colored have found Longism and the 
national Democratic party can do something for them. But per­
haps the Republican party can provide solution for the prob­
lems of the present day and become a force in the state*
The memory of past tendencies may remain an influence, but 
in the emergent situation of the present will be found the 
basis for the future of Louisiana politics.
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION
This study has analysed factors influencing voting be« 
havior in Louisiana. Move than that* using assumptions and 
methodology of political ecology as a research tool, emphasis 
has focused upon historical experiences, interests, and 
social values which have influenced political choices. 
Analysis of the geographic distribution of voting support 
in a great number of elections has revealed the presence of 
subregions within the state where existed different "politi­
cal climates" of great persistence.
In the characterization of persistent climates of 
opinion it has been necessary to demonstrate the relation 
between "regional" and "class" factors in voting behavior. 
Processes of social differentiation have worked to produce 
a number of groups within Louisiana society, each of which 
has sought to perpetuate its interests through the expression 
of the ballot; in fact a striking aspect of political tenden­
cies in Louisiana has been the actions of social groupings 
In various areas of the state which have at different times 
utilized the ballot to further particular interests and in­
terpretations of the ends of society. Political attitudes
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were expressive of cumulative experiences* of developed ways 
of life found in certain social strata*
Voting behavior has revealed the antagonisms as well 
as the accomodations which different groups have experienced« 
Since groups making up the social strata of Louisiana society 
have tended to predominate certain regions of the state* 
analysis through political ecology has been extremely useful*
A very striking differential might be expected between south 
French-Catholic and north Anglo-Saxon-Protestant Louisiana* 
an opposition in cultural backgrounds* there has been found 
antagonism* yes; but in south Louisiana assimilation has like­
wise been active* producing a blending of Anglo-American and 
German elements to French-Spanish society and culture* this 
is revealed most notably in the area of religion*
The reader might object* in fact* that this study has 
in a one-sided way emphasised class differentials as influ­
encing voting behavior to the neglect of religious factors*
But religion has been found to play a rather secondary role 
in Louisiana politics* With the minor exception of 1928* 
when south Louisiana voted heavily Democratic in favor of the 
Catholic* Alfred Smith* in the presidential election* the 
analysis of voting behavior points more certainly in the direc­
tion of socio-economic influences* Political choices have 
been made by social groupings in favor of very definite 
economic interests* factors emergent from ecological processes. 
From the beginning, Louisiana society had concern for
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and dedication to the continuance of aristocracy* The planter 
aristocracy, whether based on sugar in south Louisiana or on 
cotton in north Louisiana, had vested Interests to protect*
And in alliance with men of commerce, the planters maintained 
"gentleman rule." There was found a circulation of the po­
litical elite, only the circulation was generally within and 
between the same dominating social groupings of certain re­
gions of the state. Here was a replica of Western European 
soeiety of the nineteenth century. The latter-day Louisiana 
model might be watered down with the reception of the nouveau- 
riche by the class of old wealth, but the predisposition to 
play the role of the aristocrat has remained.
Xet, any aristocracy is by definition limited in member* 
ship. It would derive from those areas of the state where 
plantation economy was employed in the utilisation of natural 
resources. But since Louisiana had embraced an Anglo-Saxon 
type of representative government, the "people" of the society 
—  and this meant specifically the farmer class and later the 
worker class ~  potentially at least would enjoy a numerical 
superiority. And the ecology of Louisiana was such that it 
is quite simple to demonstrate the political tendencies of 
these societal groups when and where they practiced suffrage.
In the two decades before i860, planters of sugar and 
cotton country, whether originally Whig or Democrat, tended 
to find the ends of aristocracy more nearly achievable within 
Whiggery. However, the persistent migration of Democratic
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farmers and laborers into north and southwest Louisiana and 
into Hew Orleans upset the basis for the planter domination* 
The traditional appeal of Jacksonian Democracy was more timely 
and received the die-hard support of those farmers and labor­
ers who enjoyed suffrage —  and these were considerable 
despite their manifest lack of party control* The Democratic 
party became dominant through the main factor of numbers and 
because the Whig political philosophy found in general no 
place for the "people*n
The sugar planters and the cotton planters of the 
Mississippi delta country might find rapprochement within the 
ranks of Whiggery* Planters within the Florida parishes and 
upper class elements of New Orleans might gain political as­
cendancy through the Democratic party with the aid of the 
vote of the farmer and the worker* But the farmer from the 
hills was voting Democratic from Jacksonian preference, whereas 
the dominating members of the party had other interests to 
forward* Moreover, the Whig party became disorganized in the 
fifties and former members found but short-lived respite in 
the ranks of the American party*
The Issues of slavery, then, must be resolved within 
the dominant Democratic party. But factional strife was such 
that the problems and possible answers were never met nor 
solved* Secession became inevitable as the traditional po­
litical processes became ineffective* The possibility of reso­
lution or compromise was lost in the directionless drift to
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Secession.
At the end of the Civil war, the Republican party* was 
to become dominant. With the manipulations of political ad­
venturers, whose success rested upon the vote of the Negro, 
the Bourbons in emergence could point to a clearly untenable 
situation and gain the support of the "people,11 the white 
farmers and laborers. Since domination shifted to the Bour­
bons through their erection of the dogma of white supremacy 
as the raison dyetre of the Democratic party, the numerical 
potential of the Negro at the polls must be destroyed.
Whereas a voice of moderation might have been established in 
the years between l86*f and 1868, when the Louisiana Unionists 
attempted to reconstruct the Democratic party and forward the 
rebuilding of the war-ravaged state, the ex-Conf©derates gave 
short notice that the new should rest upon their interpreta­
tion of the old. The struggle for power became naked.
Again, as a generation previously, political processes 
became ineffective. The Bourbon-Lilywhites maneuvered to 
diminish the Negro strength at the polls while at the same 
time they encouraged the white farmers of the hills to support 
the Cause. And either through intimidation or the fact that 
the dominant minority controlled the economic as well as the 
political life of the state, the poor and white displayed a 
remarkable solidarity in support of the Democratic party in 
the decade of the 1880's. However, just as the farmer fac­
ing the crisis of Secession indicated that he concurred in a
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situation over which he had no control9 so now the threat of 
economic ruin in the 1890*8 became more important than the 
maintenance of white supremacy#
The farmers in north Louisiana in the parishes elus- 
tered about the central hills found a vehicle for protest, 
this time. The platform of the peoplefs party was timely and 
in fusion with the Republican party enough voting strength 
could be mustered to gain political power and avert financial 
disaster. It was now clear that the Issue was one ©f party 
representation. The farmer had supported the Democratic 
party from tradition, without looking behind the label, and 
events proved that the suffrage of the "people” had been a 
privilege of little value. In Populism, farmer groups in 
Louisiana, whether in the hills of north Louisiana or in the 
Florida parishes, in the prairies of southwest Louisiana, or 
along the bayous of south Louisiana, could gain political 
footing equal to that of the self-styled aristocrats.
The Populist "bubble” was burst, however, in bitterly 
fought elections when the Bourbons barely gained majority sup­
port over the Fusion* The great two-party tradition of this 
country had found ideological support in the opposing phil­
osophies of Hamilton and Jefferson, but while there might be 
differences of opinion, there was likewise consensus that 
they should be resolved through resort to the suffrage, in 
compliance with established rules of procedure. The Bourbons 
put aside the rules in gaining political ascendancy. And
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their action was the more striking because it was within the 
bounds of legality, the Constitution of 1896 disenfranchised 
the Negro all right , but also many thousand white farmers and 
workers, whose vote a decade or so before had aided the 
lour bon overthrow of the Republican party born of Reconstruc­
tion, In so doing, the great movement of the "people" was 
averted, The poor and white were expendable In the Bourbon 
scheme of things; social problems would be resolved through 
political action if, when, and how the Democratic minority 
party decided,
After 1900 Louisiana was aptly labeled a "one-party 
state.” The Bourbon had created a situation where only one 
party could possibly function without overthrowing the domi­
nant minority. Moreover, the Bourbon split with the past, 
for he did not display the same sense of political responsi­
bility which had been the Whigs’, nor the feeling for the 
interests of the common man which had characterised the Jack­
sonian, In such a situation machine politics could flourish. 
And even the "reforms" such as proposed by Governor Parker did 
not strike at the root of the matter, for the one party re­
mained dominant* Yet the opposition created by the actions 
of the Democratic elite was potentially explosive and numeri­
cally strong, For slightly more than one hundred years a 
favored few had enjoyed the fruits of Louisiana society In 
unequal proportions.
An analysis of the geographic distribution of voting
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tendencies over a period of more than a hundred years reveals 
a continuity of ecological influences. Farmer groups in the 
bloc of parishes which gave near one hundred per cent support 
to the Bourbons in the l890*s stiffered economic reversals and 
deprivations never righted; here was motivation for a per­
sistent solidarity* The Democratic party was compelled to 
gain ascendancy over the "Black" Republicans* Perhaps more 
emphasis than has previously been made should be pointed at 
the extreme differential between farmer-laborers and planter- 
commercial-industrial interests, between the "have nots" and 
the "haves."
Redress was finally achieved by socially and economi­
cally deprived groups of Louisiana citisens within the one- 
party state with the advent of Huey Long* The assurance of 
the emergence of a movement such as Longism was found in the 
backing of farmer and labor groups which the Bourbons had sub­
ordinated* And precedents for strong«*armed political methods 
were not lacking either. Longism, whatever else may be said 
of it, fulfilled the movement of the frustrated Populists, 
held back for a quarter of a century. The momentum of the 
success of Long candidates with the lower classes was so great 
that until 1952, at least, elections in Louisiana were the 
scene of struggles between Long and "reform" factions, neither 
willing to set a new pattern of action radically different 
from traditions of the past. The solid core of Long support 
remains in the regions of the state where the farmer
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predominates and in urban areas where laborers are numerous#
As was true of the success of the "New Deal" on the 
national level, Longism brought unprecedented numbers to the 
polls and nearly all groups within society found a vehicle of 
political expression whereby societal needs might be voiced*
By 1952 it was apparent that two-party politics was a fact, 
in voting behavior if not in name. Louisiana society had been 
transformed under the Impact of industrialization, and po­
liticians must attempt to gain the support of members of 
social strata whose preferences were untested or unknown#
This phenomenon gave rise to the appearance of "independent" 
candidates.
Analysis of the 1952 gubernatorial elections, however, 
demonstrated that whereas the electorate displayed political 
attitudes and was composed of elements similar to those of 
the national scene, yet the tendencies and traditions of the 
past were still influential# Although a numerically increas­
ing middle class had emerged in Louisiana, whose political 
preference tended to the right of center, the farmer and the 
worker showed continued adherence to the Long faction on the 
local level and preference for the Democratic party on the 
national scene# Upper class groups of planters and business 
men continued to vote anti—Long and anti—Democratic, looking 
for a safe shift to more conservative associations# The Negro 
had once more become an important factor In Louisiana politics 5 
Negro registration was another manifestation of the
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urbanisation of the state*
The result of the presidential ©lection of 19?2 made 
it clear that citizens from all levels of the social strata 
were making their political weight felt* The nearly fifty 
per cent split of the electorate and the identification of 
the support of Republicans and Democrats indicated that objec­
tively a two-party system in Louisiana is quite possible and 
probable* Factions within the state Democratic party, though 
popularly identified by their leaders actually represent deep- 
seated cleavage over interests and issues* The traditional 
solidarity of the Democratic one-party system is breaking 
down as their socio-economic interests tend to draw the domi­
nant minorities into the Republican fold. The struggle for 
power continues, and at the present time it appears that the 
Louisiana experience with representative government, because 
of or in spite of the influence of the past, will be more 
genuinely democratic than ever before*
This study has adequately demonstrated, it is believed, 
that voting tendencies which may be discovered in the analy­
sis of crucial elections are rooted in persistent attitudes 
and traditions of different groups of citizens whose political 
choices further their interests. The methodology of political 
ecology enables the investigator to ascertain the multiplicity 
of factors influential in voting behavior and through careful 
selection to highlight the determinants of Louisiana politics* 
The ideas and institutions, and cumulative experiences of
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Louisiana citizens have been discussed and the continuity of 
leading political tendencies placed in historical perspective* 
The significance of this study for political sociology 
is fourfold* In the first place* it has been demonstrated 
that the methodology of political ecology is eminently satis­
factory for the Investigation of the sociology of political 
life* Secondly* it has shown that whether analysis is made 
of selected Hcrucial” elections or in historical depth* fac­
tors of tradition as well as elements of change influence po­
litical choices* Thirdly* this study has demonstrated the 
importance of placing emphasis on the process of social dif­
ferentiation* on the groups and groupings within a society 
which support parties or movements* Finally, the importance 
of social classes and the correspondence of differentials in 
social strata and in voting behavior* even under a one-party 
regime* have been emphasized* The struggle for political 
power is real* and the political sociologist through ecologi­
cal analysis gains an Insight into this important social 
process•
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